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Abstract 
In the early 1990s, MNEs came under public scrutiny for their irresponsible sourcing practices, 
after revelations that their supplier’s workers in developing countries were working under 
exploitative conditions. Nevertheless, irresponsible behaviour and poor working conditions in 
global supply chains remain contemporary issues in developing countries. Managing corporate 
social responsibility issues in global supply chain is an important area of research. However, 
research has mainly focused on the business case for CSR: determining the positive impact CSR 
initiatives may have on corporate performances. Contrary to the business case for CSR, this 
master’s thesis assumes that there is a negative relationship between supplier CSI and MNEs sales 
performances. 
 
The literature review of this thesis is mainly built around the corporate social responsibility 
literature and the attribution theory literature. The research model and related hypothesis are 
derived from previous research in those fields. The empirical data was collected in spring 2017 
through an online self-administered vignette-based experiment survey. Walloon consumers were 
set as the studied population. The data collection resulted in 202 observations for each vignette. 
The empirical data was analysed with descriptive statistics and factor analysis and the examination 
of the relationships derived from the research model is done by means of structural equation 
modeling. 
 
In studying how consumers react to supply chain incidents and how supply chain incidents impact 
sales of MNEs, I find that consumers negatively react to supply chain incidents caused by 
irresponsible suppliers and consumers negative reactions deteriorate sales of MNEs through 
boycott. Those findings contribute to existing international business research by demonstrating 
that contrary to the business case for CSR there is a negative relationship between supplier CSI 
and MNEs sales performances because understanding what factors impact sales performances of 
MNEs and whether consumers can affect MNEs sales is key to incite MNEs to address their 
suppliers’ irresponsible behaviour and to eliminate CSI behaviour from supply chains. This would 
therefore resolve supply chain social issues and improve working conditions in supply chains. 
 
Additionally, those findings have managerial implications. Indeed, supplier CSI negative impact 
on MNEs sales suggest a fundamental revision of offshoring advantages and disadvantages. This 
paper suggest that captive offshoring is most fitted to address consumer negative reaction to supply 
chain incidents and related sales decrease while maintaining most of the advantages derived from 
offshoring. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
As early as they started to exist, Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) have been accused of 
irresponsible behaviour. Starting in the first half of the 17th century, the English East India 
Company was among the first organizations to internationalize its activities but it was also the 
first multinational to be accused of irresponsible behaviour. (Micklethwait and Woolridge, 
2003). However, irresponsible behaviour and poor working conditions in global supply chains 
remain a contemporary issue especially in developing countries (Soundararajan and Brown, 
2016) where fast fashion MNEs offshore their production.  
In the early 1990s, fast fashion MNEs came under public scrutiny for their irresponsible 
sourcing practices, after revelations that their suppliers’ workers in developing countries were 
working under exploitative conditions (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014). Companies such 
as Nike, Disney, Benetton and Adidas were publicly pressured and held responsible for the 
social irresponsible behaviour of their suppliers (Anisul Huq et al., 2014). Following those 
scandals, fast fashion MNEs integrated social sustainability aspects as fundamental parameters 
of purchasing and sourcing decisions (Carter and Rogers, 2008; Pagell and Wu, 2009) and have 
implemented social auditing schemes, also called corporate codes of conducts (Lund-Thomsen 
and Lindgreen, 2014). However, these measures have brought limited working conditions 
improvements for the labour in developing countries (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014). 
Despite these recent evolutions, poor working conditions in global supply chains remain a 
contemporary issue in the garment industry (Soundararajan and Brown, 2016) although 
numerous academic papers have been produced about fast fashion (Barnes and Lea-Greenwood, 
2006; Barnes and Lea-Greenwood, 2010; Gabrielli et al., 2013), there is a lack of research on 
CSR practices within fast fashion MNEs active in the fast fashion industry (Arrigo, 2013). 
In recent times, fast fashion MNEs came again under public scrutiny for their irresponsible 
sourcing practices. On September 2012, shortly after being certified SA8000, a Pakistani 
garment factory located in Karachi burst into flames killing more than 300 workers (Walsh and 
Greenhouse, 2012). On November 2012, a Bangladeshi factory in Dhaka burnt down killing 
112 workers despite extensive social auditing performed by Western MNEs (Yardley et al., 
2012). And on April 2013, The Bangladeshi factory called Rana Plaza collapsed killing more 
8 
 
than 1,100 workers (Yardley, 2013). The three factories, located in developing countries, were 
producing garments for fast fashion MNEs located in developed countries. These recent 
dramatic incidents illustrate that there is still progress to be made in terms of social 
sustainability in developing countries. Fast fashion MNEs struggle to address and manage 
supply chain related social sustainability issues (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012) and to improve 
the working conditions of upstream suppliers (Matos and Hall, 2007).  
1.2 Research problem and gap 
Managing corporate social responsibility issues in global supply chain management has become 
an important area of research (Soundararajan and Brown, 2016). A great deal of research about 
environmental issues in global supply chain management has been produced (Carter and 
Rogers, 2008; Seuring and Müller, 2008; Ashby et al., 2012). Environmental issues in supply 
chains have been better addressed in theory and in practice than social issues because 
environmental issues can be addressed through technical regulations (e.g. limitation of CO2 
emissions) with measurable results. As Escobar and Vredenburg (2011, p.43) argue: 
“technically oriented regulations are easier to enforce and adopt than broader and complex 
regulations that require MNE’s allocation of resources to social issues”. Although, for the last 
three decades the social agenda has been entering the supply chain management theory and 
practice, there is a lack of research addressing the social aspects of CSR (Carter and Rogers, 
2008; Reuter et al., 2010; Sarkis et al., 2010). 
The absence of an international framework for global justice in supply chains (Soundararajan 
and Brown, 2016) and the weak regulatory frameworks of developing countries (Djankov and 
Ramalho, 2009) partly explain why working conditions improvements have been limited. 
Because of the absence of an international framework for global justice in supply chains, the 
absence of financial penalties and because they are not liable for the wrongdoing of their 
suppliers, firms have no financial incentives to improve conditions. In addition, improvement 
in working conditions in global supply chains has often been characterized by initiatives that 
were economically sustainable and driven by fast fashion MNEs willing to maintain the quality 
of the supplied products over the social needs of the workers (Crane et al, 2014; Soundararajan 
and Brown, 2016).  The improvement of working conditions in supply chains depends on the 
economic profitability of such initiatives. The positive impacts CSR initiatives may have on 
corporate performances has been subject to a lot of research. Researchers have tried to 
determine whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) leads to enhanced financial 
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performances (McGuire et al., 1988; Simpson and Kohers, 2002; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; 
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Trudel and Cotte, 2009) or they have tried to demonstrate whether 
responsible supply chain practices led to competitiveness and economic performance (King and 
Lenox, 2002; Rao and Holt, 2005; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Vilanova et al., 2009; Carroll and 
Shabana, 2010; Gregory et al., 2014). The idea that CSR initiatives bring economic added value 
to corporations is usually referred as “the business case for CSR”. Partisans of the business case 
for CSR argue that if CSR initiatives improve firms’ financial performances, firms will be 
willing to develop CSR initiatives and make their operations more responsible. But findings on 
that matter remain inconclusive (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001).  
Contrary to the business case for CSR that aims to establish a positive relationship between 
corporate social performances and corporate financial performances and elaborating from 
Grappi et al. (2013a) and Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen (2014), this master’s thesis assumes 
that there is a negative relationship between supplier corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) and 
MNE sales performances (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014). Unlike the business case for 
CSR, it is believed that firms will be willing to eliminate corporate social irresponsible practices 
and make their operations more responsible because otherwise it deteriorates their financial 
performances.  
It is assumed that when confronted with irresponsible social practices in supply chains, NGOs 
and medias could bring sufficient pressure on fast fashion MNEs by organizing consumers 
boycott or by drawing attention via shaming campaigns. Consumer boycott are believed to 
impact MNEs sales performances and should force fast fashion MNEs to improve the working 
conditions of their suppliers via corporate codes of conducts for example. (Locke et al., 2009; 
Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014). Sweetin et al. (2013) discovered that consumers were 
more likely to punish and less likely to reward socially irresponsible firms in comparison with 
socially responsible firms. They also found that the purchase intention and the brand attitude 
were lower for the socially irresponsible firms compared to the socially responsible firms 
(Sweetin et al., 2013). From their findings, Sweetin et al. (2013) conclude that customers are 
willing to punish firms for CSI actions or activities. 
International trade is evolving and the concept of CSR in global supply chains is changing with 
it. Multinational enterprises and, in this case, fast fashion MNEs are more often held responsible 
not only for their operations in their home country but also for the activities of their global 
suppliers even if they are not linked together through shared ownership. (Andersen and Skjoett-
Larsen 2009; Maloni and Brown 2006, Soundararajan and Brown, 2016). Hartmann and 
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Moeller (2014) discovered the existence of chain liability effect which implies that customers 
hold multinationals enterprises responsible for the environmental irresponsible behaviour of 
their suppliers and entails negative sales performances for firms. However, whether this holds 
true considering the social dimension of CSR in a global supply chain context, has not yet been 
studied. 
1.3 Research questions 
Demonstrating the existence of a chain liability effect in supply chains could encourage fast 
fashion MNEs to take wiser management decision and would incite them to make their supplier 
improve the working conditions and commit to CSR principles. On the other hand, the absence 
of a chain liability effect could motivate formal and unformal institutions to vote new and more 
stringent regulations to ensure chain liability and global justice. Fast fashion MNES offshore 
their production to emerging/developing countries and consumer reaction to supply chain 
incidents and potential negative consequences for sales performances could be a call for a 
fundamental questioning of offshoring practices (Grappi et al., 2013a). Therefore, the main 
objective of this research is to find out how does supplier corporate social irresponsibility 
impact MNEs sales performances? 
In order to find out how does supplier corporate social irresponsibility impact MNEs sales 
performances the present study adopts a consumer approach. The objective of the consumer 
approach is to find evidence whether consumers purchase behaviour is impacted by corporate 
social irresponsibility in supply chains. As an attempt to provide an answer to this question, the 
current paper assesses consumer reaction to supply chain incidents by studying study how 
consumers attribute the responsibilities of a negative event (Weiner, 1980, 1986 and 1995; 
Lange and Washburn, 2012; Hartmann and Moeller, 2014) and how customer’s belief about 
responsibilities and related emotion translate into actions potentially impacting MNEs 
performances (Weiner, 1995; Folkes and Kamins, 1999; Bougie et al., 2003; Watson and 
Spence, 2007; Kalamas et al., 2008; Funches, 2011, Lindenmeier et al., 2012) by means of 
presenting consumers with supply chain incidents caused by irresponsible suppliers. Therefore, 
this research asks: how do consumers react to supply chain incidents?  
In addition to researching how consumers react to supply chain incidents, the findings need to 
be contextualised and analysed in order to explain how do supply chain incidents impact sales 
of MNEs. The consequences on MNE sales and related financial performances may encourage 
MNE to adopt more responsible supply chain practices (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014).  
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The main research question is answered by providing answers to the two sub questions. The 
first research sub question is answered by assessing customer responsibility attribution, 
customer anger and customer boycott intentions when confronted to supply chain incidents 
caused by irresponsible supplier behaviour. The answer to the second research sub question is 
inferred from the results of the first research question and discussed in the discussion chapter 
(see chapter 5. Discussion). 
To conclude the research problem and gap, the current study aims to bring answers to the 
following research questions:  
1. How does supplier corporate social irresponsibility impact MNEs sales 
performances? 
a. How do consumers react to supply chain incidents? 
b. How do supply chain incidents impact sales of MNEs? 
Through these research questions, this thesis aims to demonstrate the presence or absence of a 
chain liability effect for OSH incidents. In addition, I believe that understanding what factors 
impact the performances of MNEs and whether consumers can have an effect is key to incite 
MNEs to address their suppliers’ irresponsible behaviour to improve working conditions by 
eliminating CSI behaviour and practices and therefore resolving supply chain social issues.  
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1.4 Definitions 
This section of the introduction chapter provides definitions of important concepts and terms 
present in this thesis. It is worth noting that some notions covered in this thesis are not defined 
here but in the literature review, mainly because their definitions are a point of discussion in 
the literature and it is therefore worth dealing with them in depth. This section also gives 
precision about terms that are used interchangeably. 
Chain liability 
In a supply chain context, chain liability must be understood as: “the causal inferences by which 
consumers attribute responsibility for unsustainable supplier behaviour to a focal firm” 
(Hartmann & Moeller, 2014, p.282). Chain liability is a cognitive process. For Hartmann and 
Moeller (2014), unsustainable supplier behaviour refers to behaviours resulting in 
environmental wrongdoing/incident. However, the current study focuses only on social issues 
and unsustainable behaviour refers to supplier behaviour resulting in OSH incident. The 
definition also mentions a “focal firm”. The focal firm is the firm to which consumers attribute 
responsibilities. In this thesis, the focal firms are the fast fashion MNEs. 
Corporate Social Irresponsibility 
Strike et al. (2006, p.852) define CSI as: “the set of corporate actions that negatively affects an 
identifiable social stakeholder’s legitimate claims”. 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
The CSR definition the current study adheres to is the definition of Blowfield and Frynas 
(2005). They define CSR as: “an umbrella term for a variety of theories and practices all of 
which recognize the following: (a) that companies have a responsibility for their impact on 
society and the natural environment, sometimes beyond legal compliance and the liability on 
individuals; (b) that companies have a responsibility for the behaviour of others with whom 
they do business (e.g., within supply chains); and (c) that business needs to manage its 
relationship with wider society, whether for reasons of commercial viability or to add value to 
society” (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005, p.503). 
Multinational Enterprises 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are at the centre of the present study since it will be 
investigating how corporate social irresponsibility at supplier level, via consumer behaviour, 
impact their performances. But what are MNEs? The most suitable definition of an MNE, for 
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the current study, is the one of Cantwell, Dunning and Lundan (2010, p.569) in line with 
Dunning and Lundan (2008), they define the MNE as: “a coordinated system or network of 
cross-border value-creating activities, some of which are carried out within the hierarchy of the 
firm, and some of which are carried out through informal social ties or contractual relationships. 
Thus, an MNE is not defined solely by the extent of the foreign production facilities it owns, 
but by the sum of all its value-creating activities over which it has a significant influence. These 
activities may involve foreign sourcing of various intermediate inputs, including the sourcing 
of knowledge, as well as production, marketing and distribution activities”. The MNE definition 
cited above is particularly relevant for this master’s thesis because it specifically states that the 
network of an MNE can be made of contractual relationships and because it states that MNEs 
are not exclusively defined by their ownership structure. Both elements are particularly 
important for MNEs evolved in the garment or the electronic industry because these two 
industries are characterized by MNEs outsourcing their production to developing/emerging 
countries but not necessarily by owning production facilities there. 
Occupational safety and health  
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has identified and defined basic principles 
relating to OSH. In 1984, ILO stated that: “work should take place in a safe and healthy working 
environment and that conditions of work should be consistent with workers’ well-being and 
human dignity” (ILO, 1984). According to Alli (2008, p.17): “all workers have rights. Workers, 
as well as employers and governments, must ensure that these rights are protected and must 
strive to establish and maintain decent working conditions and a decent working environment”. 
Building from this, the present study defines an OSH incident as an incident where workers are 
killed or injured due to unsafe and unhealthy working environment and/or where working 
conditions do not respect workers’ well-being and human dignity. In the text, OSH issues and 
OSH incidents are often referred to as social issues and social incidents.  
Offshoring 
Offshoring is a business practice related to outsourcing. As defined by Contractor et al. (2010, 
p.1417), outsourcing is a: “conscious abdication of selected value chain activities to external 
providers”. The activities can be outsourced in the home country of the firm or to a foreign 
country. However, offshoring exclusively pertains to the transfer of activities that were 
previously carried out in the home country of a firm to a foreign location (Murtha et al., 2006). 
The offshored activities are either performed by a subsidiary of the MNE or by a contracted 
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partner/supplier (Contractor et al., 2010). The difference between offshoring and outsourcing 
matters because the current study is exclusively concerned with fast fashion MNEs offshoring 
the manufacturing of their production to developing countries. 
Supply chain management 
MNEs rely on foreign sourcing to create value (Cantwell, Dunning and Lundan, 2010). MNEs 
have adopted vertical integration strategies and rely extensively on suppliers to carry out their 
production (Tokatli, 2008). Handfield and Nichols (1999) define supply chain as encompassing 
“all activities associated with the flow and transformation of goods from raw materials stage 
(extraction), through to the end user, as well as the associated information flows. Material and 
information flow both up and down the supply chain”. And therefore, supply chain management 
(SCM) is: “the integration of these activities through improved supply chain relationships to 
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage” (Handfield and Nichols, 1999). The supply chain 
management concept is essential to understand the evolutions of MNEs developed in the next 
section. 
Supplier Corporate social irresponsibility 
A recurrent notion of this thesis is the idea of supplier corporate social irresponsibility also 
referred to as supplier irresponsible behaviour. Hartmann and Moeller (2014, p.281) define 
unsustainable supplier behaviour as: “supplier behaviours that reduce ecological capital and 
harm the environment; it differs from poor performance or supplier wrongdoing, which instead 
imply general deviance from basic supply chain management objectives (e.g., cost, quality, 
service, flexibility)”. Elaborating on Hartmann and Moeller (2014) and on the CSI definition 
of Strike et al. (2006), in the present study supplier corporate irresponsibility refers to suppliers’ 
actions and/or behaviours and/or wrongdoing leading to lead to an occupational safety and 
health incident that negatively affects an identifiable social stakeholder (e.g. workers). In the 
present study, the terms “supplier irresponsible supplier behaviour”, “irresponsible supplier 
behaviour” or supplier corporate social irresponsibility are used interchangeably.  
Sustainable supply chain management 
Recently, the supply chain management literature evolved from standalone point of view on 
social and environmental issues to embrace the concept of sustainability. The supply chain 
management field recently witnessed the emergence of a sustainable supply chain management 
field in the academic literature (Carter and Easton, 2011). Seuring and Müller (2008, p.1700) 
define sustainable supply chain management as: “the management of material, information and 
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capital flows as well as cooperation among companies along the supply chain while taking goals 
from all three dimensions of sustainable development, i.e., economic, environmental and social, 
into account which are derived from customer and stakeholder requirements”. The sustainable 
supply chain management concept captures the idea that cooperation between supply chain 
actors is necessary to achieve sustainability and that sustainable initiatives are derived from 
stakeholders’ requirements. However, a large body of the sustainable literature relating to 
supply chain concerns green supply chain management (GSCM) or environmental initiatives. 
Recent reviews of the sustainable supply chain management literature found that the 
environmental dimension is better represented and more developed than the social dimension 
(Carter and Rogers, 2008; Ashby et al., 2012). This paper focuses exclusively on the social 
aspect of sustainability. Social sustainability relates to the management of human and societal 
capital (Sarkis et al., 2010). 
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1.5 Thesis structure 
First, the literature introduces fast fashion as a business model, addresses the issues relating to 
offshoring productions to developing countries and particularly the working conditions of 
developing country suppliers, discusses the macro-economic drivers shaping offshoring 
practices and explain the emergence and the advantages of offshoring by means of the OLI and 
DLE frameworks. The literature then discusses responsibilities in supply chain and argues for 
the lack of accountability of fast fashion MNEs in the supply chain, goes on with MNEs 
motivations for the adoption of CSR principles and the global supply chain governance. Finally, 
the literature review argue that more importance should be given to corporate social 
irresponsibility and eliminating irresponsible practices rather than focusing on corporate social 
responsibility and implementing responsible practices. The research model developed to 
address the research question is then presented and argued for with the relevant literature. The 
theory regarding the research model is then followed by the development of the related 
hypotheses. 
Second, the methodology chapter discusses why the vignette-based survey experiments was 
selected as the appropriate methodology to test the hypotheses. The selection of the fast fashion 
MNEs included in the vignettes is justified and the three vignettes and related scenarios are 
presented and put in relation to the hypothesis. The methodology chapter also summarizes 
which population is studied, how the sample was produced, how the data was collected and the 
demographics of the respondents included in the sample. Afterwards, the statistical analysis 
method picked to perform the data analysis is presented. The data is analysed with structural 
equation modeling. 
Third, the empirical findings chapter presents the empirical results obtained from the structural 
equation modeling. The results are then discussed in relation to the research questions and the 
literature in the discussion chapter. Additionally, the OLI and DLE frameworks will be further 
used to discuss the findings and other outsourcing/offshoring practices available to fast fashion 
MNEs that are less subject to supplier irresponsible behaviour or that yield more control over 
the offshored activities and the advantages that can be derived from them.  
Finally, the conclusion chapter presents the main findings, theoretical contribution of this 
research, the managerial implications and the limitations and suggestions for future research. 
The last two chapters following the conclusion chapter are devoted to the list of references and 
the appendix. 
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2. Literature Review 
The literature review of this thesis is mainly built around the corporate social responsibility 
literature and the attribution theory literature. The research model and related hypothesis are 
derived from previous research in those fields. The first chapter of the literature review 
addresses fast fashion and related sourcing practices. The second chapter addresses corporate 
social responsibility in the context of MNEs and supply chains. The third chapter develop the 
research model of the current study. And finally, the last chapter of the literature review develop 
the hypothesis related to the research model.  
2.1 Fast fashion 
In the current study, fast fashion MNEs are multinational enterprises running global supply 
chain operating in the garment industry. The following sections aim to introduce fast fashion 
as a business model and explain the emergence and the success of offshoring among fast fashion 
MNEs. In addition, in order to understand offshoring and its related advantages it is discussed 
through the lens of an IB framework: the eclectic paradigm. 
2.1.1 Fast fashion: a business model and related issues 
Fast fashion has become an important field of research because it concerns the oversupplied 
and highly competitive garments industry; and because it disrupted the strategic approach to 
supply chain management (Barnes and Lea-Greenwood, 2006). Fast fashion is “a business 
strategy which aims to reduce the processes involved in the buying cycle and lead times for 
getting new fashion product into stores, in order to satisfy consumer demand at its peak” 
(Barnes and Lea-Greenwood, 2006, p. 259).  
Socio-cultural change in consumer’s lifestyle is a key factor explaining the outbreak of the fast 
fashion phenomenon. Consumers have become highly knowledgeable about fashion trends and 
trendy, disposable and affordable clothing as a manner to fulfil their needs and to adapt to their 
surroundings (Cachon and Swinney, 2011; Gabrielli et al., 2013). This approach to fashion is 
trans-generational: young consumers seek affordable and disposable clothes to be fashionable 
and mature consumers give up on expensive quality clothing to be able to renew their wardrobe 
more often (Bhardwaj and Fairhurst, 2010; Gabrielli et al., 2013). According to Doeringer and 
Crean (2004): “the key ingredients of fast fashion are the ability to track fashion trends quickly 
and to identify potentially popular new designs through daily proximity to fashion markets, 
fashion images and fashion makers”. Taking account of the nature of consumer demand causes 
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a shift from a push strategy (supply chains driven by buyer/supplier) towards a pull strategy 
(supply chain driven by consumer demand) for fashion production (Doyle et al., 2006; Sull and 
Turconi, 2008). 
The two most essentials aspects shaping the fast fashion business model are: lead time reduction 
and consumer demand (Barnes and Lea-Greenwood, 2010). First, fast fashion MNEs adapting 
their business strategies to get fashion products into store more quickly by reducing the time 
between production and distribution (Barnes and Lea-Greenwood, 2010; Cachon and Swinney, 
2011). Second, fast fashion MNEs constantly update product ranges throughout the season by 
means of in-season buying in order to offer trendy, fashionable and affordable products to 
consumers at any time (Barnes and Lea-Greenwood, 2010; Cachon and Swinney, 2011). In a 
fast fashion environment, time and cost are key parameters to satisfy customer demand (Bruce 
and Daly, 2006).  Therefore, to satisfy these constraints, fast fashion MNEs offshore their 
productions to many suppliers (Doyle et al., 2006). Different suppliers serve different purposes, 
as explained by Bruce and Daly (2006, p.332): “a company will have a variety of relationships 
ranging from close partnerships with key suppliers to develop products, through to distant 
relationships for a one-off purchase and an emphasis on getting the lowest price”. To ensure 
the flexibility of their supply chains, fast fashion MNEs often adopt an off-shore/local sourcing 
mix strategy (Bruce and Daly, 2006). Local suppliers reduce the time needed for production 
and delivery and off-shore-suppliers reduce the costs (Bruce and Daly, 2006). Brands such as 
H&M and ZARA have developed successful fast fashion strategies by offering constantly 
refreshed and affordable fashion products (Christopher et al., 2004).  
However, these evolutions impacting the operations of fast fashion MNEs have positive and 
negative impacts on developing countries. On the one hand, developing country economies 
benefit a great deal from the garment industry trading activities: the economic growth is boosted 
by the orders received by factories and a significant number of locals are provided with 
employment opportunities. The garment industry also offers opportunities to developed and 
developing economies to enter the global markets. (Gereffi, 1999; Soundararajan and Brown, 
2016). However, the garment industry has been recognized to have questionable labour 
practices. Poor working conditions, child labour, health and safety hazards, factory fires and 
building collapse incidents are characteristic of the garment industry. (Clarke and Boersma, 
2010; Lu, 2013; Soundararajan and Brown, 2016). Global competition compels fast fashion 
MNEs to minimize their production and distribution costs. Fast fashion MNEs are often accused 
of exploiting weak social standards in developing countries, damaging the social environment 
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to fulfil their quest for profit maximization (Arrigo, 2013). Economic and social performances 
of MNEs are subject to much public scrutiny from stakeholders but it is also the case for their 
suppliers’ performances (Vachon and Klassen, 2006).  
In the early 1990s, fast fashion MNEs came under public scrutiny for their irresponsible 
sourcing practices, after revelations that their supplier’s workers in developing countries were 
working under exploitative conditions (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014). And although 
since then the social conditions in the garment industry has been subject to much public 
attention (Maccarthy and Jayarathne, 2012), the recent deadly incidents, mentioned in the 
introduction chapter, have once again drawn global attention to the necessity of improving 
working conditions and more broadly the social standards in developing country factories 
(Anisul Huq et al., 2014). Failures to improve social conditions in global supply chains have 
resulted in a series of deadly factory fires and building collapses in Pakistan and Bangladesh in 
a span of just two years (Anisul Huq et al., 2014). The next section summarizes the macro-
economic drivers explaining the emergence of offshoring practices as a dominant sourcing 
practice in the garment industry. 
2.1.2 Macro-economic drivers shaping offshoring  
Two major trends, that are rather recent and concomitant, made MNEs operations evolved into 
what they are today and encouraged them to offshore their activities. These trends also partly 
explain why irresponsible practices still exist and why working conditions in supply chains 
have not drastically improved.  
The first trend that recently shaped MNEs is: globalization. In recent years, globalization has 
increased the speed of firms’ internationalization. As defined by Sideri (1997, p.38), 
globalisation is: “essentially a process driven by economic forces. Its immediate causes are: the 
spatial reorganisation of production, international trade and the integration of financial 
markets”. Profit maximization and cost leadership strategies have driven the garment industry 
and MNEs to search for cheaper manufacturing sites located in developing countries to offshore 
their activities (Cheung et al., 2009; Reuter et al., 2010) causing a spatial reorganisation of the 
global production. One factor explaining the spatial shift of the global garment production is 
institutional misalignment (Witt and Lewin, 2007). As explained by Witt and Lewin (2007, 
p.583) institutional misalignment refers to a situation where: “institutions are not aligned with 
the business requirements of firms, economic advantage may shrink or disappear, or even 
become an economic liability” (institutions and the institutional theory are further developed 
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and defined in section 2.2). Fast fashion MNEs face institutional misalignment because 
developed countries have established stringent labour regulations policies while most of 
developing countries often have lax social regulations. It became impossible for MNEs located 
in developed economies to compete with firms in developing countries. To counter the negative 
effect related to the institutional misalignment (Witt and Lewin, 2007) and to avoid stringent 
regulations, developed countries MNEs started to offshore their production to suppliers 
established in developing countries to reduce cost. Cost reductions were made possible because 
of existing differences on labour regulations between developed and developing countries 
(Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009). 
The second trend that shaped MNEs and particularly their structure and network is the shift in 
competition. Global competition shifted from “firm versus firm” to “supply chain versus supply 
chain” (Christopher, 2005; Gold et al., 2010 Soler et al., 2010), pushing MNEs to offshore their 
activities. It is not beneficial for MNEs to keep all operations in-house because some activities 
do not create enough value while being extensively costly. Globalization and the shift in the 
structure of the market competition (from firm competition to supply chain competition) 
transformed MNEs operations: offshoring emerged as an effective practice (Kedia and 
Mukherjee, 2009). To survive, firms were forced to spread their operations over external 
partners and over foreign markets (Contractor et al., 2010). It was not surprising to witness 
formerly producing corporations becoming brand manager firms (Moosmayer and Davis, 
2014). These evolutions made production processes less transparent and production 
intermediaries less visible for stakeholders. Offshoring helped MNEs to be more competitive 
and to make bigger profits but it is argued that it was at the expanse of the workforce and of the 
environment. In order to understand offshoring, the next section discusses the implications and 
advantages of offshoring by means of an international business framework: the OLI framework. 
2.1.3 Understanding offshoring  
The eclectic paradigm also referred to as the OLI framework developed by Dunning (1980) is 
a framework explaining firms’ rationale for internationalizing their activities or MNEs’ 
rationale for adopting some international strategies instead of others. The OLI framework 
developed by Dunning (1980) was originally meant to explain foreign direct investment 
decision by MNEs. OLI stands for Ownership, Location and Internalization and the framework 
proposes that MNEs decide to internationalize their operations based on these three variables. 
Ownership, location and internalization are three potential sources of advantage when operating 
abroad. The framework suggest that firm investment locations and entry modes are influenced 
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by these advantages. The ownership advantage refers to firm-specific competitive advantage to 
overcome the costs of foreign operations when pursuing foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
location advantage refers to the advantage of undertaking value adding activities in cities, 
regions, countries that are more attractive. And the internalization advantage refers to the 
creation and exploitation of unique capabilities/competencies and therefore its ability to reduce 
transaction costs. Differently said, ownership addresses the question why some firms 
internationalize their activities and become MNEs but not others; location addresses the 
question where MNEs internationalize their activities and internalization addresses the question 
what MNEs’ activities are internationalized. (Dunning, 1980, 1981). Dunning’s framework 
(1980) highlight the advantages that are specific to each form of market entry as shown in 
Figure 1. The FDI is the only form of market entry that provides the three types of advantages 
(see Figure 1). 
 
 
In the light of the OLI framework, offshoring practices confirm and challenge the eclectic 
paradigm (Doh, 2005). Doh (2005) argues that location advantages through cost-minimization 
strategies are believed to be the main motivation for offshoring practices. Additionally, an 
empirical study on US apparel producers found that offshoring the production to Asian 
countries rather than producing in the US could increase cost savings up to 26% but inducing 
substantial lead time (Kumar and Samad Arbi, 2007). Although offshoring is relevant for 
location advantages, the link is less evident for ownership and internalization advantages. Doh 
(2005) argue that the division and dissemination of production processes along different supply 
Figure 1. The OLI framework (Dunning, 1980) 
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chain tier may erode MNEs’ ownership and internalization advantages. However, Doh (2005) 
also highlights that offshoring production processes may be beneficial for MNEs operating in 
industries in which production does not provide distinct competencies. In the garment industry, 
building distinct competencies from the competitors depends more on product design and 
marketing capabilities than on mastering production processes. MNEs in the fast fashion 
industry offshore activities that are not bringing the essential value to the product. On the other 
hand, MNEs strengthen their expertise on activities they believe creates the most value for their 
product such as clothing design and marketing. Building a flexible and competitive supply 
chains has become key to running fruitful operations worldwide (Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009). 
Building from Doh (2005), Contractor et al. (2010) regard the OLI framework as ill-equipped 
to capture the strategic thinking behind offshoring decisions. According to Contractor et al. 
(2010) MNE activities offshored to foreign subsidiaries are a subset of FDI but MNE activities 
offshored to arm’s length suppliers are not included in the traditional theorization of FDI. 
Contractor et al. (2010, p.1418) argue that offshoring: “in a fuller sense, is the building of a 
global network whose strategic objectives go well beyond serving a local market, to a focus on 
global network efficiency and coherence”. Therefore, offshoring goes beyond the conventional 
and widespread conceptualization of FDI and beyond the development of country-specific 
advantages (Contractor et al., 2010). 
Taking account of Doh (2005) argument that the ownership and internalization advantages are 
less relevant to explain offshoring, Kedia and Mukherjee (2009) have adapted the OLI 
framework to provide a better understanding of why MNEs offshore their activities and a better 
understanding of the implications of offshoring. The OLI framework, proposes that 
internalization advantages can be gained from competitors by internalizing 
competencies/activities/processes that are crucial for value creation or by developing in-house 
expertise. However, Kedia and Mukherjee (2009) argue that offshoring practices are developed 
and implemented when there are advantages to be gained from competitors by disintegrating 
some processes into parts and by externalizing the parts that are not relevant for the core 
business or that are not essential for value creation. The macro-economic evolutions presented 
in the previous section characterizing the international business environment and impacting 
MNEs’ operations explain and justify the diminishing relevance of internalization advantages 
(Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009).  
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Therefore, to analyse and explain MNEs’ offshoring practices, Kedia and Mukherjee (2009) 
building from Dunning (1980) have developed the DLE framework. DLE stands for 
Disintegration, Location and Externalization. Disintegration advantages refer to the advantages 
to be gained from decoupling value chain activities, dividing processes into smaller parts. As 
in the OLI framework (Dunning, 1980), location advantages refer to the advantages of 
undertaking value adding activities in cities, regions, countries that are more attractive. And 
externalization advantages refer to the advantages gained from externalizing parts of the value 
chain activities to foreign suppliers/contractors. In order to understand differences in the 
sourcing practices of MNEs, Kedia and Mukherjee (2009) have developed a matrix categorizing 
sourcing practices depending on the disintegration advantages, location advantages and 
externalization advantages. Figure 2 is a graphical presentation of that matrix and related 
sourcing practices.  
  
Figure 2. DLE framework related sourcing practices (adapted from Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009) 
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As shown in Figure 2, four different outsourcing models have been identified: Domestic 
outsourcing, offshore-outsourcing, captive offshoring and in-house development. (Kedia and 
Mukherjee, 2009). However, in-house development refers to a situation in which disintegration 
advantages, location advantages and externalization advantages are low and therefore 
suggesting internalization advantages derived from the repatriation of value chain activities or 
development of in house expertise. Low disintegration advantages, low location advantages and 
low externalization characterizes the traditional internalization advantages proposed by 
Dunning (1980) in its OLI framework. The DLE framework (Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009) and 
the OLI framework (Dunning, 1980) are complementary. The prevalence of one framework 
over the other is dependent upon macro-economic factors that are subject to change in the future 
and consequently impacting MNEs operations. 
Fast fashion MNEs have developed offshore-outsourcing practices (referred to as offshoring in 
the current study). Offshore-outsourcing is characterized by high disintegration advantages to 
meet customer demands and to remain competitive. The location advantages stem from the low 
labour costs in developing countries. The externalization advantages stem from the costs 
savings obtained by offshoring the production to foreign suppliers/contractors rather than 
offshoring it a subsidiary of the MNE (captive offshoring). (Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009). Fast 
fashion MNEs, through the adoption of an off-shore/local sourcing mix strategy (Bruce and 
Daly, 2006) reduce production costs but increase lead time substantially (Kumar and Samad 
Arbi, 2007) by offshoring part of their garment production to off-shore suppliers in developing 
countries. The OLI and DLE frameworks will be further used to discuss the implications of the 
findings for offshoring and related advantages in relation to other offshoring/outsourcing 
practices available to MNEs (see section 5.4 of the discussion chapter). 
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2.2 Corporate social responsibility  
The CSR definition selected for the current study argue that MNEs should be responsible and 
liable beyond legal compliance and that MNEs have a responsibility for their suppliers’ 
behaviour (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005). The first section discusses whether MNEs should be 
held responsible and liable beyond legal compliance and if they should be held responsible for 
their suppliers’ behaviours. Afterwards, the chapter goes on by addressing MNEs motivations 
to develop CSR practices and covers the governance of global value chains to address MNEs 
response to pressures for implementing CSR practices within supply chains. Finally, the last 
section of the chapter argues that instead of focusing on motivations for implementing CSR 
practices, the efforts should be on motivations to eliminate CSI practices. 
2.2.1 Responsibilities in global supply chains 
The expansion of global supply chains generates questions about the scope of MNEs liability 
(Van Tulder et al, 2009). The numerous supplier irresponsible behaviour cases unveiled by the 
media draw public attention on responsibilities between supply chains actors. Blowfield and 
Frynas (2005, p.503) argue that: “companies have a responsibility for the behaviour of others 
with whom they do business (e.g., within supply chains)”. Considering Blowfield and Frynas’ 
definition (2005) of CSR, MNEs and in this case fast fashion MNEs should be held responsible 
not only for their operations in their home country but also for the activities of their global 
suppliers even if they are not linked together through shared ownership. (Andersen and Skjoett-
Larsen 2009; Maloni and Brown 2006, Soundararajan and Brown, 2016). After acknowledging 
the need of CSR in supply chains, researchers have moved on to understanding its challenges 
(Soundararajan and Brown, 2016). The notion of responsibilities in supply chains has been 
covered in some research under various terms including: corporate social responsibility in 
global supply chains (Amaeshi et al. 2008; Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen 2009, chain liability 
in multi-tier supply chain (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014), sustainable supply chain management 
(Seuring and Müller, 2008). 
However, there are arguments for and against MNEs accountability for supplier’s irresponsible 
behaviour. Scholars have diverging opinions and point of views about the scope of MNEs 
responsibilities in supply chains (Amaeshi et al., 2008; Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). 
Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen (2009, p.77) argue that commitment to CSR in supply chains 
implies that MNEs “are also held responsible for environmental and labour practices of their 
global trading partners such as suppliers, third party logistics providers, and intermediaries over 
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which they have no ownership”. For Amaeshi et al. (2008, p223), the concept of CSR created 
“a taken-for-granted assumption that firms should be accountable for the practices of their 
suppliers by espousing the moral (and sometimes legal) underpinnings of the concept of 
responsibility”. They argue that the only reason pushing pressure groups to target MNEs’ 
suppliers is because they have difficulties to target global brands directly. And that the pressure 
groups’ attacks have affected global brands’ reputation irrespective of the fact that it was the 
suppliers that were guilty of irresponsible practices (Amaeshi et al., 2008). For Amaeshi et al. 
(2008), MNEs should not bear responsibilities that are beyond their juridical walls. They argue 
that corporations are independent legal entities and that participating in a supply chain with 
other firms or having contractual relationships with suppliers does not extend the legal 
responsibilities of MNEs to the actions of their suppliers (Amaeshi et al., 2008). Additionally, 
around the globe, most legal systems define corporations as legal entities and it implies that 
corporations are legally independent from their employees, shareholders or suppliers (Amaeshi 
et al., 2008). 
According to Amaeshi et al. (2008), supply chains should not be viewed as an extension of the 
firm unless the firm and its supplier are linked through shared ownership. In this case, the 
supplier is de facto an extension of the firm. Because the firm has the legal power to influence 
the supplier’ decision and actions (Amaeshi et al., 2008). However, MNEs control over 
suppliers is not limited to situation of ownership. Indeed, it is argued that MNEs can control 
supplier’s operations over large distances without exercising ownership (Jenkins, 2001) and 
have sufficient power to control the supplier’s social practices (Ulstrup et al., 2013). MNEs are 
powerful actors in supply chains because of their market-power and their control over critical 
resources (Gereffi, 1994). According to Jenkins (2001, p.iii): “the growth of ‘global value 
chains’, through which Northern buyers control a web of suppliers in the South, has led to calls 
for them to take responsibility not only for aspects such as quality and delivery dates, but also 
for working conditions and environmental impacts”. Pedersen and Andersen (2006) nuance 
Jenkin’s argument and argue that the controllability of buyers on their suppliers depends on the 
bargaining power of the buyer on the suppliers and they do not exclude the possibility of a 
buyer having a weak bargaining power.  
One factor that should also be considered when discussing supplier controllability is 
geographical distance. Geographical distance influences the power buyers have over their 
suppliers (Elg and Hultman, 2011), the greater the distance, the more difficult it is for MNEs to 
control suppliers’ activities and practices (Ulstrup et al., 2013). And geographical distance is 
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negatively related to the adoption of responsible practices by suppliers (Awaysheh and Klassen, 
2010). On the one hand scholars consider that the power asymmetry between MNEs and 
suppliers is the cause of irresponsible business practices at supplier level. In this case, MNEs 
are powerful corporations driving supply chains and imposing their price and their requirements 
on suppliers. To survive to competitors and to fulfil MNEs orders, suppliers engage in unethical 
and irresponsible business practices. On the other hand, some scholars consider that the power 
asymmetry is a condition for suppliers to comply with responsible business practices (Locke et 
al, 2009) established by the buyer through, for example, codes of conduct. In this case, MNEs 
power drives suppliers to adopt responsible practices. It is argued that MNEs power over 
suppliers can induce a multiplier effect and incite sub-suppliers to adopt responsible practices 
(Preuss, 2001).  
Because irresponsible behaviour and poor working conditions in global supply chains remain a 
contemporary issue especially in developing countries (Soundararajan and Brown, 2016) where 
fast fashion MNEs offshore their production and because of the weak regulatory bodies in 
developing countries to ensure suppliers responsible behaviours, the present study considers 
that MNEs should be held responsible and liable beyond legal compliance and that MNEs are 
responsible for their suppliers’ behaviours. 
2.2.2 MNE adoption of CSR 
It is argued that corporations will not address CSR issues voluntarily and that only coercive 
forces will drive organisations to adopt CSR principles and develop CSR practices. In this case, 
regulators, stakeholders and industry bodies are expected to enforce the adoption of CSR 
(Escobar and Vredenburg, 2011).  On the other hand, scholars consider that organizations will 
voluntarily commit to CSR principles and implement CSR practices because there are potential 
economic benefits to be gained. In this case, corporations commit themselves to CSR because 
they perceive its financial added value. The implementation of CSR practices is believed to lead 
to better financial performances through, for example, the development of CSR related 
competitive advantages (Escobar and Vredenburg, 2011). 
Rugman and Verbeke (1998) have developed a compliance behaviour typology explaining 
under what circumstances MNEs comply with CSR policies.  MNEs compliance behaviour 
depends on the net economic benefits of compliance which are the expected benefits caused by 
complying with the policy (Rugman and Verbeke, 1998). Net economic benefits of compliance 
range from high to low and are either driven by a contribution to industrial performance (e.g., 
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profitability, growth, etc.) or by an administrative enforcement (e.g., sanctions). Rugman and 
Verbeke (1998) suggest that if the net economic benefits of compliance are high, then two types 
of compliance might occur. Compliance can be performance-driven which suggest that MNEs 
accept to comply with the policy because they believe it will enhance the industrial performance 
through growth, market-share or profitability. And compliance can be enforcement-driven. In 
this case MNEs comply with the policy because they fear the impact costly sanctions of non-
compliance could have on their performances. When sanctions are great, complying with the 
policy is considered as providing high net benefits of compliance (Rugman and Verbeke, 1998). 
However, if the only driver for MNE compliance is improved industrial performances and the 
net economic benefits of compliance are low, compliance is then compromised. But low net 
economic benefits of compliance combined with administrative enforcement does not 
necessarily lead to a situation of non-compliance: the conditional non-compliance describes a 
situation in which the net economic benefits of compliance are low and the administration cares 
to implement sustainable policies but lack resources to enforce them (Rugman and Verbeke, 
1998).  
The argument of Rugman and Verbeke (1998) for MNEs compliance to CSR and MNEs 
implementation of related CSR initiatives lies on the assumption that improved corporate social 
performances lead to improved corporate financial performances and on the assumption that 
regulatory bodies are successful in drafting and enforcing policies and sanctions. However, this 
paper has already argued that the research on the nature of the relationship between 
sustainability performances and financial performances have been inconclusive (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2001) and that MNEs do not fear to be liable and do not fear penalties for 
irresponsible supply chain practices because of the absence of an international framework for 
global justice in supply chains (Soundararajan and Brown, 2016) and the weak regulatory 
frameworks of developing countries (Djankov and Ramalho, 2009). These elements explain 
why MNEs have no financial incentive to develop CSR initiatives and why working conditions 
improvements have been limited. 
Researchers have therefore turned to the institutional theory of organizations to understand the 
spread, the selection and adoption of CSR strategies and practices among MNEs (Escobar and 
Vredenburg, 2011). It is argued that sustainability, as a business model, never was dominant 
nor vanishing (Escobar and Vredenburg, 2011). The institutional theory describes processes 
which are useful to explain why organisations operating in the same environment are likely to 
adopt similar structures and practices. It is argued that organizations experiencing similar 
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institutional pressures to conform will develop similar structures and practices (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.150) argue that “organizations compete not just 
for resources and customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as 
well as economic fitness”. Organizational legitimacy is a central concept of institutional theory 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Legitimacy can be defined as: “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p.574). 
Organizations gain legitimacy when stakeholders consider that the organization’s operations or 
goals meet their expectations (Suchman, 1995). Organization theorists have been particularly 
interested in isomorphic processes and their research have, for example, examined how 
subsidiaries acquired legitimacy in the eyes of their parent MNE and host country (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999; Cantwell et al., 2010). 
Institutions can be divided into two groups: formal (e.g., governments, regulatory bodies) and 
informal (e.g., consumers, NGOs, firms, medias, norms, values) (Connelly and al., 2013). But 
institutions can also be understood as constraints (North, 1994). There are formal constraints 
(e.g. rules, laws, constitutions) and informal constraints (e.g., norms of behaviour, conventions, 
self-imposed codes of conduct) (North, 1994). The institutional theory of organizations 
regroups three isomorphic processes, namely coercive, normative and mimetic, which tend to 
explain organizational changes and why organizations facing identical pressures are similar 
and/or adopt similar strategies (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Coercive isomorphism occurs 
when governments or regulatory bodies pressure MNEs to conform to new regulations or 
legislations, notably through enforcement mechanisms and fines. Normative isomorphism 
refers to self-regulation. It occurs when an industry pressures its members to conform to new 
standards or conventions. And finally, mimetic isomorphism happens when organizations 
identify and replicate successful business models or strategies developed by other organizations 
(Di Maggio and Powell, 1983).  
Escobar and Vredenburg (2011) apply the institutional theory to explain the institutional 
pressures for CSR faced by MNEs and why CSR practices are sporadically implemented. 
Coercive isomorphism processes predict that organisations facing similar pressures from 
regulators through the legislation would adopt similar practices. It suggests that international 
regulations would force MNEs to implement CSR practices across the globe because they fear 
to be penalize if they do not respect the regulations. However, in practice the theory does not 
seem to work. Indeed, international regulations lack international enforcement mechanisms and 
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clear agendas and rely extensively on national regulators to implement and enforce them 
(Rugman and Verbeke, 1998b; Escobar and Vredenburg, 2011). The adoption of CSR by MNEs 
because of coercive isomorphism lacks empirical support (Escobar and Vredenburg, 2011). 
Normative isomorphism processes suggest that an industry will regulate itself through 
collective agreements on production standards. For CSR, it implies that if an industry regulates 
itself with CSR standards and that related CSR practices will be implemented within MNEs 
that belong to that industry. Industry self-regulation can prevent the emergence of more 
stringent regulations from coercive forces (Escobar and Vredenburg, 2011). In practice, the 
impact of normative isomorphism processes on the implementation of sustainable development 
seems limited. Indeed, the lack of a worldwide accepted CSR definition, the existence of 
numerous complex national context and the absence of explicit sanctions characterizing 
industry self-regulations limit the implementation of CSR practices induced by normative 
isomorphism (Escobar ad Vredenburg, 2011). Due to the lack of international enforcement 
mechanism, the presumed influence of industry pressures is dependent on and mediated by 
national stakeholders’ pressure level (Escobar and Vredenburg, 2011). Mimetic isomorphism 
processes suggest that successful business strategies will be replicated by organisations if they 
are successful. Successful CSR practices would therefore be replicated if it is believed that they 
lead to improved financial performances and if they reduce the uncertainty and complexity 
related to CSR pressures (Escobar and Vredenburg, 2011). According to Escobar and 
Vredenburg (2011) mimetic isomorphism is the most likely type of isomorphism to occur and 
therefore to lead to sustainable practices development and implementation. Nevertheless, 
mimetic processes are slow and rare because the resources needed to achieve them are complex 
and intangible.  
However, Clarke and Boersma (2015) argue that the institutions are inefficient when it comes 
to the governance of global value chains and refer to an institutional failure. According to 
Clarke and Boersma (2015, p.1): “this institutional failure is reflected in the lack of collective 
bargaining rights, the weaknesses of international employment framework principles in 
practice, the lack of traction of social movements except in extreme situations and the failure 
of states to remedy known problems with governments committed to investments and economic 
growth at all costs”. The institutional inefficiency could be explained by the institutional 
distance, which is for MNEs the differences between institutions from their home and host 
countries (Connelly et al., 2013). In addition, gaining legitimacy is costly. In a context of profit 
maximization and absence of stakeholder pressure, MNEs would not be prone to meet or exceed 
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stakeholders’ expectations (Campbell, 2007). The next section covers the governance of global 
value chains to address MNEs response to pressures for implementing CSR practices within 
supply chains. 
2.2.3 Global supply chain governance 
The management of complex CSR issues in global supply chains has become an important area 
of research (Soundararajan and Brown, 2016). Since the mid-1990s, various topics have been 
covered, including the adoption of socially sustainable practices by developing country 
suppliers (Anisul Huq et al., 2010), the characteristics of supply chain governance (Lund-
Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014), voluntary governance mechanisms in global supply chains 
(Soudararajan and Brown, 2016), achieving sustainability in multi-tiers supply chains (Mena et 
al., 2013; Tachizawa and Wong, 2014; Wilhelm et al., 2016), chain liability in multi-tier supply 
chains (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014). 
In the literature, there is a consensus on the idea that MNEs should monitor the operations and 
sustainable performances of their suppliers (Carter and Jennings, 2002). To do that MNEs 
govern the supply chain. Supply chain governance refers to, “the mechanisms with which some 
firms in the chain set and/or enforce the parameters under which others in the chain operate’’ 
(Humphrey and Schmitz 2001, p. 20). Fast fashion MNEs control and influence the sustainable 
performances of their suppliers with voluntary governance mechanisms. Voluntary governance 
mechanisms have emerged as the primary instrument by which fast fashion MNEs address their 
suppliers’ social responsibility because of the absence of an international framework for global 
justice in supply chains (Soundararajan and Brown, 2016) and the weak regulatory frameworks 
of developing countries (Djankov and Ramalho, 2009). Voluntary governance mechanisms are: 
“complex, multi-stakeholder mechanisms used to govern aspects of a firm’s social and 
environmental responsibilities, especially in global supply chains” (Soundararajan and Brown, 
2016, p.84). Voluntary governance mechanisms are MNEs response to increasing stakeholder 
pressures for improved social conditions (Jiang, 2009, Soundararajan and Brown, 2016). In this 
case, MNEs motivation to address supply chain CSR issues and supplier irresponsible 
behaviour is to channel increasing stakeholder pressures. Voluntary governance includes 
mechanisms like supplier development and trainings, codes of conduct, third-party certification 
(Christmann and Taylor, 2006; Jiang, 2009). 
In order to improve their suppliers’ CSR performances and particularly their working 
conditions, MNEs can develop, educate and train their suppliers (Pagell and Wu, 2009). By 
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developing their first-tier suppliers, MNEs efforts have a rippling effect over lower-tier 
suppliers: suppliers educate each other and cascade down the knowledge (Rao and Holt, 2005). 
Internal supply chain collaboration can improve the CSR performance of suppliers and 
encourage them to adopt more responsible behaviour. Supplier development by MNEs can 
occur through: dialogues with suppliers, joint development of new products and processes, 
awareness raising for sustainability aspects, and ensuring supplier continuity (Pagell and Wu, 
2009; Harms et al., 2013). To measure the results of the trainings and investments on the 
sustainable performances of their suppliers, MNEs have put in place supplier evaluations. The 
evaluation may be accompanied by incentives or sanction (Harms et al., 2013). Poor evaluation 
may entail contract termination for the supplier in question. However, switching from a supplier 
to another implies costs and companies may prefer continuing to develop suppliers that 
performed poorly at the evaluation (Harms et al., 2013). However, collaborative supply chains 
remain limited in practice. There are benefits resulting from the collaboration but there are also 
some drawbacks. MNEs fear that if they invest in suppliers it might as well benefit other MNEs 
sourcing from those suppliers (Harms et al., 2013). Another reason restraining MNEs from 
developing their suppliers is the investment could turn into a sunk cost if the sourcing contract 
is terminated (Pagell and Wu; 2009). 
Codes of conduct are a form of private regulations established between two companies. Codes 
of conduct are usually used by MNEs to express their expectations and requirements in terms 
of sustainability to suppliers. They were first developed by MNEs to fill the institutional voids 
when sourcing from suppliers in developing countries (Pinkse and Kolk, 2012; Clarke and 
Boersma, 2015). Codes of conduct “stipulate, among other operations issues, that working 
conditions are safe and hygienic, child labour is not used, working hours are not excessive, and 
workers are paid living wages” (Jiang, 2009, p.77). Codes of conduct can be accompanied by 
control mechanisms to ensure suppliers commitment and compliance (Jiang, 2009). Codes of 
conduct have the potential to improve the sustainable performances of supply chains (Clarke 
and Boersma, 2015) and have been widely implemented by MNEs to push their suppliers to 
adopt sustainable management practices (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). However, the 
success of the codes of conduct is questioned. First, it is difficult to ensure suppliers 
commitment to the codes (Clarke and Boersma, 2015). Second, Pinkse and Kolk (2009) argue 
that codes of conduct lack monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Third, codes of conduct 
are often established by Western MNEs and imposed on suppliers in developing countries 
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making them passive players (Jiang, 2009). And finally, the codes are not delivering large scale 
and sustained working condition improvements (Locke et al.,2007).  
MNEs can also encourage their suppliers to be more sustainable and to adopt more responsible 
behaviour through third-party certification. Third-party certification refers to standards firms 
must comply with to be certified. For example, ISO26000 sets standards for corporate social 
responsibility. There also exists a certification for social accountability, the SA8000. A firm 
complying with ISO standards can be certified by the Organization for International 
Standardization (ISO). Third-party certification can be understood as a “governance mechanism 
for firm self-regulation of corporate social responsibility” (Christmann and Taylor, 2006).  
Although promising, third-party certification effectiveness has not been demonstrated yet 
(Christmann and Taylor, 2006). It is because “weak third-party monitoring allows firms to 
obtain certification without continuously complying with standard requirements” (Christmann 
and Taylor, 2006, p.873). Firms use certification as a symbol to demonstrate to customers that 
they are making progress on sustainable issues (Christmann and Taylor, 2006) without 
addressing them. 
Locke et al. (2009) argue that fast fashion MNEs have sufficient power over their dependent 
suppliers to force them to adopt their sustainability standards and therefore to comply with their 
standards for working conditions. Global retails brands can influence their first-tier suppliers 
with whom they have direct relationships but also their second-tier suppliers with whom they 
have indirect relationships (Wu et al., 2010). Tachizawa and Wong (2014, p.651) explains this 
approach: “contact with lower-tier suppliers is performed indirectly through another supplier. 
For example, lead firms use their power over first-tier suppliers to make them monitor or 
collaborate with lower-tier suppliers”. To force lower-tier suppliers to adopt improved working 
conditions standards, fast fashion MNEs can use their power to pressure their first-tier suppliers 
(Tachizawa and Wong, 2014). In multi-tier supply chain, first-tier suppliers act as a bridge 
between the sourcing company and the upstream suppliers in propagating CSR standards and 
practices (Grimm et al., 2014). The selection of first-tier suppliers is critical for buying 
companies because first-tier suppliers may take decisions that will deteriorate the social 
performances of the whole supply chain (Wilhelm et al., 2016). Contrarily to Locke et al. 
(2009), Soundararajan and Brown (2016) argue that in the garment industry, buying MNEs’ 
power is diluted as the number of tier/intermediaries in the supply chain increases. 
Additionally, the lack of convincing working condition improvements in global supply chains 
resulting from voluntary governance mechanisms might be explained by the MNE rationale 
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behind voluntary governance mechanisms implementation. Indeed, voluntary governance 
mechanisms are used by fast fashion MNEs as means of control over suppliers in developing 
countries rather than a means to solve social issues (Soudararajan and Brown, 2016). Several 
studies are questioning the efficacy of voluntary governance mechanisms to replace 
dysfunctional institutional regulatory frameworks in developing countries because of the gap 
between its objectives to implement improved working condition and its results in practice 
(Fulponi 2006; Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010). The weakness of voluntary governance 
mechanisms happens to be its voluntary nature: they are not legally binding (Soundararajan and 
Brown, 2016). Soundararajan and Brown (2016, p.90) argue that: “the measurement and reward 
systems for volunteer mechanisms across global supply chains are also difficult to track, enforce 
and administer”. In addition, the understanding on how global supply chains function and 
operate in the global economy is lacking (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009) and according 
to Soundararajan and Brown (2016) this is why despite fast fashion MNEs efforts voluntary 
governance mechanisms have failed to improve significantly the working conditions in 
factories of developing country suppliers. MNEs response to pressures for implementing CSR 
practices within supply chains through voluntary governance mechanisms has not lead to 
significant working conditions improvement. 
2.2.4 Corporate Social Irresponsibility 
MNEs struggle to manage social issues in their supply chains (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012). 
The implementation of improved social standards such as decent working conditions in 
upstream suppliers is a contemporary challenge (Matos and Hall, 2007). Therefore, it is argued 
that instead of focusing on CSR practices to improve working conditions in supply chains, the 
efforts should be on eliminating CSI practices in supply chain and de facto improving working 
conditions (Campbell, 2007). 
The sustainable literature recently evolved to include the concept of corporate social 
irresponsibility (CSI) (Campbell, 2007; Lange and Washburn, 2012). Recent incidents at 
supplier facilities in developing countries and poor working conditions in global supply chain 
highlighted a discrepancy between CSR literature and its application to concrete issues. To 
understand this misalignment between CSR theory and results in practice, it is argued that the 
focus should be on the minimum requirements ensuring that organization do not act 
irresponsibly instead of on requirement to achieve sustainability, (Campbell, 2007). Campbell 
(2007) considers that too much importance is given to defining the highest level of CSR and 
related practices. Campbell (2007) depicts CSR as a continuum ranging from the least socially 
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responsible behaviour to the most socially responsible behaviour. CSR definitions calibrate 
corporate behaviours and compare them. Campbell (2007) argues that the literature, through 
various CSR definitions, does not address the minimum end of the continuum. CSR definitions 
are often oriented towards the maximum end of the continuum by trying to define the best 
socially responsible behaviour and fail to simply define irresponsible behaviours. The problem 
of this situation is that firms might score high in CSR depending on the definition used to assess 
and measure the sustainable performances (Campbell, 2007). To solve this inconsistency, 
Campbell (2007) proposed a definition of socially responsible behaviour including a threshold 
under which firms are no longer considered as behaving responsibly.  
Campbell (2007) considers that firms are above the threshold, and therefore act responsibly, if: 
“first, they must not knowingly do anything that could harm their stakeholders - notably, their 
investors, employees, customers, suppliers, or the local community within which they operate. 
Second, if corporations do cause harm to their stakeholders, they must then rectify it whenever 
the harm is discovered and brought to their attention. Rectification could be done voluntarily 
or in response to some sort of encouragement, such as moral suasion, normative pressure, legal 
threats, regulatory rulings, court orders, and the like” (Campbell, 2007, p.951). The definition 
sets the minimal requirements under which corporate behaviour would be considered 
irresponsible or unsustainable.  
While CSR is expected to improve the financial performances of the firm, it is argued that CSI 
lead to negative consequences for firms, including penalties, compensation payments, customer 
losses, decreased employee motivation, or reputational damage (Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013).  Lin-
Hi and Müller (2013, p.1932) wonder “why the discussion of CSR has predominantly focused 
on doing good, thereby resulting in very little attention having been devoted to avoiding bad.” 
One reason explaining the predominance of CSR rather than CSI is that avoiding bad is a taken 
for granted behaviour (Lin-Hi et Müller, 2013). As explained by Davis (1973, p.313): “avoiding 
bad constitutes actions that any good citizen would do.” Therefore, avoiding irresponsible 
behaviour is not considered revealing of a firm’s CSR (Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013). However, 
Lange and Washburn (2012) see no added value of the CSI debate. For them, CSI is only the 
mirrored image of CSR. Lange and Washburn (2012, p.300) consider that: “irresponsibility, 
distinct from responsibility, is often not discussed explicitly in the CSR literature, [because] 
irresponsibility is simply the opposite side of the responsibility coin – that is the failure to act 
responsibly”. Strike et al. (2006) reject the idea that CSI is simply the opposite side of CSR. 
They argue that CSR and CSI are, obviously, related but that the constructs are not reflections 
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of each other (Strike et al., 2006). For example, there is a positive relationship between a firm’s 
business complexity and the occurrence of CSI (Strike et al, 2006). The more complex MNEs 
operations, the more likely is the occurrence of CSI. However, firms remain responsible to 
prevent CSI from occurring (Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013) 
In their 2006 study, Strike et al. (2006) suggested that firms could be characterised by dual 
behaviours: being socially responsible and socially irresponsible at the same time. Their study 
unveiled strong evidences for the decomposition of corporate social responsibility into positive 
(CSR) and negative components (CSI). Strike et al. (2006) developed their own definition of 
CSI using the CSR definition of Bateman and Snell (2002). They defined CSI as: “the set of 
corporate actions that negatively affects an identifiable social stakeholder’s legitimate claims 
(in the long run)” (Strike et al., 2006, p.852). Acknowledging the coexistence of socially 
responsible and irresponsible behaviours is essential for a better understanding of CSR because 
it influences stakeholders’ perceptions of an MNE’s responsibilities which in turn impacts 
stakeholders’ attitudes toward that MNE (Lange and Washburn, 2012; Lin-Hi and Muller, 
2013). The current study focuses on CSI rather than CSR because consumers are more exposed 
to negative CSR through media (Wagner et al., 2008) and because they have stronger reactions 
when confronted with negative CSR than with positive CSR information (Sen and 
Bhattacharya, 2001). 
This master’s thesis assumes that there is a negative relationship between CSI in supply chain 
and MNE sales performances (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014). Unlike the business case 
for CSR, it is believed that firms will be willing to eliminate corporate social irresponsible 
practices and make their operations more responsible because otherwise it deteriorates their 
financial performances. Finding out how does supplier corporate social irresponsibility impact 
MNEs sales performances could be an incentive for MNEs to improve working conditions in 
supply chains.  
MNEs performances and especially sales performances depend on consumers (Grappi et al., 
2013b). It is therefore crucial to understand how customers react to irresponsible behaviour in 
the supply chain and how it impacts fast fashion MNEs. CSR research have tried to demonstrate 
whether consumers would reward companies seen as ethical or whether consumers would 
punish companies considered as unethical (Trudel and Cotte, 2009). Trudel and Cotte (2009) 
found that consumers are ready to pay a premium and that they will punish companies seen as 
unethical by requesting lower prices and that consumers are requesting a bigger price reduction 
for unethical products than the premium they are willing to pay for ethical products. Trudel and 
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Cotte (2009, p.61) conclude that: “the negative effect of unethical behaviour has a substantially 
greater impact on consumer willingness to pay than the positive effects of ethical behaviour”. 
However, previous research on consumer behaviour regarding ethical consumption shows that 
consumers are not necessarily responsive to the moral behaviours of MNEs (Pinkse and Kolk, 
2012, p.338). Other research has concluded that consumers are unwilling to pay substantially 
more for sustainable products (Wolf, 2011). Additionally, consumer behaviours are 
characterized by an attitude-behaviour gap phenomenon (Vermeir and Verbeke, 2006). The 
attitude-behaviour gap describes situation where consumers condemn the unsustainable 
behaviour of a company but fail to translate it into shopping behaviour and continue to buy 
from that company (Vermeir and Verbeke, 2006). 
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2.3 Research model 
Understanding consumers’ responsibility attributions, the emotion they experienced and the 
behaviour that results from it in the event of supply chain incidents could help finding out how 
does supplier corporate social irresponsibility impact MNEs sales performances and could be a 
financial incentive for MNEs to improve working conditions in supply chains and eliminate 
irresponsible practices. Consumers pressures and related negative consequences for MNEs’ 
sales performances could force MNEs to address supplier irresponsible behaviour more 
effectively, to take wiser management decision and to adopt responsible supply chain practices. 
Thanks to their purchase behaviour consumers have a direct impact on MNEs financial 
performances (Schuler and Cording, 2006). 
The term attribution refers to the “consumer’s explanations of the firm’s behaviours and 
outcomes in terms of firm and situational characteristics” (Lange and Washburn, 2012, p.302). 
The term attribution comes from the attribution theory literature. Mizerski (1978, p.220) define 
attribution theory as: “the processes whereby people make causal explanations about the 
information they receive. Then, based on the causal attribution chosen, it can be used to predict 
how those individuals will make inferences about themselves or their environment”. The 
attribution process refers to “the causal reasoning stakeholders engage in when trying to make 
sense of events or occurrences they encounter, particularly when these events are negative or 
out of the ordinary (Weiner, 1986)” (Janssen et al., 2015, p.184). Individuals build attributions 
based on perceptions and not on objective reality (Lange and Washburn, 2012) which implies 
that attribution is a subjective process. The research model of the current study is built around 
the responsibility attribution process developed by Weiner (1986, 1995). 
The proposed research model studies the relationships between several situational 
characteristics referred to as causal attribution or dimensions of causal determination 
(controllability, stability and severity) of the supplier irresponsible behaviour and the 
consumers’ reaction towards fast fashion MNE. Furthermore, it studies the relationship between 
consumer identification with the fast fashion MNE and perception of the fast fashion MNE 
(organizational identification and perceived corporate social irresponsibility) towards MNE 
brands and consumer’s reaction towards fast fashion MNE. Consumers’ reactions are evaluated 
through consumers’ causal inferences for the supplier’s irresponsible behaviour (responsibility 
attribution), consumers’ emotion (anger) and consumers’ behaviour (boycott intentions).  
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In the model, the causal attributions reflect the OSH incident characteristics influencing 
consumers’ causal explanations for the incident. The best-known categorization system of 
causal dimensions has been developed by Weiner (1980). The causal dimensions identified by 
Weiner (1980, 1986, 1995) are: controllability, stability, locus of causality and severity. 
Controllability, refers to the degree of control MNEs have over their supplier irresponsible 
behaviour and the resulting incident. Stability, refers to the permanence of the irresponsible 
behaviour. Consumers will ask themselves whether a similar incident will happen in the future 
and whether the supplier irresponsible behaviour will persist through time. Locus of causality, 
refers to what caused the incident or the supplier irresponsible behaviour: is the incident caused 
by the supplier or is it caused by circumstances. The severity dimension refers to the degree of 
severity of the incident that results from the supplier irresponsible behaviour. 
The mechanism of the model is that incident characteristics and consumer identification with 
the fast fashion MNE and perception of the fast fashion MNE positively or negatively impact 
(the nature of the impact is discussed in 2.5 Hypothesis) consumer’s responsibility attribution. 
Then, consumer’s responsibility attribution positively impacts consumer’s anger. And finally, 
consumer’s anger positively impact consumer’s boycott intentions. 
There are numerous emotions that consumers can experience when confronted to supply chain 
OSH incidents. The current study acknowledge that different emotions lead to different 
behavioural responses (Watson and Spence, 2007) and that limiting consumer’s emotion to 
anger limits the consumer’s behaviour that will result. However, anger is an emotion that is 
frequently experienced (Averill, 1982; Robbins, 2000) and Coombs and Holladay (2005) found 
that anger is one of the most often experienced emotions by stakeholders during a crisis. In the 
context of unethical corporate conduct, Lindenmeier et al. (2012, p.112) define consumer anger 
as: “a negative emotional reaction to unethical corporate behaviour, [that] can be classified as 
a type of moral emotion”. According to Meyer and Baker (2010), moral emotions are associated 
with concerns for well-being. Consumers can be concerned about their own well-being or 
other’s well-being (Lindenmeier et al., 2012). In the context of the current study, the vignette-
based experiments (see section 3.1) have been designed to trigger consumer’s anger associated 
with a concern for the well-being of others: the workers of the suppliers.  
Anger is an emotion resulting from a negative event and a belief that the negative event could 
have been prevented by someone else or that the cause of the negative event could have been 
controlled by someone else (Folkes et al., 1987; Ortony et al.,1988; Nyer, 1997; Ruth et al., 
2002). Moreover, anger has two characteristics that makes it a unique emotional reaction 
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(Funches, 2011). The first characteristic of anger is someone’s belief that he/she has been 
wrongly taken advantage of by someone else (Averill, 1982; Lazarus, 1991). The second 
characteristics of anger is: “the element of blame” (Funches, 2011, p.421). The element of 
blame refers to consumers concern about what or who is to be blamed for a negative event 
(Funches, 2011). The first characteristics of anger has little interest for the current study. 
However, the second characteristics of anger is essential because it links anger to the attribution 
theory and to responsibility attribution. Anger is a value judgement about a situation (Weiner, 
1995). Weber (2004) argue that higher degree of agent’s blame lead to higher degrees of anger 
and agent’s blame is for instance a function of controllability. Agent’s blame refers to 
consumer’s responsibility attribution. According to Weiner’s (1986, 1995) attribution process, 
anger is the most likely emotional reaction to be experienced by consumers following 
responsibility attribution for negative incidents. Furthermore, it is suggested that the intensity 
of consumers’ emotional reaction depends on how they attribute responsibilities (Ortony et al., 
1988; Machleit and Mantel, 2001). Differently said, consumers’ causal inferences about a 
negative event influences their anger level.  
According to Frijda (1986) and Weiner (1995) anger is a stimulus for further actions by 
consumers. Furthermore, Anger is a moral emotion and moral emotions tend to provoke pro-
social actions among consumers (Haidt, 2003). Pro-social behaviours or actions are behaviours 
or actions that benefit others without necessarily benefiting the person or group of people at the 
source of those behaviours or actions (Paulus, 2014). And anger is an emotion that motivates 
consumers to take actions to change the negative outcome (Lewis, 1993). It implies that 
consumers might take actions to help the people affected by the negative event. In the context 
of this research, consumers may take actions against MNEs to benefit the suppliers’ workers. 
Additionally, consumer anger can induce behaviours that are costly to firms in terms of money 
and that deteriorate the relationship between the consumer and the firm (Huefner and Hunt, 
2000). For example, responsibility attribution and anger towards a firm are more likely to incite 
consumers to switch brands (Folkes et al.,1987). Kalamas et al (2008) found that with 
increasing anger levels, consumers were more inclined to deliberately worsen the consequences 
of their actions towards a firm. Previous research studying the relationships between attribution, 
emotion and behaviour have found that consumers that attribute responsibilities to the firm for 
a negative event, exhibited higher levels of anger and were more inclined to stop buying 
products from the firm they blame (Folkes et al., 1987; Diaz et al., 2002; Funches, 2011, 
Hartmann and Moeller, 2014). Correspondingly, anger was found to have a negative effect on 
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future purchasing behaviour, increased levels of anger make consumers less likely to repurchase 
products from the firm (Bougie et al., 2003; Chebat and Slusarczyk, 2005; Kalamas et al., 
2008). Furthering the idea that anger motivates consumers’ actions and stimulates behaviours, 
Kozinets and Handelman (1998) argue that anger triggers boycott intentions. The relationships 
between consumer anger, purchase intentions and boycott intentions have been strongly 
established in previous studies. Therefore, boycott was selected to be included in the research 
model as the behavioural reaction to be exhibited by consumers after they experienced anger. 
In addition, keeping anger as the emotional reaction experienced by consumers and boycott as 
the behaviour exhibited by consumers as in the original model developed by Hartmann and 
Moeller (2014), offers opportunities for discussing the results and comparing the two studies 
(see chapter 5. Discussion). Therefore, anger and boycott were selected as the emotion to be 
included in the model. 
The proposed research model relies extensively on the consumer reaction for unsustainable 
supplier behaviour model developed by Hartmann and Moeller (2014). The remaining of this 
section discusses the differences between the model developed by Hartmann and Moeller 
(2014) (Figure 3) and the model developed in the current study (Figure 4). As shown in Figure 
4, the major difference between the model developed by Hartmann and Moeller (2014) and the 
model developed in the current study is that it was decided to include consumer identification 
with the fast fashion MNE and perception of the fast fashion MNE as potentially important 
factors in determining responsibility attribution levels. Consumer identification with the fast 
fashion MNE and perception of the fast fashion MNE is tested by measuring their 
organizational identification with the brand and their perception of corporate social 
irresponsibility of the MNE. The decision to include these two elements characterising 
consumer relationship with the fast fashion MNE emanates from a theoretical research paper 
on consumer attribution of corporate social irresponsibility by Lange and Washburn (2012).  
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Figure 3. Hartmann and Moeller’s model (2014) for consumer reaction for unsustainable supplier behaviour resulting in environmental incident 
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Figure 4. Proposed research model for consumer reaction for supplier irresponsible behaviour resulting in OSH incident  
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Firstly, according to Lange and Washburn (2012) customers that identify more with the focal 
firm are less likely to consider it as morally responsible for the incident. Lange and Washburn 
(2012) argue that customer’s organizational identification with the implicated firm is negatively 
related to customer’s assessment of the firm’s culpability. In the current study, it is argued that 
responsibility attribution will be negatively impacted by consumer’s organizational 
identification with the MNE brands (see 2.5 Hypothesis). Secondly, according to Lange and 
Washburn (2012), the more CSI customers perceive, the more CSI they attribute to firms. They 
argue that a customer’s perception of a firm disposition for irresponsible behaviour is positively 
related to the customer’s assessment of the firm’s culpability (Lange and Washburn, 2012). 
Correspondingly, Folkes and Kamins (1999) found that perceived unethical corporate 
behaviour may influence consumer attitude. In the current study, it is argued that responsibility 
attribution will be positively impacted by consumer’s perceived corporate social 
irresponsibility (see section 2.5 Hypothesis). 
Contrary to Hartmann and Moeller (2014) whose research focuses on supplier unsustainable 
behaviour resulting in environmental incidents, the current study focuses on supplier 
irresponsible behaviour resulting in social incidents. Therefore, not all dimensions of causal 
determination from the Hartmann and Moeller (2014) model were included in the model 
developed for the current study. In the model developed by Hartmann and Moeller (2014), what 
caused the incident plays a role in determining the responsibilities. Hartmann and Moeller 
(2014) argue that responsibility attribution will be negatively impacted if force majeure is what 
caused the incident or positively impacted if the company is what caused the incident. Those 
considerations make sense in the context of environmental incidents and catastrophe but it was 
decided to remove it from the current study because force majeure is not relevant in the context 
of fast fashion and OSH incidents. In addition, because the focus is on social incidents and not 
environmental incident, the dimension of causal determination environmental management 
system was transformed into a supplier safety management system. This modification makes 
the dimension more relevant in the fast fashion context. 
In the model developed by Hartmann and Moeller (2014), the location of the incident plays a 
role in determining the responsibilities. Hartmann and Moeller (2014) argue that responsibility 
attribution will be negatively impacted if the incident happens at a supplier facility or positively 
impacted if the incident happens at a subsidiary of the focal firm or a facility owned by the focal 
firm. Contrary to Hartmann and Moeller (2014), the current study focuses only on 
outsourcing/offshoring practices and exclude situations in which MNEs and suppliers are linked 
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together through shared ownership and in which MNEs have built their own factories abroad to 
manufacture their products.  The location of the incident is always the supplier facility. 
Therefore, it was decided to remove the incident locality: firm vs. supply from the dimensions 
of causal determination in the current study model 
In the model developed by Hartmann and Moeller (2014), the size of the focal firm plays a role 
in determining the responsibilities. Hartmann and Moeller (2014) argue that responsibility 
attribution will be negatively impacted if the focal firm is small or positively impacted if the 
focal firm is large. Contrary to Hartmann and Moeller (2014), the current study focuses 
exclusively on MNEs. The MNEs are quite large firms. Therefore, it was decided to remove 
the focal firm size from the dimensions of causal determination. All the above-mentioned 
changes made in the original model developed by Hartmann and Moeller (2014) to fit the 
specifications of the current study confirms the uniqueness and originality of this research.  
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2.4 Hypothesis building 
This chapter presents the development and the nature of the hypothesised relationships included 
in the research model. First the hypotheses related to the causal dimensions of responsibility 
attribution are developed. Secondly, the hypotheses related to consumer attitude are developed 
and finally the hypotheses related to anger and boycott are developed. At the end of this chapter, 
Figure 5 summarizes the hypothesized relationships and its nature. 
Causal dimensions of responsibility attribution 
The first dimension that can potentially affects customers’ attribution process to be addressed 
is: controllability. The controllability dimension should be understood as the varying degrees 
of control that MNEs have over their supplier. The greater the control the MNE has, the greater 
the chances are that the MNE can prevent or foresee the supplier irresponsible behaviour, the 
greater the responsibility attribution in case of supplier irresponsible behaviour (Weiner, 1986, 
1995). MNEs extend their reach deeper into the supply chain increasing the number of 
intermediaries and making supply chain dynamic but also more complex networks (Choi & 
Linton, 2011; Pagell et al., 2010; Mena et al., 2013). Longer supply chains are more complex 
and more difficult to manage than shorter ones (Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010). And longer 
supply chain are less transparent than shorter ones because transparency decreases when the 
number of intermediaries increases (Roth et al., 2008). There is a positive relationship between 
a firm’s business complexity and the occurrence of CSI (Strike et al, 2006). The more complex 
MNEs operations, the more likely is the occurrence of CSI. Scholars have suggested that 
geographical distance influences the power a buyer has over its suppliers (Elg and Hultman, 
2011). It implies that the greater the distance, the more difficult it is for MNEs to control 
suppliers’ activities and practices (Ulstrup et al., 2013). It was also suggested that geographical 
distance is negatively related to the adoption of responsible practices by suppliers (Awaysheh 
and Klassen, 2010). The greater the geographical distance, the more difficult it is for firms to 
interact frequently with suppliers (Choy and Lee, 2003). 
It is argued that second-tier, third-tier suppliers and sub suppliers rather than direct suppliers 
are often the starting point of the most severe environmental and social incidents (Ernst and 
Kim, 2002; Plambeck, 2012). There are at least four reasons explaining why lower-tier suppliers 
are causing severe incidents (Tachizawa and Wong, 2014). First, MNEs have fewer or 
inadequate information about their lower-tier suppliers than for first-tier suppliers. Therefore, 
it is difficult for fast fashion MNEs to manage the sustainability of lower-tier suppliers and to 
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prevent irresponsible behaviour (Choi and Hong, 2002). Second, due to the organizational 
distance, MNEs are not in position where they could influence lower-tier suppliers’ practices 
(Tachizawa and Wong, 2014). Third, lower-tier suppliers are usually located in developing 
countries where social regulations are weak and enforcement is not always optimal (Esty and 
Winston, 2006). And finally, MNE and non-critical lower-tier suppliers have unstable 
relationships and are therefore changed more often (Ponce and Prida, 2004). Moreover, lower-
tier suppliers are less subject to public scrutiny because they often are small and medium-sized 
factories. Thus, lower-tier suppliers are less exposed to institutional pressures to improve their 
environmental and social performances. The reduced exposition to institutional pressures 
makes lower-supplier at a higher risk of developing or continuing irresponsible behaviours and 
causing severe incidents. (Lee et al., 2012; Wilhelm et al, 2016). The sustainability 
performances of lower-tier supplier are therefore more difficult to monitor and to influence than 
the sustainability performances of first-tier suppliers. Because fast fashion MNEs have less 
power over lower-tier suppliers than over first-tier suppliers. Hartmann and Moeller (2014) 
argue that customers should recognize that longer supply chains are more difficult to control 
and to manage. Therefore, I argue that: 
H1 (-). Customers attribute less responsibility to fast fashion MNEs for social irresponsible 
supplier behaviour when organizational distance between the fast fashion MNE and the 
supplier is greater. 
Fast fashion MNEs outsource their productions to many suppliers (Doyle et al., 2006). 
However, not all have them have the same strategic importance. Fast fashion MNEs develop 
different relationships with their supplier ranging from close partnerships to distant 
relationships (Bruce and Daly, 2006). One factor influencing the relationship between fast 
fashion MNEs and their supplier is: the product criticality. Highly critical products sourced 
from lower-tier suppliers are likely to force the fast fashion MNEs to establish a direct 
relationship with that lower-supplier (Choi and Hong, 2002; Lee et al., 2012a, Tachizawa and 
Wong, 2014). According to Awaysheh and Klassen (2010), fast fashion MNEs’ dependency on 
suppliers for critical products directly influence the adoption of socially responsible practices 
in the supply chain. Suppliers that are important get more attention from the MNE. It is in the 
MNE interest to invest in and to develop its relationship with the supplier. The more important 
the supplier is, the tighter their relationship gets.  
Close partnerships between fast fashion MNEs and lower-tier suppliers implies that fast fashion 
MNEs have more information, oversight and control their suppliers and to prevent or foresee 
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supplier irresponsible behaviour. Additionally, Hartmann and Moeller (2014) argue that if 
consumers recognize that the fast fashion MNE and the supplier have a close relationship, that 
the fast fashion MNEs have more opportunities to control suppliers’ behaviours then they will 
perceive the fast fashion MNEs as more culpable for the supplier irresponsible behaviour 
because it failed to prevent it. Therefore, I argue that: 
H2 (+). Customers attribute more responsibility to fast fashion MNEs for social irresponsible 
supplier behaviour when the strategic importance of the supplier is greater. 
The second dimension that can potentially affects customers’ attribution process to be addressed 
is: stability. As abovementioned, stability refers to the permanence of the irresponsible 
behaviour. Weiner (1980), Folkes (1984, p.399) argue that: “attributions to unstable reasons 
lead to uncertainty about future outcomes, whereas stable attributions lead a person to expect 
the same outcome in the future”. It implies that if the reason leading to the supplier irresponsible 
behaviour is permanent, the reason is said to be unstable. And customers will attribute more 
responsibilities to the MNE because there is an uncertainty about future outcomes, meaning 
that the chances of a similar incident happening again in the future are higher. However, if the 
reason leading to the supplier irresponsible behaviour is fairly fluctuating over time, the reason 
is said to be stable. And customers will attribute fewer responsibilities to the MNE because 
there is more certainty about future outcomes, meaning that the chances of a similar incident 
happening again in the future are lower. The stability dimension led to the identification of two 
incident characteristics and then to the development of two hypotheses. 
The first characteristics that may influence the customer attribution process based on the 
stability dimension is whether the irresponsible behaviour that triggered the incident was carried 
out by the supplying company or by one of the worker of the supplying company (Hartmann 
and Moeller, 2014). If the irresponsible behaviour that triggered the incident is caused by a 
systemic failure of the company rather than being caused by a single worker, the uncertainty of 
future outcomes and the chances of a similar incident happening again are higher. In that case, 
the reason leading to the irresponsible behaviour is unstable. Customers are expected to attribute 
more responsibilities to the MNE because it should have foreseen that the supplier was behaving 
irresponsibly. 
Conversely, if the incident was triggered by the irresponsible behaviour of a single worker, it 
does not mean that the supplier is irresponsible. Therefore, the chances of a similar incident 
happening again in the future are lower. In that case, the reason leading to the irresponsible 
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behaviour is stable. Customers are expected to attribute fewer responsibilities to the fast fashion 
MNE because it could not have foreseen or prevented that a single supplier worker would 
behave irresponsibly (Hartmann and Moeller (2014). Therefore, I argue that: 
H3 (+). Customers attribute more responsibility to fast fashion MNEs for social irresponsible 
supplier behaviour when the supplying company, rather than an individual worker within the 
supplying company, caused the irresponsible behaviour. 
Another stability factor influencing the customer attribution process is whether the supplier’s 
irresponsible behaviour could have been prevented or the resulting severity limited by the 
implementation of a voluntary governance mechanism (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014). Gao et 
al. (2012) argue that consumers expect firms to account for the environmental behaviour of the 
suppliers when making purchasing decisions. This research supposes that consumers will have 
similar expectations for social behaviours. Global buyers are expected to monitor the operations 
and the behaviours of their suppliers (Carter and Jennings, 2002). Past incidents and scandals 
have pushed MNEs in the garment industry to develop codes of conduct for their suppliers. 
These codes of conduct are sets of rules defining the norms, the rules and the practices to be 
respected by the suppliers. Codes of conduct are expected to ensure that the working conditions 
are safe and hygienic (Jiang, 2009). Suppliers’ incentive to abide by these codes of conduct is 
to secure future subcontracting deals with the sourcing MNE.  
However, the success of the codes of conduct is questioned. First, it is difficult to ensure 
suppliers commitment to the codes (Clarke and Boersma, 2015). Second, Pinkse and Kolk 
(2009) argue that codes of conduct lack monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Third, codes 
of conduct are often established by Western MNEs and imposed on suppliers in developing 
countries making them passive players (Jiang, 2009). And finally, the codes are not delivering 
large scale and sustained working condition improvements (Locke et al.,2007). These are the 
reasons why codes of conduct are not always successfully implemented and even when they 
are, MNEs should monitor that they are respected by suppliers. A code of conduct that is not 
successfully implemented or that is not entirely respected by a supplier is considered 
dysfunctional. Dysfunctional safety management system implies that safety measures are not 
respected at the supplier facilities which can potentially worsen the outcomes of an incident. In 
presence of a dysfunctional safety management system, the reason leading to a worse incident 
outcome is unstable. Customers are expected to attribute more responsibilities to the fast fashion 
MNE because it failed to ensure the safety at the supplier facilities and because of that they 
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believe a similar supplier irresponsible behaviour will happen again in the future and causing 
another incident (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014). Therefore, I argue that:  
H4 (+). Customers attribute more responsibility to fast fashion MNEs for social irresponsible 
supplier behaviour, when the safety management system in place is dysfunctional. 
Individuals build attributions based on perceptions and not on objective reality (Lange and 
Washburn, 2012) which implies that attribution is a subjective process. Building from causal 
inferences and moral judgments theories, Lange and Washburn (2012) identified the assessment 
of effect undesirability as influencing the observer’s assessment of corporate culpability. In the 
current study, the assessment of effect undesirability refers to the perceived incident severity 
and the assessment of corporate culpability refers to the responsibility attribution. According to 
Lange and Washburn (2012, p.305), the assessments of effect undesirability: is: “dependent on 
the values, perspectives, and interpretations of the perceiver and likely will be rooted in the 
individual’s perceptions of threat and moral impulses”. The degree of severity of an incident 
resulting from supplier’s irresponsible behaviours plays a role in consumer’s responsibility 
attribution.  
According to Janssen et al. (2015, p.190): “it is worth noting that regardless of the actual or 
potential severity of the damages inflicted, crisis responsibility and crisis severity eventually lie 
in the public’s eyes”. Additionally, the psychology literature suggests that the more severe an 
accident is perceived by observers, the more blame they attribute to the responsible of the 
accident (Robbennolt, 2000; Burger, 1981). The presence of this relationship between severity 
and blame attribution was researched to determine consumer behaviour in the context of a 
product-harm crisis by Laufer et al. (2005). Laufer et al. (2005) found that consumers attributed 
more responsibility for the product-harm crisis when the crisis was more severe. Potentially, 
the greater the severity, the greater the consequences, and therefore the greater the reaction it 
will provoke (Zyglidopoulos, 2001, p.423). Then, incident outcome of greater scale drives 
greater reactions than smaller incident outcome. Therefore, I argue that: 
H5 (+). Customers attribute more responsibility to fast fashion MNEs for social irresponsible 
supplier behaviour when the severity of the outcomes of the irresponsible behaviour is higher. 
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Consumer attitude 
In addition to the causal dimensions, intrinsic characteristics of the customers themselves might 
play a role in their attribution process. Although, the attribution theory considers people as 
rational information processors (Folkes, 1984), it does not prevent people to be biased in their 
judgements and therefore in their attribution process. 
Customers identify with MNE brands with varying degrees. On the one hand, some customers 
will praise the brand and be proud of its successes. And on the other hand, some customers will 
appreciate the brand but be indifferent about its successes and will not look for others’ approval 
of the brand. These different levels of identification with the MNE brand can possibly impact 
customers’ judgement when hearing about supply chain incidents and having to attribute 
responsibilities. Lange and Washburn (2012, p.315) argue that a customer’s social 
identification (most often referred to as organizational identification) with an implicated firm 
is negatively related to the customer’s assessment of the firm’s culpability. Therefore, 
customers are less likely to consider a firm culpable and to attribute responsibilities because the 
customer identifies with the fast fashion MNE. Therefore, I argue that: 
H6 (-). The more customers identify with the fast fashion MNE, the less responsibilities they 
attribute. 
In addition to the notion of organizational identification, there is another element that can 
possibly influences customers’ judgement when hearing about supply chain incidents and 
having to attribute responsibilities. For example, customer’s knowledge about previous 
incidents and knowledge about the MNE CSR initiatives can influence customer’s perceptions 
of the MNE. 
CSI information influences stakeholders’ perceptions of an MNE’s responsibilities which in 
turn impacts stakeholders’ attitudes toward that MNE (Lange and Washburn, 2012; Lin-Hi and 
Muller, 2013). In addition, fast fashion MNEs’ CSI record affect consumers’ perceptions of 
those fast fashion MNEs (Brown and Dacin 1997; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). It is argued 
that, fast fashion MNEs that are considered as socially irresponsible will be evaluated 
negatively by consumers (Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001; Yoon et al., 2003). In the present study, 
MNEs are not directly causing the accident nor directly behaving irresponsibly. However, it 
does not prevent customers from perceiving MNEs disposition to deal with irresponsible 
behaving suppliers. 
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Previous research has shown that perceived unethical corporate behaviour has an influence on 
consumer attitude (Folkes and Kamins, 1999). Lange and Washburn (2012, p.313) argue that a 
customer’s perception of a firm disposition for irresponsible behaviour is positively related to 
the customer’s assessment of the firm’s culpability. Briefly explained by Lange and Washburn 
(2012, p.312), it means that: “consumer’s prior perceptions of the company as socially 
responsible create a halo or spill over effect, leading to a bias about whether the company is or 
is not responsible for the product-harm crisis”. Building from that assumption, if a consumer is 
less likely to consider a firm culpable due to firm perceived disposition for irresponsible 
behaviour, it will also be less likely to attribute responsibility because the assessment of 
culpability is key in consumer’s process of determining the responsibility attribution (Lange 
and Washburn, 2012). Therefore, I argue that: 
H7 (+). The more customers perceive the fast fashion MNE as socially irresponsible, the more 
responsibilities they attribute. 
Anger 
CSI information about MNEs or their suppliers affect the stakeholders’ perceptions of MNEs 
and stakeholders’ perceptions of MNEs influence positively or negatively their behaviour 
towards those MNEs (Paloviita and Luoma-Aho, 2010, Lange and Washburn, 2012; Lin-Hi and 
Muller, 2013). Consumers’ responsibility attributions are intrinsically linked to emotional and 
behavioural reactions (Weiner, 1986, 1995). The more responsibility is attributed to an MNE, 
the stronger the emotional and behavioural reactions (Fincham and Jaspars, 1980; Shaver, 
2012).  Weber (2004) argue that higher degree of agent’s blame lead to higher degrees of anger. 
Agent’s blame refers to consumer’s responsibility attribution. According to Weiner’s (1986, 
1995) attribution process, anger is the most likely emotional reaction to be experienced by 
consumers following responsibility attribution for negative incidents. Furthermore, it is 
suggested that the intensity of consumers’ emotional reaction depends on how they attribute 
responsibilities (Ortony et al., 1988; Machleit and Mantel, 2001). Differently said, consumers’ 
causal inferences about a negative event influences their anger level. Previous research studying 
the relationships between attribution and emotion have found that consumers that attribute 
responsibilities to the firm for a negative event, exhibited higher levels of anger (Folkes et al., 
1987; Diaz et al., 2002; Funches, 2011, Hartmann and Moeller, 2014). Therefore, I argue that: 
H8 (+). Higher levels of customer responsibility attribution, towards the fast fashion MNEs for 
social irresponsible supplier behaviour, lead to higher levels of customer anger. 
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Boycott 
The major boycott motivation has been identified as being an instrumental motivation. In this 
case, boycott is an instrument used to make the target change or discontinue a detrimental 
behaviour (Friedman, 1999). It is expected that higher levels of anger would lead to higher 
levels of willingness to boycott.  
A decade ago, Klein et al. (2004, p.92) observed that “as a result of greater public attention to 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the increased vulnerability of brands and corporate 
reputations, boycotts have become ever more relevant for management decision making.” This 
observation remains pertinent today. The internet, through social networks and communities, 
allows customers to make their willingness to punish corporate brands a reality. Internet has 
eased customers’ retaliation against corporate brands for CSI activities. (Sweetin et al., 2013). 
Sweetin et al. (2013) found that consumers were more likely to punish and less likely to reward 
socially irresponsible firms in comparison with socially responsible firms. They also found that 
the purchase intention and the brand attitude were lower for the socially irresponsible firms 
compared to the socially responsible firms (Sweetin et al., 2013). Consumers are more likely to 
punish or boycott socially irresponsible firms than to reward socially responsible firms (e.g. 
paying a premium for responsible products). (Mohr et al., 2001; Sweetin et al., 2013). 
Consumers’ willingness to punish corporate brands can be materialized through various actions 
(bad word of mouth, complaint, boycott…) but the current study exclusively focus on boycott. 
First, because boycott has a direct impact on products sales and harm the brand image. Second, 
because there is empirical support showing that boycott is a mechanism used by consumers to 
hold corporate brands responsible for CSR failings (Klein et al., 2004). Using Friedman’s 
(1985, p. 97) definition, consumer boycott is “an attempt by one or more parties to achieve 
certain objectives by urging individual consumers to refrain from making selected purchases in 
the marketplace.” Modern boycotts are motivated by irresponsible corporate practices rather 
than by socio-political agenda (e.g. civil rights) (Klein et al., 2004). Boycott are typically called 
by NGOs condemning irresponsible corporate practices (Klein et al., 2004) and boycotts 
“represent a source of consumer power and a mechanism for the social control of business” 
(Klein et al., 2004, p.92). 
However, consumers may be willing to punish corporate brands but they do not necessarily 
know what are the reasons that motivates them to take actions (Carlsmith, 2008). Consumers 
may not be aware of their own motivation and to which extent they desire to punish corporate 
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brands (Sweetin et al., 2013). Although this research is not focused on individual consumer’s 
motivation to boycott, investigating the reasons that motivate consumers to participate in 
boycott is important to understand consumers’ behaviour towards firms they perceive as acting 
irresponsibly. Klein et al. (2004) found that consumers’ participation to a boycott depends 
among other things on: the perceived egregiousness of the firm’s actions, the belief that the 
boycott is the appropriate and effective response, to feel good about themselves if they take part 
in the boycott, the estimation of others participation in the boycott and assessment of the 
available alternatives to the boycotted product. Klein et al. (2004) argue that negative emotions, 
such as anger, are a good indicator of boycott participation. 
In addition, Kalamas et al (2008) found that with increasing anger levels, consumers were more 
inclined to deliberately to worsen the consequences of their actions towards a firm. 
Correspondingly, anger was found to have a negative effect on future purchasing behaviour and 
increased levels of anger make consumers less likely to repurchase products from the firm 
(Bougie et al., 2003; Chebat and Slusarczyk, 2005; Kalamas et al., 2008). Therefore, I argue 
that: 
H9 (+). Higher levels of customer anger, towards the fast fashion MNEs for social irresponsible 
supplier behaviour, lead to higher levels of customer willingness to boycott.  
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Figure 5. Research model including hypothesis for consumer reaction for supplier irresponsible behaviour resulting in OSH incident  
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3. Methodology 
The methodology chapter presents the methodology used in this master’s thesis. More precisely, 
the chapter covers the selected research method, the data collection, the operationalization of 
the measures and the statistical analysis method used.  
3.1 Choice of research method 
This section explains why the vignette-based experiment survey was selected as the research 
method and argues for the company included in the survey and how the vignettes were 
developed. Each vignette and related scenarios are described and put in relation with the 
hypothesis. 
3.1.1 Vignette-based experiment survey 
The data collection methodology is the method that refers to the collection of observations from 
respondents. Picking an appropriate data collection methodology is essential to ensure that the 
research problem is appropriately addressed and provides coherence for the research design. To 
measure customer responsibility attribution, consumer anger and consumer boycott intentions 
it was decided to perform a quantitative methodology under the form of a self-administered 
vignette-based experiments survey.  
One of the advantage of self-administered survey is that they do not require the presence of an 
interviewer or the presence of the researcher (Scheaffer et al., 2011). Because the contact 
between the researcher and the respondents are limited, self-administered surveys may be 
subject to low response rate consequently producing a non-representative sample (Scheaffer et 
al., 2011). However, the current study survey was made available through the online survey 
platform Webropol making it impossible to measure the response rate. Nevertheless, the online 
survey platform indicates that 612 people visited the survey web page and in total 202 people 
submitted a questionnaire which means that 33% of the people that visited the survey web page 
actually responded to the questionnaire. The survey methodology was selected as the most 
relevant method because the survey is the method used to gather information from a sample of 
individuals and the present study requires to gather information from fast fashion consumers. 
One issue relating to survey methodologies is that the comparisons of answers to a set of 
questions within a single survey is problematic because respondents’ answers may be 
influenced by the other questions in the survey (Schuman and Presser, 1981). For example, to 
test whether consumers attribute more responsibility to MNEs for OSH incidents caused by the 
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supplier irresponsible behaviour in function of the organizational distance between the MNE 
and the supplier, one could successively present the respondents with the following affirmation: 
The MNE is responsible for the incident. And ask them to assess (using a Likert-scale) whether 
they agree or disagree with the affirmation in a situation where there is no intermediary, one 
intermediary or two intermediaries between the MNE and the supplier. However, this is 
problematic because respondents’ answer to one situation may be influenced by the answers 
they gave to the other two situations.  
The current study, through the dimension of causal determination constantly assesses how 
consumers attribute responsibility in function of varying situations (e.g. the severity of the 
incident is high or the severity is low). Therefore, the fact that previous questions may influence 
respondent’s answers to other questions needs to be addressed to ensure the internal validity of 
the findings. To solve this issue, one would suggest to test the different situations in different 
surveys. However, responses may change over time and variations across surveys would cause 
more problems (Schuman and Bobo, 1988). The survey methodology that avoids these 
problems is the vignette-based experiment survey with the use of subsamples within the survey 
(Schuman and Bobo, 1988). Two important concerns to consider when picking a methodology 
are: internal and external validity. Internal validity refers to the extent to which the causal 
relationships are guaranteed within the study by minimizing the systematic error. The external 
validity refers to the extent to which the findings can be generalized to other situations or 
contexts. By improving the realism of the experimentation and by allowing the researcher to 
select the independent variables, the vignette-based experiments simultaneously improve 
internal and external validity (Atzmüller and Steiner, 2010). Consequently, this methodology 
was selected for the current study.  
In survey methodology, vignettes are short texts depicting a situation and containing carefully 
worded elements that are believed to be essential in the respondents’ judgement-making process 
(Alexander and Becker, 1978; Atzmüller and Steiner, 2010). Vignettes are useful to standardize 
the situation across respondents and to avoid that respondents impute additional information 
when answering abstract questions (Alexander and Becker, 1978). In the current study scenarios 
are sometimes referred to as “cases”. Different scenarios or version of the same vignettes are 
then assigned to different respondents (Alexander and Becker, 1978). According to Alexander 
and Becker (1978) the main advantage of vignette-based survey is that it allows the analysis of 
variation in respondent’s judgement by systematically modifying characteristics of the 
described situation. In order to perform the analysis between respondents it is essential to ensure 
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that the different vignettes scenarios are approximately equally spread across the sample 
(Alexander and Becker, 1978). Table 1 shows the distribution per vignette of the different 
scenarios across the respondents. 
 
 
 
Atzmüller and Steiner (2010) have identified three different types of vignette-based 
experiments: within-subjects design in which respondents are presented with all the possible 
scenarios from each vignette, mixed design in which respondents are presented with one 
scenario from each vignette and between-subjects design in which respondents are presented 
with only one scenario from one of the vignettes. To prevent respondents from having to answer 
a lengthy and repetitive survey, the within-design was rejected. The between-subjects design is 
subject to measurement problems (Birnbaum, 1999). Therefore, the mixed design was selected 
for the vignette based-experiments. 
In order to test the hypothesised relationships a vignette-based survey was designed. Three 
vignettes presenting varying incidents characteristics were developed. The vignettes describe 
different situations/scenarios in which an MNE is engaged in an outsourcing/off-shoring 
relationship with a developing country supplier and in which an OSH incident resulting from 
supplier irresponsible behaviour occurs. The research model of the current study comprises of 
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202 202 202
ZARA vignette (N=202) C&A vignette (N=202) H&M vignette (N=202)
Scenario 1 (two-tier 
supply chain)
Scenario 1 (low supplier 
importance and company)
Total Total Total
Scenario 1 (low severity 
and functional ssms)
Scenario 2 (low severity 
and dysfunctional ssms)
Scenario 3 (high severity 
and functional ssms)
Scenario 4 (high severity 
and dysfunctional ssms)
Scenario 3 (high supplier 
importance and company)
Scenario 2 (low supplier 
importance and individual)
Scenario 4 (high supplier 
importance and individual)
Scenario 2 (three-
tier supply chain)
Scenario 3 (four-tier 
supply chain)
Table 1. Number of respondents per vignette and per scenario 
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5 dimensions of causal determination which would necessitate the production of 5 different 
vignettes for a total of 11 scenarios (4 of the dimensions of causal determination are 
dichotomous situation and 1 has three situations). Nevertheless, to avoid respondents fatigue 
when answering the survey the number of vignettes was limited to three. Two of the vignettes 
(C&A and H&M) were composed with two dimensions of causal determinations and one 
vignette (ZARA) was composed with only one dimension of causal determination. Moreover, 
the inclusion of more than one explanatory factors in a vignette enhance the realism of the 
scenarios (Atzmüller and Steiner, 2010). To prevent correlation between the dimensions of 
causal determination the two dimensions of causal determination that referred to controllability 
(organizational distance and supplier criticality) and the two dimensions of causal 
determination that referred to stability (company vs. individual act and supplier safety 
management system) were split across different vignette. The different vignettes and scenarios 
are discussed in subsection 3.1.3 to 3.1.4 and presented in Appendix 1. 
3.1.2 Company selection 
All the companies that are included in the vignette-based survey meet the following criteria: 
first, they are multinational enterprises operating in the fast-fashion industry; second, they have 
a high physical presence in Belgium through numerous stores; third, they source materials, parts 
or products from suppliers located in developing countries; and fourth, in recent years, one of 
their suppliers was confronted with social sustainable issues. 
I decided to only select multinational enterprises because “MNEs were among the organizations 
first called to take actions” (Escobar and Vredenburg, 2011, p.39) on sustainable development 
and because “MNEs are confronted with institutional tensions more frequently than are 
uninational firms” (Cantwell et al., 2010, p.572) helping them to reach higher levels of CSR 
(Sharfman et al., 2004). For this research, I set the focus on MNEs operating in the fast fashion 
industry. Because the fast fashion industry is often criticized for its social practices and its quest 
to take advantage of cheap labour condition (Bruce and Daly, 2006). Additionally, it was 
decided to select companies evolving in the same industry in order to produce results that are 
comparable or that are, at least, not biased due to industry differences. Contrary to Hartmann 
and Moeller (2014), I developed the vignette-based experiments using existing companies.  For 
their research, Hartmann and Moeller (2014), created fictional company names and brands, 
mainly to prevent bias caused by customers’ identification with existing brands. However, this 
research also aims to determine whether customer’s organizational identification influence the 
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responsibility attribution. Existing MNE brands were used because respondents are more likely 
to be familiar with their brands and products.  
The three company cases selected to build the survey are: H&M, C&A and ZARA. They were 
selected because they respect all the above-mentioned criteria. Another reason that led to the 
selection of these MNEs is because they exhibit strong sustainability communication strategies. 
In addition, extensive marketing and communication make CSR practices and policies of MNEs 
more likely to be known by potential respondents than those of smaller firms. ZARA is a brand 
of the largest global clothing retailer, namely INDITEX, and it has 2,162 stores located in 88 
countries, out of which 27 are located in Belgium as of 2015 (INDITEX, 2015). ZARA also 
has an online store available in Belgium. Though the MNE owning the ZARA brand is 
INDITEX, the term “ZARA” will be used throughout the thesis when referring to that case in 
order to remove potential confusion.  
The links between the theory, the constructs, the hypotheses, and vignette-based experiments 
are presented in Table 2. The ZARA case was developed to test H1 (organizational distance). 
C&A is a large global clothing retailer and has 1575 retail stores in Europe, out of which 138 
were located in Belgium as of November 2016. C&A also has an online store available in 
Belgium. The C&A case was developed to test H2 (supplier criticality) and H3 (company vs. 
individual). H&M is the second largest global clothing retailer and it has 4,351 retail stores in 
61 countries, out of which 90 were located in Belgium as of November 2016 (H&M, 2016). 
H&M also has an online store available in Belgium. The H&M case was developed to test H4 
(SSMS) and H5 (severity). The experiments and their detailed scenarios can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
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3.1.3 ZARA vignette: worker exploitation 
Experiments were developed for each of the selected fast fashion MNEs, namely: ZARA, C&A 
and H&M. The content of the experiments is fictional but was broadly inspired by real incidents 
that took place in developing country garment factories. The real case accidents were adapted 
to create the scenarios and to fit the different hypotheses. The structure of the experiments and 
the related scenarios were adapted from Hartmann and Moeller (2014). 
In 2011, the Brazilian government identified 52 charges against INDITEX (ZARA’s parent 
company) after AHA, the company that produces 90% of ZARA’s Brazilian production, had 
sub-contracted the production to a factory in Sao Paulo. The subcontracted factory was 
exploiting 15 migrant workers from Bolivia and Peru. One of the worker was only 14 years old. 
The workers were living on site and worked 12-hour shift in dangerous conditions. The workers 
earned between $156 and $290 while Brazil’s minimum wage was at that time $344. ZARA 
said it did not authorized AHA to outsource the production and therefore could not be held 
responsible. (The Guardian, 2011). Building from that real case incident, the first experiment 
was developed to test whether organizational distance (H1) influences customer’s responsibility 
Table 2. Links between theory, constructs, hypotheses and experiments 
Manipulated constructs Hypothesis Experiments
Causal dimensions
Controllability Organizational distance H1 ZARA
Importance of the supplier H2 C&A
Stability Company vs. Individual H3 C&A
Supplier Safety Management System H4 H&M
Severity Degree of severity H5 H&M
Consumer attitude
Identification with the brand Organizational Identification H6 All
Perceived brand CSI Perceived coporate social irresponsibility H7 All
Consumer reaction
Causal inferences Responsibility attribution H1 to H5 All
Emotional reaction Anger H8 All
Behavioral reaction Boycott H9 All
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attribution. The situation described in the experiment depicts ZARA outsourcing its production 
of hoodies to Nolio Inc., a garment manufacturer exploiting adult migrants, located in Sao 
Paulo, Brazil. Three different scenarios were developed by modifying one variable: the number 
of intermediaries between ZARA and Nolio Inc. In the first scenario, there is no intermediary 
between ZARA and Nolio Inc, in the second scenario, there is one intermediary (the Brazilian 
garment wholesaler, Hozipa) and in the third scenario, there are two intermediaries (the Latin 
American garment wholesaler, Texerio and the Brazilian garment wholesaler, Hozipa).  
3.1.4 C&A vignette: factory fire 
On November 24th 2012, a fire broke out at the Tazreen Fashion factory, a multi-storey garment 
factory located outside Bangladesh's capital, Dhaka. The fire killed 123 workers and injured 
more than 150 others. The factory was producing garments for European fast fashion MNEs, 
including C&A. Incident reports suggest that the factory fire exit had locks on which had to be 
broken to enable workers to escape the site. (The Guardian, 2012). Building from that real case 
incident, the second experiment was developed to test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
tested in this experiment aims to find out whether the strategic importance of the supplier (H2) 
for the MNE influences customer’s responsibility attribution. The second hypothesis tested 
aims to find out whether the customer’s responsibility attribution will be influenced by who 
caused the incident at the supplier factory (H3). The situation described in the experiment 
depicts C&A outsourcing its production of t-shirts to the Tazreen Fashion Factory, a garment 
manufacturer, located in Dhaka, Bangladesh. In the experiment, a fire breaks out at the factory 
and workers are injured and killed. Four different scenarios were developed by modifying two 
variables: the strategic importance of the supplier for C&A (the sourced t-shirts are critical 
products that attract a lot of customers in C&A stores versus the t-shirts are basic products and 
customers would continue to go to C&A stores even if those were not available) and who caused 
the incident at the supplier factory (the supplier as a whole failed to prevent the incident versus 
an individual worker failed to prevent the incident). 
3.1.5 H&M vignette: factory fire 
In March 2010, a fire broke out at the Garib & Garib Newaj Company, a Bangladeshi garment 
factory manufacturing cardigans and jumpers for the fast fashion MNE H&M. The fire killed 
21 workers and 50 were injured. The fire broke out at 9pm, workers were still present on site to 
fulfil orders. Reports suggest that the factory had ineffective fire equipment. However, H&M 
said to have audited the factory in October and did not found serious safety failure. (The 
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independent, 2010). Building from that real case accident, the third experiment was developed 
to test whether the severity of the incidents (H5) and the successful implementation of safety 
codes of conduct (H4) influence customer’s responsibility attribution. The situation described 
in the experiment depicts H&M outsourcing its production of t-shirts to Khulna Inc., a garment 
manufacturer, located in Bangladesh. In the experiment, a fire breaks out at the factory and 
workers are injured and/or killed. Four different scenarios were developed by modifying two 
variables: the severity of the incident (a small number of workers injured versus a high number 
of workers injured and killed) and the implementation of a code of conduct on safety 
management systems (the successful implementation of the code led to improvement in safety 
within the supplier factory versus the unsuccessful implementation of the code leaving workers 
at risk in terms of safety). 
3.1.6 Manipulation checks 
Respondents were asked to answer manipulation check questions in order to verify that they 
perceived as intended the vignette-scenario that they were requested to reflect upon (Field and 
Hole, 2003). The ZARA vignettes tests one hypothesis. The cases presented variations based 
on incident controllability (organizational distance). The ZARA vignette has three scenarios. 
Each of the scenario has a different number of intermediary (ranging from 0 to 2) between fast 
fashion MNE and the irresponsible supplier. In case 1, there is no intermediary between ZARA 
and Nolio Inc. In case 2, there is one intermediary between ZARA and Nolio Inc. And in case 
3, there are two intermediaries between ZARA and Nolio Inc. With respect to the experimental 
manipulation of the ZARA vignette, participants were asked how many intermediaries there are 
between ZARA and the supplier in the situation. Graph 1 summarizes the answer of the 
respondent to the manipulation check. There are 202 respondents that answered one of the 
ZARA cases: 54 answered the case 1, 92 answered the case 2 and 56 answered the case 3. Out 
of the 54 respondents of case 1, 42 answered the manipulation check question correctly (zero 
intermediary) and 12 answered the manipulation check question incorrectly (7 for one 
intermediary and 5 for two intermediaries). Out of the 92 respondents of case 2, 60 answered 
the manipulation check question correctly (one intermediary) and 32 answered the manipulation 
check question incorrectly (2 for zero intermediary and 30 for two intermediaries). Finally, out 
of the 56 respondents of case 3, 53 answered the manipulation check question correctly (two 
intermediaries) and 3 answered the manipulation check question incorrectly (3 for one 
intermediary). Many respondents to whom case 2 was presented answered the manipulation 
check question incorrectly. The two main reasons to explain that are that either respondents did 
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not understand the case or that the case was flawed and therefore confusing. These results 
potentially have important consequences for H1 (effect of organizational distance on 
responsibility attribution). In order to ensure that the results of H1 are not impacted by the 
respondents that responded wrongly to the manipulation check, H1 will be tested two times. 
First, with the 202 observations. Second, with the 30 respondents that answered the 
manipulation check wrongly removed, leaving 182 observations. The results can be found ins 
section 4.3 Hypothesis testing. 
 
 
 
 
The C&A vignette tests two hypotheses. The cases presented variations and based on incident 
controllability (supplier criticality) based on incident stability (company vs. individual). With 
respect to the manipulations present in the C&A vignette, participants were asked whether the 
supplier played an important role in C&A activities and whether the described irresponsible 
behaviour was caused by an individual worker of the supplier or by the supplier as a company. 
The answers of the previous questions were collected using a seven-point scale (1= strongly 
disagree; 7= strongly agree). There are 202 respondents that answered one of the C&A cases: 
60 answered the case 1, 43 answered the case 2, 50 answered the case 3 and 49 answered case 
4. Case 1 and case 2 described a situation in which the supplier was not particularly important 
for C&A activities and case 3 and case 4 described a situation in which the supplier was critical 
for C&A activities. On average, when asked about supplier criticality, respondents that were 
Graph 1. Results of ZARA manipulation check 
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presented case 1 (mean= 4,05; median=3) and case 2 (mean=3.98; median=4) considered that 
the supplier was less critical for C&A activities than the respondents that were presented case 
3 (mean=5,84; median=6) and case 4 (mean=5,69; median=6). It seems that the respondents 
perceived the supplier criticality manipulation as intended. Case 1 and case 3 described a 
situation in which the supplier as a whole was responsible for the irresponsible behaviour and 
case 2 and case 4 described a situation in which an individual worker of the supplier was 
responsible for the irresponsible behaviour. On average, when presented an affirmation stating 
that an individual worker caused the accident, respondents that were presented case 1 
(mean=2,38; median=2) and case 3 (mean=2,56; median=2) disagreed with the affirmation and 
the respondents that were presented case 2 (mean=4,58; median=5) and case 4 (mean=5,39; 
median=6) agreed with it. It seems that the respondents perceived company vs individual 
manipulation as intended. 
The H&M vignette tests two hypotheses. The cases presented variations based on the incident 
severity (high severity vs. low severity) and based on incident stability (supplier safety 
management system). With respect to the manipulations present in the H&M vignette, 
participants were asked whether the described accident is severe and whether a similar accident 
will happen again in future. The answers were collected using a seven-point scale (1= strongly 
disagree; 7= strongly agree). There are 202 respondents that answered one of the H&M cases: 
44 answered the case 1, 58 answered the case 2, 57 answered the case 3 and 43 answered case 
4. Case 1 and case 2 described a situation in which the accident severity was “low” (55 workers 
were bothered by the smokes) and case 3 and case 4 described a situation in which the accident 
severity was “high” (21 workers killed, 34 workers injured and another 55 workers bothered by 
the smokes). On average, when presented an affirmation stating that the described accident was 
severe, respondents that were presented case 1 (mean=5,13; median=6) and case 2 (mean=5,67; 
median=6) somewhat agreed with the affirmation but the respondents that were presented case 
3 (mean=6,03; median=6) and case 4 (mean=6,37; median=7) agreed with it. It seems that the 
respondents perceived the severity manipulation as intended. Case 1 and case 3 described a 
situation in which H&M successfully implemented a safety management system at its supplier 
and case 2 and case 4 described a situation in which H&M unsuccessfully implemented a safety 
management system at its supplier. The successful implementation suggests that the safety 
management system is functional and that it will prevent future accident and the unsuccessful 
implementation suggests that the safety management system is dysfunctional and that it will 
fail prevent future accident. On average, when presented an affirmation stating that a similar 
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accident will happen again in the future, respondents that were presented case 1 (mean=4,86; 
median=5) and case 3 (mean=4,87; median=5) were neutral or somewhat agreed with the 
affirmation but the respondents that were presented case 2 (mean=5,72; median=6) and case 4 
(mean=5,62; median=6) agreed with it. It seems that the respondents perceived the stability 
(supplier safety management system) manipulation as intended. 
 
  
67 
 
3.2 Data collection 
The data collection section contains the definition of the studied population, the sampling 
methodology, the sample size calculations, the sample definition, the demographics of the 
respondents and the limitations of the data collected. 
3.2.1 Studied population 
The present study aims to measure customers’ responsibility attribution to MNEs for supplier 
irresponsible behaviour, consumer anger and consumer boycott intentions. Building on that, it 
was decided that the target population to extract the sample from is the Walloon population. 
Wallonia is an administrative region within Belgium. The reasons behind this choice are that 
first, the researcher is from Belgium and is currently living in Belgium, it is therefore easier to 
approach and survey the targeted population, second the present study targets consumers and 
non-consumers, therefore selecting the Walloon population as the target population makes 
sense. Table 3 presents the structure of the Walloon population by group of age and sex for the 
year 2016 (Eurostat, 2016). The sample will be extracted from the Walloon population that is 
at least 18 years old.  
 
 
 
There are three important ethical considerations when conducting online surveys: anonymity, 
privacy and consent of the respondents (Rhodes et al., 2003). The survey was designed to ensure 
anonymity and the online tool Webropol ensure the privacy of the collected data. It is difficult 
to obtain parental consent for self-administered online survey. Therefore, respondents 
minimum age was set at 18 years old to ensure that parental consent is not needed for 
respondents younger than 18 (Maddox, 2016). Although, according to the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) there is no clear regulation about parental consent and 
Table 3. Structure of the Walloon population by group of age and sex for 2016 (Eurostat, 2016)  
Population % Population % Population %
Male 389210 10,8 1378928 38,1 1768138 48,9
Female 371607 10,3 1478088 40,9 1849695 51,1
Total 760817 21,0 2857016 79,0 3617833 100
Less than 18 years Over 18 years Total
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age groups in Belgium for the participation of minors in research (FRA, 2014), it was decided 
to take a “low-risk approach to the research conduct” as suggested by Maddox (2016, p.85). In 
addition, it ensures that the respondents are old enough to be knowledgeable about the fast 
fashion MNEs and that the respondents understand the cases and its consequences and that the 
respondents are making their own clothing purchase decisions.  
3.2.2 Convenience sampling 
The data collection is an important step for every research. The definition of the surveyed 
population and the selection of the sampling method are crucial elements in the research design. 
The most suitable sampling method for survey research would be a probabilistic method such 
as the simple random sampling method. The simple random sampling method is considered 
appropriate because individuals from the studied population do have an equal chance of being 
selected to be part of the sample. It prevents a sampling error known as sampling bias. Sampling 
bias is caused by a sampling methods that does not give each member of the studied population 
an equal chance of being selected in the sample. It implies that the sample may not be 
representative of the studied population. (Gideon, 2012, p.40). 
However, resource, budget and time constraints do not allow the researcher to use the simple 
random sampling method for this research. Instead, the use of a non-random sampling method 
called convenience sampling is preferred. The data were collected through the convenience 
sampling method using the researcher’s own social network.  The convenience sampling 
method is classified as a non-random sampling method because individuals from the studied 
population do not have an equal chance of being selected to be part of the sample. The sample 
obtained through the convenience sampling methods is made of respondents from the 
researcher’s social network that were available and were easily recruited to participate in the 
study. (Gideon, 2012, p.67). 
The convenience sampling method offers advantages and limitations. For this master’s thesis 
research, the convenience sampling method was selected to collect data because it provides, 
with the help of social network websites, a simple way to obtain a lot of responses in a short 
period of time and at no cost. Indeed, the convenience sampling method is the least expensive 
in terms of money and time for the researcher. These two advantages made the convenience 
sampling the best sampling method for the current study. In addition, the convenience sampling 
was selected because it allows to include respondents based on their accessibility and proximity 
to the researcher. However, the convenience sampling method, due to its non-probabilistic form 
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of sampling, introduces the risk of selecting only people with similar characteristics and 
background. Convenience sampling convey high risk of a major sampling error. In addition, 
findings obtained with the help of convenient samples should not be used to make 
generalizations for the entire population. Nevertheless, the sample error risk can be contained 
by selecting a sample large enough and if necessary by applying sampling error formulas to the 
data (Ferber, 1977; Randall et al., 1990).  
The data were collected through a self-administered online survey. Before being published the 
survey was pretested by 8 people. Based on the pretesting feedbacks and comments the 
vignette-based experiments were adapted. The final survey was made available using the online 
questionnaire platform Webropol (provided by Aalto University) and shared through Facebook 
(public posts and personalized messages), Linkedin (public posts) and by contacting people by 
email. People receiving and completing the survey were asked to further share it to their social 
networks in order to reach a diverse and sufficient number of participants. The survey was only 
available online and it was considered sufficient because as argued by Bhutta (2012, p.61): “as 
the internet penetration continues to increase, web-based samples become increasingly 
representative of the population of interest”. The convenience sampling method does not allow 
the researcher to know how many people were asked to fill in the survey and establishing a 
response rate is made impossible. The survey was first shared on the 13th of February, 2017 
and the data collection was closed on the 30th of June, 2017. During that time, data were 
collected from 202 respondents in total. None of the 202 observations had to be deleted for 
missing data because all item questions were made mandatory. 
3.2.3 Sample size 
As above mentioned the external validity of the sample may be limited because the main 
problems of the convenience sampling method are sample representativeness and selection bias 
(Baltar and Brunet, 2012). In order to reduce the sample bias induced by the convenience 
sampling method it is important to select a sample that is big enough to prevent the samples 
bias. However, convenience sampling methods do not have formulas that define the required 
sample size. But since there are formulas that calculate the required sample size for the simple 
random sampling method, these formulas will be used to set the minimum required sample size 
for this research. 
The present study will therefore use Cochran’s (1977) sample size formula, retrieved from 
Bartlett et al. (2001), for simple random sampling to determine the size of the sample. Cochran’s 
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(1977) formula is built on two key elements. The first one, the margin of error also described 
as the error the researcher is willing to accept (Bartlett et al., 2001). The second one, alpha level 
defined as “the level of acceptable risk the research is willing to accept that the true margin of 
error exceeds the acceptable margin of error” (Bartlett et al., 2001, p.44-45). 
 
𝑛𝑜 =
𝑡2 ∗ 𝑠2
𝑑2
 
n0 = the sample size required 
t = t-value for the alpha level selected 
s = estimate of standard deviation in the population 
d = acceptable margin of error for mean being estimated 
 
The next step, in determining the required sample size, is to set the values of t, s and d within 
the equation. The acceptable margin of error for mean being estimated (d) is obtained by the 
product of the acceptable margin of error with the number of point on the primary scale. The 
acceptable margin of error must be decided arbitrarily. For educational and social research, the 
rule is that a margin of error of 3% is acceptable for continuous data (Krejcie and Morgan, 
1970). The acceptable margin of error selected is therefore 3%. The number of points on the 
primary scale is obtained by selecting a variable as the primary variable of measurement 
(Bartlett et al., 2001). The number of points on its scale is used in then used to calculate the d. 
The primary variable of measurement in the present study is boycott, the variable is measured 
through a seven-point scale. The number of points on the primary scale is 7. 
Now that d is determined and the acceptable margin of error is selected, it is time to determine 
the t-value for the alpha level selected (t). The alpha level should also be determined arbitrarily 
by the researcher. However, most educational and social research studies use an alpha level of 
either 0.05 or 0.01 (Ary et al., 1996). The present study considers an alpha of 0.05. The t-value 
for an alpha of 0.05 and a target population exceeding 120 is 1.96 (Bartlett et al., 2001). 
To estimate the standard deviation in the population (s), Cochran (1977) has proposed a formula 
where for s to be obtained “one must determine the inclusive range of the scale, and then divide 
by the number of standard deviations that would include all possible values in the range” 
(Bartlett et al., 2001, p.45). The inclusive range of the scale is 7 (the primary variable of 
measurement is measure through a seven-point scale) and the number of standard deviations 
that would include all possible values in the range is 6. Three standards deviation on each side 
of the means would capture 98% of the responses (Bartlett et al., 2001). 
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𝑠 =  
7 (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒)
6 (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
≈ 1.1667 
 
Now that t, s and d have been determined we can introduce their value in the equation in order 
to obtain the required size of the sample (n0). 
 
𝑛0 =  
𝑡2 ∗ 𝑠2
𝑑2
=  
1.962 ∗ 1.16672
(7 ∗ 0.03)2
≅ 119 
 
In this case, Cochran’s (1977) equation determines that the minimum number of respondents to 
be included in the sample for simple random sampling method with continuous data is 119. 
This sample size of 119 respondents is, here, considered as the minimum required sample size 
for the convenience sampling method.  
 
3.2.4 Demographics 
The data collection resulted in 202 valid responses to the online survey. In total, there were 606 
observations as all respondents answered questions regarding the three different vignettes. The 
demographic characteristics of the respondents are summarized in Table 4. More than half of 
the respondents, 67,3%, represent younger generation being 30 years old or below that. In 
addition, majority of the respondents (61,9%) were female. The educational background of 
16,8% of the respondents was upper secondary or lower. Almost half of the respondents have 
a master’s degree (49,5%) and a third (32,7%) of the respondents have a bachelor’s degree as 
their highest level of education. Considering the convenient sampling method, it is not 
surprizing because the pool of respondents represents researcher’s social network. 
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  Table 4. Demographic characteristics of the sample 
%
Gender
Male 77 38,1 38,1
Female 125 61,9 100,0
Age
18-19 7 3,5 3,5
20-24 51 25,2 28,7
25-29 78 38,6 67,3
30-34 9 4,5 71,8
35-39 10 5,0 76,7
40-44 8 4,0 80,7
45-49 13 6,4 87,1
50-54 10 5,0 92,1
55-59 8 4,0 96,0
60-64 6 3,0 99,0
>65 2 1,0 100,0
Education
Primary School 1 0,5 0,5
Lower secondary 5 2,5 3,0
Upper secondary 28 13,9 16,8
Bachelor 66 32,7 49,5
Master 100 49,5 99,0
PhD 1 0,5 99,5
Other 1 0,5 100,0
N of respondents (n=202) Cumulative %
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3.3 Measures 
This section presents the measures (Table 5) and gives details about their operationalization. 
Most of the variables were measured using a seven-point scale with extremities labelled with 
an intensity stimulus (e.g. strongly disagree – strongly agree) (Petersen, 2000). An odd number 
was selected to construct the scales in order to allow the respondents to have a 
neutral/indifferent opinion (Petersen, 2000). 
  
 
Table 5. Constructs and items measured 
Contruct Items Adapted from
Organizational OI1 I am proud of the success of Brand X Mael and Ashforth (1992)
identification OI2 I am interested in what others think about Brand X
OI3
OI4
OI5
Perceived Corporate PCSI1 Brand X is not aware of social issues Currás-Pérez et al. (2009)
social irresponsibility PCSI2 Brand X does not fulfil its social responsibilities
PCSI3 Brand X does not give back to society
PCSI4 Brand X does no act in a socially responsible way
PCSI5
Responsibility RA1 Brand X is responsible for the accident
attribution RA2 Brand X is careless
RA3 The accident is the fault of Brand X Klein and Dawar (2004)
RA4 Brand X is to blame for the accident
RA5 Brand X should be accountable for the accident
Anger AN1 As a customer of Brand X, I would be angry Crossley (2009)
AN2 As a customer of Brand X, I would be enraged
AN3 As a customer of Brand X, I would be offended
Boycott BO1
BO2
BO3
BO4
Hartmann and Moeller 
(2014)
Hartmann and Moeller 
(2014)
Following the accident, as a customer, I would 
boycott Brand X
Following the accident, as a customer, I would stop 
buying products from Brand X
When someone praises Brand X, it feels like a 
compliment
If a story in the media criticized Brand X, I would 
feel embarrassed
When someone criticizes Brand X, it feels like an 
insult
Brand X sources products from suppliers that do 
not respect the workers’ rights
Following the accident, as a customer, I would do 
something to harm Brand X
Following the accident, as a customer, I would do 
something to make Brand X pay for the accident
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Organizational identification 
Customers’ organizational identification with the focal MNE brand was measured through a 5-
item-construct developed by Mael and Ashforth (1992). The construct was selected because it 
fitted the present study and because it is the most reliable and the most used through previous 
studies attempting to measure organizational identification (Bergami and Bagozzi, 2000; 
Bhattacharya et al., 1995; Bhattacharya and Sen, 2003; Kim et al., 2001; Mael and Ashforth, 
1992). However, the construct originally comprised of 6 items but 1 item was removed because 
it did not make sense for the present study. The items in the construct were measured using a 
seven-point scale (1= strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). The Cronbach’s alphas for this 
construct are 0,847 for the ZARA vignette; 0,887 for the C&A vignette and 0,822 for the H&M 
vignette. 
Perceived corporate social irresponsibility 
Customer perceived corporate social irresponsibility was measured through a 5-item-construct. 
A 4-item-construct measuring the perceived CSR image (Currás-Pérez et al., 2009) was 
selected, reversed and adapted to become a perceived corporate social irresponsibility 
measurement construct. In addition to that, one item was added to the original construct in order 
to capture the supply chain perspective. The items of the construct were measured using a 
seven-point scale (1= strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). The Cronbach’s alphas for this 
construct are 0,892 for the ZARA vignette; 0,917 for the C&A vignette and for the 0,796 H&M 
vignette. 
Responsibility attribution 
The responsibility attribution construct was built by merging two constructs from Hartmann 
and Moeller (2014) and from Klein and Dawar (2004). It was decided to merge the two 
constructs because they completed each other. From the merger results a 5-item-construct 
measuring responsibility attribution. The items of the construct were measured using a seven-
point scale (1=strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). The Cronbach’s alphas for this construct 
are 0,926 for the ZARA vignette; 0,951 for the C&A vignette and 0,914 for the H&M vignette. 
Anger 
Customers’ anger was measured through a 3-item-construct adapted from Crossley (2009). The 
items of the construct were measured using a seven-point scale (1= strongly disagree; 7= 
strongly agree). The Cronbach’s alphas for this construct are 0,912 for the ZARA vignette; 
0,940 for the C&A vignette and 0,928 for the H&M vignette. 
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Boycott 
Customers’ boycott was measured using a 4-item-construct adapted from Hartmann and 
Moeller (2014). The items of the construct were measured using a seven-point scale (1= 
strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). The Cronbach’s alphas for this construct are 0,920 for 
the ZARA vignette; 0,928 for the C&A vignette and 0,891 for the H&M vignette. 
Control variables 
As it was mentioned in the data collection subchapter, this master’s thesis data are collected 
through a survey using a convenience sampling method. However, according to Fink (2003, 
p.27): “the best way to avoid selection bias is to use probability sampling methods. If you 
cannot, you must demonstrate that the target population and the sample do not differ statistically 
on selected but important variables, such as age, health status, and education”. In addition to 
defining a minimum sample in order to improve the chances of the sample to be representative 
of the studied population, personal data were collected from respondents. Data such as age, 
gender and education level. The data were collected through control variables to statistically 
demonstrate that the samples obtained represent the target population. Special attention will be 
given to the impact of gender on perceived corporate social irresponsibility because according 
to Wagner et al. (2008) women are more sensitive to CSI than men. Additionally, Laufer and 
Gillespie (2004) argue that, when confronted to the same situation, women attribute more 
responsibility than men and that younger consumers attribute more responsibility than older 
ones. Therefore, the current study will control for the impact of respondents’ gender and age 
on responsibility attribution. 
Respondents were also asked to communicate their Belgian zip code at the end of the survey in 
order to ensure that a majority of them is not located in the same region or area. The zip code 
also limits respondents outside Wallonia to fill in the survey, indeed respondents filling in a 
wrong zip code were excluded from the sample. As explained by Fink (2003, p.1) “survey 
samples are not meaningful in themselves. The importance of a sample lies in the accuracy with 
which it represents or mirrors the target population”. 
3.4 Statistical analysis method 
The statistical analysis method used for this research is a two-step, covariance-based structural 
equation modeling (SEM). The structural equation modeling was selected because it can 
examine multiple dependent relationships at the same time. The SEM method is applicable to 
study complex consumer behaviour. The first step of SEM is to run a factor analysis to test the 
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validity of the measurement model and the second is the evaluation of the hypotheses with a 
structural model by examining how the constructs are associated with each other. (Hair et al., 
2010). Because the constructs included in the model were adapted from previous research and 
because constructs from previous research were combined to create new constructs an 
exploratory factor analysis is required prior to the CFA to assess the structure among the 
variable in the analysis. The data analysis was performed using SPSS 24.0 and AMOS 24.0 
software.  
3.4.1 Factor Analysis 
The factor analysis is a data reduction technique that has for objective the identification of 
relationships between the variables and then the production of clusters regrouping some 
variables together. The relationships between variables are examined by measuring the 
correlations coefficients. Correlating variables are regrouped into clusters because it might 
measure the same underlying characteristics. Those clusters of variables are called factors. 
(Field, 2009; Hair et al., 2010). The advantage of factor analysis through data reduction is that 
it facilitates the analysis because the number of variables in factors are reduced (Hair et al., 
2010). The factor analysis can be exploratory or confirmatory. 
The Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is a technique used to discover the composition of latent 
constructs (Field, 2009). The EFA identifies the number of factors and measures the strength 
of the relationships between items included in factors and the strength of the relationships 
between factors. Because the current study had adapted and mixed some previously tested 
construct, an EFA will be performed on the data. 
3.4.2 Structural equation modeling  
The SEM is useful to test research model that have multiple equations with dependence 
relationships (Hair et al., 2010). In the current study, there is a theoretically defined dependence 
relationship between responsibility attribution, anger and boycott. Responsibility attribution 
and anger are simultaneously independent and dependent variables. As explained by Hair et al. 
(2010, p. 628): “a hypothesised dependent variable becomes an independent variable in a 
subsequent dependence relationship.” The structural model determines the causal relationship 
between the independent and the dependent variables also respectively referred to as exogenous 
and endogenous variables (Gefen and al., 2000). The structural model evaluates the hypotheses 
that are defined in the research model. When the software is run, the relationship between the 
exogenous and endogenous variables are assessed as well as its significance. 
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3.5 Trustworthiness of the study 
To ensure statistically sound results in SEM, Gefen et al. (2000) and Ding et al. (1995) 
recommend 100 to 150 observations to be the minimal sample size to conduct a structural 
equation modeling analysis. The sample size for this study is 202 observations and meets the 
recommended sample size. In addition, the current study faced validity challenge as the items 
in the constructs necessitated to be translated from English to French. The translation was done 
carefully by selecting the words wisely to convey the same meaning in French as the English 
items did. Back translation was then performed on the French translated items to ensure that 
the translation was optimal (Harkness et al., 2004). The vignette-based experiments were 
originally conceived in French and were the translated into English only to be included in this 
document. 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) argue that research with sensitive topics such as reactions to firm CSI 
are subject to social desirability bias. The current study is subject to social desirability bias 
because respondents were asked to evaluate their own causal inferences, emotion and behaviour 
for an MNE’s supplier irresponsible behaviour. Social desirability is a source of error to survey 
when respondents believe that some answers are more desirable than others (Malhotra & Birks, 
2000). Therefore, respondents’ answers may not represent the reality but are biased by the idea 
that some answers are more desirable.  
As abovementioned (see 3.2.2) the current study collected data through a convenience sampling 
method. However, the convenience sampling method, due to its non-probabilistic form of 
sampling, introduces the risk of selecting only people with similar characteristics and 
background. Convenience sampling convey high risk of a major sampling error. In addition, 
findings obtained with the help of convenient samples should not be used to make 
generalizations for the entire Walloon population. The sample error risk can be contained by 
selecting a sample large enough. The present sample is slightly biased towards young female 
and people in possession of a master’s degree. However, the data collected fulfils the criteria 
for the current study. The exploratory factor analysis results and the structural equation 
modeling results are discussed in the next chapter.  
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4. Empirical Findings 
This chapter presents trends in the empirical data, summarizes the results of the exploratory 
factor analysis and tests the hypotheses with structural equation modeling. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The mean of organizational identification was low (between 2,87 and 3,05) indicating that most 
respondents did not identify with the three brands included in the experiments. On average, 
respondents perceived ZARA (4,40) and H&M (4,70) as exhibiting more CSI than C&A (4,14) 
but their perceptions are somewhere between neutral (4) and somewhat negative (5). The mean 
of the responsibility attribution was neither low nor high (between 3.91 and 4,48) indicating 
low responsibility attribution levels or slightly no attribution. The mean of the boycott 
intentions was rather low (between 3,46 and 3,19) indicating that consumers have no intentions 
to boycott the fast fashion MNEs. Table 6 summarizes per experiments the means and standard 
deviation associated with the measures. 
 
 
  
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Organizational 3,05 1,09 2,99 1,14 2,87 1,08
identification
Perceived corporate 4,40 0,92 4,14 0,89 4,70 0,95
social irresponsibility
Responsibility 4,48 1,30 3,91 1,41 4,08 1,22
attribution
Anger 4,07 1,49 3,64 1,63 4,08 1,44
Boycott 3,46 1,41 3,19 1,43 3,19 1,35
H&MZARA C&A
Table 6. Descriptive statistics per experiments 
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4.2 Exploratory factor analysis 
In order to perform the EFA, the independent and dependent variables must be analysed 
separately and it is suggested that each construct be composed of at least 4 items (Hair et al., 
2010). However, constructs with three items are sometimes tolerated (Hair et al., 2010). One 
construct, anger, had only three items but all the other constructs included in the EFA had more 
than 3 items. Following those rules, the independent variables were analysed together. 
However, the independent variables derived from the experimental manipulations were not 
included in the EFA because each only included one item. Therefore, the EFA was run on the 
organizational identification construct and the perceived corporate social irresponsibility 
construct. Three other separate EFA were run on the responsibility attribution construct, the 
anger construct and the boycott construct. The boycott construct is made of dependent variables 
and should therefore be analysed in a separate EFA (Hair et al., 2010). The responsibility 
attribution construct and the anger construct are simultaneously independent and dependent 
variables because it belongs to a structural path (Hair et al., 2010). In the assumed relationships 
of hypothesis 1 to hypothesis 7, responsibility attribution is a dependent variable because it is 
assumed to depend on the dimensions of causal attribution and the consumer attitude. However, 
in the assumed relationships of hypothesis 8, responsibility attribution is now an independent 
variable because it is assumed to influence anger. Similarly, in the assumed relationships of 
hypothesis 8, the anger construct is a dependent variable because it is assumed to depend on 
responsibility attribution. However, in the assumed relationships of hypothesis 9, anger is an 
independent variable because it is assumed to influence boycott. Therefore, the responsibility 
attribution construct and the anger construct were also analysed in separate EFAs. 
In order to perform the EFA, 202 observations were available per vignette. However, 
correlation coefficients are sensitive to the sample size and correlation coefficients oscillate 
more in small samples than in large samples. The sample size impacts the reliability of the 
factor analysis (Field, 2009). Therefore, measures of sample adequacy for the final factor 
analysis will be considered as suggested by Field (2009). The EFA and related analysis were 
performed in IBM SPSS 24.0. To determine the adequate sample size to perform an EFA, Kass 
and Tinsley (1979) recommend to have 5 to 10 respondents per variable. To perform the EFA, 
the current study has 202 respondents for 22 variables which is a respondent to variable ratio 
over 9:1. The ratios falls into the recommendation of Kass and Tinsley (1979).  
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Finally, another alternative to control for the sample size effect is to use the KMO measure. 
(Field, 2009). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure is a measure of sampling adequacy. As 
explained by Field (2009, p.647) the KMO: “represents the ratio of the squared correlation 
between variables to the squared partial correlation between variables”. The KMO statistic 
fluctuate between 0 and 1, values close to 0 suggest that the factor analysis will probably 
produce incorrect results and values close to 1 suggest that the factor analysis results are reliable 
(Field, 2009). The minimum recommended threshold for the KMO value is 0,5 (Kaiser, 1974). 
As detailed by Field (2009) KMO values between 0,5 and 0,7 are considered mediocre, values 
between 0,7 and 0,8 are considered good and values above 0,8 are considered great. 
The correlation matrix output in SPSS consists of the Pearson correlation coefficients between 
each item included in the constructs and the significance levels of those coefficients. Field 
(2009) highlights the importance of considering the variables intercorrelation when performing 
a factor analysis because correlations between items that are not high enough and correlations 
between items that are too high are source of problems. Field (2009) recommends to exclude 
items for which numerous correlation coefficients are below 0,3 and to exclude items for which 
the correlation coefficients are above 0,9 because they are a source of multicollinearity. Table 
7, Table 8 and Table 9 present the correlation coefficients and related significance levels for 
each vignette data. The correlation coefficients produced by the three vignettes data are difficult 
to interpret because one vignette data may suggest to remove one item but the other two might 
suggest to keep it. As highlighted by Field (2009), the correlation matric analysis is a subjective 
approach and each item should be considered carefully before being excluded. To assess 
whether the overall correlations between the variables are significant the Bartlett’s test od 
sphericity can be used (Field, 2009). If the Bartlett’s test is significant it indicates overall 
correlations between the variables are significant. If it is not significant, it is a cause of concern 
(Field et al., 2009). As explained by Field (2009, p.648), “a significant test does not necessarily 
mean that correlations are big enough to make the analysis meaningful”. However, a non-
significant test is definitely a problem. The three vignettes data produced a significant Bartlett’s 
test. 
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Table 8. Correlation matrix for C&A 
Table 7. Correlation matrix for ZARA 
Item 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
1. OI1 I am proud of the brand successes 1,000
2. OI2 Interested in other's opinion about the MNE brand 0,462 *** 1,000
3. OI3 It feels like a compliment 0,479 *** 0,542 *** 1,000
4. OI4 I would feel embarrassed 0,337 *** 0,420 *** 0,742 *** 1,000
5. OI5 It feels like an insult 0,328 *** 0,409 *** 0,763 *** 0,830 *** 1,000
6. PCSI1 Not aware of social issues -0,088 0,061 0,056 0,082 0,113 * 1,000
7. PCSI2 Does not fulfil social responsibilities -0,304 *** -0,085 -0,151 ** -0,085 -0,094 * 0,459 *** 1,000
8. PCSI3 Does not give back to society -0,330 *** -0,083 -0,164 ** -0,145 ** -0,086 0,454 *** 0,766 *** 1,000
9. PCSI4 Does no act in a socially responsible way -0,364 *** -0,112 * -0,201 *** -0,140 ** -0,127 ** 0,375 *** 0,855 *** 0,812 *** 1,000
10. PCSI5 Suppliers do not respect the workers’ rights -0,255 *** -0,039 -0,133 ** -0,141 ** -0,147 ** 0,406 *** 0,770 *** 0,649 *** 0,830 *** 1,000
*** Correlation significant at the 0,01 level
** Correlation significant at the 0,05 level
* Correlation significant at the 0,1 level
Item 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
1. OI1 I am proud of the brand successes 1,000
2. OI2 Interested in other's opinion about the MNE brand 0,546 *** 1,000
3. OI3 It feels like a compliment 0,536 *** 0,640 *** 1,000
4. OI4 I would feel embarrassed 0,437 *** 0,523 *** 0,801 *** 1,000
5. OI5 It feels like an insult 0,423 *** 0,522 *** 0,831 *** 0,887 *** 1,000
6. PCSI1 Not aware of social issues -0,202 *** -0,108 ** -0,041 -0,110 * -0,076 1,000
7. PCSI2 Does not fulfil social responsibilities -0,194 *** -0,026 -0,063 -0,097 * -0,134 ** 0,526 *** 1,000
8. PCSI3 Does not give back to society -0,189 *** 0,004 -0,075 -0,111 * -0,077 0,498 *** 0,810 *** 1,000
9. PCSI4 Does no act in a socially responsible way -0,187 *** -0,063 -0,102 * -0,151 ** -0,138 ** 0,485 *** 0,893 *** 0,822 *** 1,000
10. PCSI5 Suppliers do not respect the workers’ rights -0,244 *** -0,132 ** -0,125 ** -0,152 ** -0,165 ** 0,496 *** 0,816 *** 0,751 *** 0,871 *** 1,000
*** Correlation significant at the 0,01 level
** Correlation significant at the 0,05 level
* Correlation significant at the 0,1 level
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Table 9. Correlation matrix for H&M 
Item 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
1. OI1 I am proud of the brand successes 1,000
2. OI2 Interested in other's opinion about the MNE brand 0,358 *** 1,000
3. OI3 It feels like a compliment 0,498 *** 0,525 *** 1,000
4. OI4 I would feel embarrassed 0,389 *** 0,402 *** 0,648 *** 1,000
5. OI5 It feels like an insult 0,352 *** 0,367 *** 0,652 *** 0,704 *** 1,000
6. PCSI1 Not aware of social issues 0,038 0,044 -0,040 -0,010 -0,052 1,000
7. PCSI2 Does not fulfil social responsibilities -0,353 *** -0,011 -0,231 *** -0,147 ** -0,213 *** 0,343 *** 1,000
8. PCSI3 Does not give back to society -0,351 *** -0,078 -0,296 *** -0,192 *** -0,248 *** 0,220 *** 0,652 *** 1,000
9. PCSI4 Does no act in a socially responsible way -0,306 *** -0,030 -0,295 *** -0,185 *** -0,303 *** 0,127 ** 0,622 *** 0,625 *** 1,000
10. PCSI5 Suppliers do not respect the workers’ rights -0,215 *** 0,050 -0,104 * -0,034 -0,128 ** 0,221 *** 0,588 *** 0,598 *** 0,593 *** 1,000
*** Correlation significant at the 0,01 level
** Correlation significant at the 0,05 level
* Correlation significant at the 0,1 level
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A factor analysis was performed on the data of the ZARA, C&A and H&M vignettes by using 
the principal components analysis (PCA) (Field, 2009). The PCA is useful to identify the ideal 
number of factors to be extracted from the data and to identify the items that did emerged as 
expected (Field, 2009; Matsunaga, 2010). As explained by Matsunanga (2010, p.99), “the PCA 
provides an effective tool to reduce a pool of items into a smaller number of components with 
as little a loss of information as possible”. The PCA determines whether the items used to 
measure the organizational identification (OI), the perceived corporate social irresponsibility 
(PCSI), the responsibility attribution (RA), the anger (AN) and the boycott (BO) actually 
represent those constructs/concepts (Long, 1983).  
The rotated factor solution was considered for the analysis of OI and PCSI (Field, 2009). 
Because the three others separate PCA performed for RA, AN and BO only extracted one factor, 
the rotated factor solution was not needed and therefore not produced by SPSS 24.0. The rotated 
factor solution is useful because the rotation maximizes the loading of each variable on one of 
the extracted factors but also minimizes the loadings on other factors (Field, 2009). In order to 
determine the number of factors that should be extracted from a set of variables it is necessary 
to look at the eigenvalues. The Kaiser criterion stipulates that each factor with an eigenvalue 
larger than 1,0 should be extracted (Field, 2009). The initial rotated factor solution for each of 
the three vignettes data is summarized in Table 10, Table 11 and Table 12. Table 10, 11 and 12 
only shows factor loadings greater than 0,5. Stevens (2009) recommends that when the number 
of cases included in the PCA is around 100 or above, factor loadings of 0,5 or greater than 0,5 
are significant and that factor loadings below that threshold should not be considered because 
of its potential non-significance. Accordingly, Matsunaga (2010) argues the threshold of 0,5 is 
common is social scientific studies. 
The initial analysis of the rotated factor solutions highlighted one problem: no factor loading 
above the threshold value of 0,5 (Stevens, 2009) were produced for the PCSI1 item in the H&M 
data (see Table 10). Considering the results of the initial PCA results, it was decided to excluded 
PCSI1 from the H&M data. Building from Netermeyer et al. (1991), in order to ensure 
comparability and validity of the results across all vignettes data, if an item was removed from 
one vignette data it has to be removed from the other two. Therefore, PCSI1 was also removed 
from the ZARA data and the C&A.  
.
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Table 12. Rotated Component Matrix ZARA Table 10. Rotated Component Matrix H&M Table 11. Rotated Component Matrix C&A 
1 2 1 2 1 2
OI1 0,574 - OI1 0,656 - OI1 0,607 -
OI2 0,683 - OI2 0,764 - OI2 0,695 -
OI3 0,903 - OI3 0,927 - OI3 0,864 -
OI4 0,873 - OI4 0,892 - OI4 0,835 -
OI5 0,878 - OI5 0,898 - OI5 0,803 -
PCSI1 - 0,611 PCSI1 - 0,650 PCSI1 - -
PCSI2 - 0,915 PCSI2 - 0,937 PCSI2 - 0,850
PCSI3 - 0,871 PCSI3 - 0,898 PCSI3 - 0,814
PCSI4 - 0,922 PCSI4 - 0,941 PCSI4 - 0,789
PCSI5 - 0,862 PCSI5 - 0,904 PCSI5 - 0,824
Item
Component
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
Item
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization.
Item
Component
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
Component
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis 
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After the exclusion of the problematic item, the factor analysis was performed again on the 
newly reduced set of variables. The second iteration of the PCA yielded the expected results, 
all items loaded significantly on only one factor and across the vignette data the same items 
loaded on the same factors. Two factors were extracted one including the items of the OI 
construct and the other including the remaining items the PCSI constructs. The results of the 
final rotated factor solution can be found in Table 13. The rotated factor solutions of the three 
vignettes data are summarized in one table to demonstrate that the PCA ended with the same 
conclusions for the ZARA, the C&A and the H&M set of variables. The items with consistent 
factor loadings across the three vignettes are: OI1, OI2, OI3, O4 and OI5 for organizational 
identification and PCSI2, PCSI3, PCSI4 and PCSI5 for perceived corporate social 
irresponsibility. 
The Keiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was computed and reported for the 
three vignettes data (see Table 13). The minimum recommended threshold for the KMO value 
is 0,5 (Kaiser, 1974). As detailed by Field (2009) KMO values between 0,5 and 0,7 are 
considered mediocre, values between 0,7 and 0,8 are considered good and values above 0,8 are 
considered great. The final KMO values for each vignette data are respectively of 0,815 for the 
ZARA vignette, of 0,806 for the C&A vignette and of 0,837 for the H&M vignette. KMO values 
for the three vignettes are considered great which indicate that the EFA produced valid results 
across the three vignettes data. In addition, the Bartlett’s tests of sphericity were significant 
across the three vignettes. 
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The extraction of the factors resulted in two factors extracted based on the Kaiser criterion that 
suggest that a factor should be extracted for each eigenvalue greater than one (Field, 2009). The 
factor analysis confirmed the dimension of organizational identification (OI) and the dimension 
of perceived corporate social irresponsibility (PCSI). OI had factor loadings ranging from 0,558 
and 0,903 for ZARA, from 0,658 to 0,927 for C&A and from 0,579 to 0,859for H&M. PCSI 
had factor loadings ranging from 0,877 and 0,951 for ZARA, from 0,906 to 0,957 for C&A and 
from 0,822 to 0,844 for H&M. Together these factors accounted for 73,27% of the variance, 
77,84% of the variance and 66,14% of the variance for ZARA, C&A and H&M respectively. 
The factor ladings are consistent across the three vignettes. The Cronbach’s alphas of the OI 
Table 13. Results of the final factor analysis for OI and PCSI per vignette 
Item ZARA C&A H&M ZARA C&A H&M
OI1 0,558 0,658 0,579 - - -
OI2 0,685 0,765 0,704 - - -
OI3 0,903 0,927 0,859 - - -
OI4 0,875 0,892 0,837 - - -
OI5 0,879 0,897 0,800 - - -
PCSI2 - - - 0,925 0,943 0,844
PCSI3 - - - 0,877 0,906 0,832
PCSI4 - - - 0,951 0,957 0,822
PCSI5 - - - 0,878 0,913 0,833
Eigenvalue 3,976 4,028 3,783 2,619 2,978 2,170
% of variance explained 44,17 44,75 42,03 29,10 33,09 24,11
Cumul var. explained 44,17 44,75 42,03 73,27 77,84 66,140
Cronbach's alpha 0,847 0,887 0,822 0,932 0,950 0,863
KMO ZARA 0,815 - -
KMO C&A - 0,806 -
KMO H&M - - 0,837
Bartlett's test sign. ZARA 0,000 - -
Bartlett's test sign. C&A - 0,000 -
Bartlett's test sign. H&M - - 0,000
N ZARA 202 - -
N C&A - 202 -
N H&M - - 202
Component
1 2
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measure were 0,847; 0,887 and 0,822 for ZARA, C&A and H&M respectively and indicated a 
high reliability of the boycott measure because it is beyond the recommended level of 0,7 
(Nunnally, 1978). The Cronbach’s alphas of the PCSI measure were 0,932; 0,950 and 0,863 for 
ZARA, C&A and H&M respectively indicated a high reliability of the boycott measure because 
it is beyond the recommended level of 0,7 (Nunnally, 1978). 
A factor analysis was performed on the responsibility attribution measures because it was also 
combined into one construct for the final analysis. The final results of the factor analysis for the 
responsibility attribution measures are summarized in Table 14. For the three vignettes data, 
the five items included in the responsibility attribution construct loaded on only one factor as 
expected. All items had significant factor loadings (greater than 0,5) ranging from 0,773 to 
0,918 in the ZARA data, from 0,869 to 0,946 in the C&A data and from 0,810 to 0,891 in the 
H&M data. The KMO was 0,860 for ZARA; 0,889 for C&A and 0,876 for H&M. The Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity was significant for ZARA, C&A and H&M. The Cronbach’s alphas of 0,926; 
0,951 and 0,914 for ZARA, C&A and H&M respectively indicated a high reliability of the 
responsibility attribution measure.  
 
 
  
Table 14. Results of the factor analysis for responsibility attribution 
Item ZARA C&A H&M
RA1 0,891 0,926 0,883
RA2 0,773 0,869 0,810
RA3 0,910 0,896 0,854
RA4 0,918 0,946 0,891
RA5 0,892 0,939 0,872
Eigenvalue 3,857 4,191 3,719
% of variance explained 77,13 83,81 83,22
Cronbach's alpha 0,926 0,951 0,914
KMO 0,860 0,889 0,876
Bartlett's test sign. 0,000 0,000 0,000
N 202 202 202
Component
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A factor analysis was performed on the anger measures because it was also combined into one 
construct for the final analysis. The final results of the factor analysis for the anger measures 
are summarized in Table 15. For the three vignettes data, the 3 items included in the anger 
construct loaded on only one factor as expected. All items had significant factor loadings 
(greater than 0,5) ranging from 0,872 to 0,958 in the ZARA data, from 0,924 to 0,963 in the 
C&A data and from 0,912 to 0,955 in the H&M data. The KMO was 0,694 for ZARA; 0,742 
for C&A and 0,741 for H&M. The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant for ZARA, C&A 
and H&M. The Cronbach’s alphas of 0,912; 0,940 and 0,928 for ZARA, C&A and H&M 
respectively indicated a high reliability of the anger measure.  
 
 
 
A factor analysis was performed on the boycott measures because it was also combined into 
one construct for the final analysis. The final results of the factor analysis for the boycott 
measures are summarized in Table 16. For the three vignettes data, the 4 items included in the 
boycott construct loaded on only one factor as expected. All items had significant factor 
loadings (greater than 0,5) ranging from 0,879 to 0,914 in the ZARA data, from 0,901 to 0,919 
in the C&A data and from 0,854 to 0,958 in the H&M data. The KMO was 0,747 for ZARA; 
0,729 for C&A and 0,726 for H&M. The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant for ZARA, 
C&A and H&M. The Cronbach’s alphas of 0,920; 0,928 and 0,891 for ZARA, C&A and H&M 
respectively indicated a high reliability of the boycott measure.  
Table 15. Results of the factor analysis for anger 
Item ZARA C&A H&M
AN1 0,936 0,947 0,938
AN2 0,958 0,963 0,955
AN3 0,872 0,924 0,912
Eigenvalue 2,556 2,677 2,624
% of variance explained 85,18 89,25 87,46
Cronbach's alpha 0,912 0,940 0,928
KMO 0,694 0,742 0,741
Bartlett's test sign. 0,000 0,000 0,000
N 202 202 202
Component
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Correlations of variables 
The correlation matrices of the variables for each of the vignette experiment are shown in Table 
17, Table 18 and Table 19 and can be found at the end of this section. The matrices contain the 
hypothesised independent and dependent variables and the control variables. Before testing the 
hypothesis, there are some interesting correlations that need to be commented on.  
In Table 17, the experimental manipulation organizational distance does not seem to be 
associated with higher levels of responsibility attribution. Contrary to what was expected, in 
Table 18, the experimental manipulation supplier criticality does not seem to be associated with 
higher levels of responsibility attribution. However, in Table 18 still, the experimental 
manipulation company vs individual correlate as expected with responsibility attribution. The 
current study has hypothesised that customers would attribute more responsibility to fast 
fashion MNEs for social irresponsible supplier behaviour when the supplying company, rather 
than an individual worker within the supplying company, caused the irresponsible behaviour. 
The correlation between these two variables is line with the expectations and it is likely that the 
relationship is to be found significant between these two variables. In Table 19, contrarily to 
what was expected, it seems that higher incident outcome severity is not associated with higher 
responsibility attribution by consumers. Indeed, the matrix has not produced a significant 
correlation between severity and responsibility attribution. It is unlikely that the hypothesis 
testing lead to a significant relationship between the experiment manipulation severity and 
responsibility attribution. In table 19 can also be found the correlation between the experimental 
manipulation involving the supplier safety management system and responsibility attribution. 
Table 16. Results of the factor analysis for boycott 
Item ZARA C&A H&M
BO1 0,879 0,901 0,871
BO2 0,908 0,915 0,854
BO3 0,914 0,905 0,906
BO4 0,903 0,919 0,958
Eigenvalue 3,248 3,313 3,045
% of variance explained 81,19 82,81 76,13
Cronbach's alpha 0,920 0,928 0,891
KMO 0,747 0,729 0,726
Bartlett's test sign. 0,000 0,000 0,000
N 202 202 202
Component
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As it was expected, the dysfunctional supplier safety management system is associated with 
higher responsibility attribution. 
Across all vignette and therefore across the three correlation matrices, it seems that 
organizational identification is not correlated with responsibility attribution. However, as it was 
expected, the matrices reveal that higher levels of perceived corporate social irresponsibility 
are associated with higher levels of responsibility attribution. Furthermore, the hypothesised 
consumer reaction process to supply chain incidents seems likely to result in significant 
relationships among the different variables included in the process because as expected higher 
consumer responsibility attribution is associated with higher consumer anger and higher 
consumer anger is associated with higher consumer boycott (see Table 17, Table 18 and Table 
19). 
Across the three vignettes, the control variables seem to have changing correlations. For 
example, female respondents are associated with higher perceived corporate social 
irresponsibility in the H&M vignette data (Table 19) but not in the ZARA (Table 17) and C&A 
vignette data (Table 18). Whether there is a significant relationship between female respondents 
and higher perceived corporate responsibility attribution will be assessed in the next section.  
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Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1. Organizational distance 1,000
2. Organizational identification 0,007 1,000
3. Perceived CSI 0,055 -0,217 *** 1,000
4. Responsiblity attribution -0,060 -0,015 0,376 *** 1,000
5. Anger -0,020 0,052 0,222 *** 0,599*** 1,000
6. Boycott 0,057 0,103 * 0,221 *** 0,491*** 0,781 *** 1,000
7. Gender 0,052 0,003 0,082 0,031 0,065 0,006 1,000
8. Age 0,006 0,039 -0,116 * 0,011 0,104 * 0,130 ** -0,090 1,000
9. Education -0,028 -0,192 *** 0,008 -0,080 -0,017 -0,094 * -0,019 -0,243 *** 1,000
*** Correlation significant at the 0,01 level
** Correlation significant at the 0,05 level
* Correlation significant at the 0,1 level
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
1. Supplier criticality 1,000
2. Company vs. Individual -0,078 1,000
3. Organizational identification 0,024 -0,051 1,000
4. Perceived CSI 0,121 ** -0,092 * -0,153 ** 1,000
5. Responsiblity attribution -0,038 0,196 *** -0,069 0,365 *** 1,000
6. Anger -0,113 * 0,162 ** 0,100 * 0,286 *** 0,687 *** 1,000
7. Boycott -0,100 * 0,138 ** 0,134 ** 0,302 *** 0,611 *** 0,830 *** 1,000
8. Gender -0,046 -0,042 0,041 0,085 0,053 0,046 0,083 1,000
9. Age -0,017 0,001 0,218 *** -0,111 * 0,030 0,113 * 0,107 * -0,090 1,000
10. Education -0,062 0,071 -0,272 *** 0,006 -0,044 -0,085 -0,107 * -0,019 -0,243 *** 1,000
*** Correlation significant at the 0,01 level
** Correlation significant at the 0,05 level
* Correlation significant at the 0,1 level
Table 18. Correlation matrix of the variables for the C&A data 
Table 17. Correlation matrix of the variables for the ZARA data 
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Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
1. Severity 1,000
2. Safety Management Sytem -0,139 ** 1,000
3. Organizational identification 0,014 -0,002 1,000
4. Perceived CSI 0,037 -0,017 -0,270 *** 1,000
5. Responsiblity attribution 0,007 0,167 *** -0,113 * 0,273 *** 1,000
6. Anger -0,034 0,110 * -0,001 0,380 *** 0,594 *** 1,000
7. Boycott -0,001 0,038 -0,078 0,370 *** 0,512 *** 0,699 *** 1,000
8. Gender -0,059 -0,031 0,065 0,145 ** 0,044 0,080 0,019 1,000
9. Age -0,103 * 0,049 0,071 -0,143 ** 0,106 ** 0,131 ** 0,163 ** -0,090 1,000
10. Education 0,015 0,035 -0,141 ** 0,057 -0,015 -0,076 -0,078 -0,019 -0,243 *** 1,000
*** Correlation significant at the 0,01 level
** Correlation significant at the 0,05 level
* Correlation significant at the 0,1 level
Table 19. Correlation matrix of the variables for the H&M data 
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4.3 Hypothesis testing 
After the constructs were confirmed appropriate for the three models through the EFA, the 
hypotheses were tested using structural equation modeling with AMOS 24.0 software. Three 
structural equation models were developed to test the hypotheses, one for each vignette. The 
experimental manipulations were set as independent variable in each model. Prior to the 
analysis of the causal model and the hypothesis testing, it is necessary to establish that the model 
fit is good. At the end of this chapter, Table 20 and Figure 6 summarizes the results of the 
structural equation modeling for each model. 
The goodness of fit of the causal models is assessed through various indices: the chi square 
(χ2), the degree of freedom (df), the RMSEA and the CFI. Table 20 summarizes the goodness 
of fit measures per structural model. The first measure of fit to be considered is the chi square 
to degree of freedom ratio: χ2 /df, the ratio assesses the magnitude of discrepancy between the 
sample and fitted covariance (Hair et al., 2010). Values between 1.0 and 5.0 for chi square to 
degree of freedom ratio indicates good model fit (Hair et al., 2010). The χ2 /df is a good measure 
of fit for models between 75 to 200 cases. However, the χ2 is highly sensitive to the sample 
size and models with more than 400 cases almost always produce a significant χ2. The current 
causal models contain 202 cases each, the sample size should not be impacting the goodness of 
fit conclusions drawn from the χ2 /df. The χ2 is also influenced by the correlations in the model, 
large correlations may cause poor fit according to the χ2. The chis square to degree of freedom 
ration is also referred to CMIN in AMOS 24, this notation will be used in the current study. 
Because the CMIN is affected by the sample size and the covariance, other measures of fit are 
taken into consideration. 
The root mean square error of approximation “estimates the amount of error of approximation 
per model degree of freedom and takes the sample size into account” (Kline, 2005, P.139). The 
RMSEA assesses the model in terms of how close it fits to the data (Matsunaga, 2010, p. 106). 
The lower the RMSEA, the better the model fits to the data. There are various recommendations 
for the acceptable threshold value for the RMSEA index, Hu and Bentler (1998) argue that the 
RMSEA should be lower than 0,06; Marsh et al. (2004) suggest that a RMSEA of 0,08 is still 
acceptable and Brown (2006) recommends not to accept RMSEA value beyond 0,1. 
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The comparative fit index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) belong to the incremental 
fit indices. Incremental fit indices compare the chi-square of the hypothesized model to one of 
a null model. The null model usually contains a model where all the variables are uncorrelated 
and has therefore a large χ2. The CFI and the TLI are affected by the average size of the 
correlation in the data, the higher the correlation, the higher the CFI and TLI. (Hu and Bentler, 
1999). The recommended threshold for the CFI and the TLI is 0,95 (Hu and Bentler, 1999). 
Threshold value of 0,90 for the CFI and the TLI is still considered as acceptable (Russel, 2002) 
The ZARA causal model had a χ2 of 530,683 and 202 df (p-value 0,000). The CMIN was 
computed and a CMIN of 2,627 was obtained for the ZARA causal model. The CMIN falls 
between the recommended range of 1,0 and 5,0 recommended by Hair et al. (2010). The 
RMSEA values was 0,090 for the ZARA causal model. The root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) is below the recommended threshold value of 0,1 (Brown, 2006). The 
CFI was computed and found to be 0,912 for the ZARA causal model and the TLI was 
computed and found to be 0,900 for the ZARA causal model. The confirmatory fit index (CFI) 
is above the recommended threshold of 0,90 (Russel, 2002) and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 
is above the recommended threshold of 0,90 (Russel, 2002). These measures summarize the 
goodness of fit of the ZARA causal model and shows that the model is appropriate and that it 
is likely to have produced valid results. The goodness of fit measures for the ZARA causal 
model can be found in Table 20. 
The C&A causal model had a χ2 of 654,609 and 220 df (p-value 0,000). The CMIN was 
computed and a CMIN of 2,975 was obtained for the C&A causal model. The CMIN falls 
between the recommended range of 1,0 and 5,0 recommended by Hair et al. (2010). The 
RMSEA values was 0,099 for the C&A causal model. The root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) is below the recommended threshold value of 0,1 (Brown,2006). The 
CFI was computed and found to be 0,907 for the C&A causal model and the TLI was computed 
and found to be 0,893 for the C&A causal model. The confirmatory fit index (CFI) is above the 
recommended threshold of 0,90 (Russel, 2002) but the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) falls shortly 
under the recommended threshold of 0,90 (Russel, 2002). These measures summarize the 
goodness of fit of the C&A causal model and shows that the model is appropriate and that it is 
likely to have produced valid results. The goodness of fit measures for the C&A causal model 
can be found in Table 20. 
The H&M causal model had a χ2 of 478,918 and 220 df (p-value 0,000). The CMIN was 
computed and a CMIN of 2,177 was obtained for the H&M causal model. The CMIN falls 
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between the recommended range of 1,0 and 5,0 recommended by Hair et al. (2010). The 
RMSEA values was 0,077 for the H&M causal model. The root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) is below the recommended threshold value of 0,08 (Marsh et al., 
2004). The CFI was computed and found to be 0,911 for the H&M causal model and the TLI 
was computed and found to be 0,897 for the H&M causal model. The confirmatory fit index 
(CFI) is above the recommended threshold of 0,90 (Russel, 2002) but the Tucker-Lewis index 
(TLI) falls shortly under the recommended threshold of 0,90 (Russel, 2002). These measures 
summarize the goodness of fit of the H&M causal model and shows that the model is 
appropriate and that it is likely to have produced valid results. The goodness of fit measures for 
the H&M causal model can be found in Table 20. 
Next, the hypotheses were evaluated. For each hypothesis, the standardized coefficient (β) and 
the related p-value (p) are shown in brackets. Standardized coefficient with p-value over 0,1 
are considered non-significant, therefore the causal relationship is not established and the 
hypothesis is rejected. The ZARA structural model tested whether higher organizational 
distance lead to lower levels of responsibility attribution (H1). H1 was rejected because the 
relationship between organization distance and responsibility attribution was not significant (β= 
-0,080 and p=0,241). The results of this hypothesis were subject to problems because numerous 
respondents answered the manipulation check incorrectly (see 3.1.5). However, the model was 
tested again with the problematic observations removed and H1 (β= -0,83 and p=0,268) was 
still not supported. 
The C&A structural model tested two hypotheses: H2 and H3. First, the model tested whether 
higher supplier criticality lead to higher levels of responsibility attribution (H2). The 
experimental manipulation was coded as a dummy variable (0=low supplier importance, 1=high 
supplier importance). H2 was rejected because the relationship between supplier criticality and 
responsibility attribution was not significant (β= -0,070 and p=0,291). Second, the model tested 
whether the supplying company, rather than an individual worker within the supplying 
company, caused the irresponsible behaviour lead to higher levels of responsibility attribution 
(H3). The experimental manipulation was coded as a dummy variable (0= individual worker, 
1=supplying company). H3 was supported (β=0,246 and p=0,000). 
The H&M structural model tested two hypotheses: H4 and H5. First, the model tested whether 
a dysfunctional supplier safety management system (SSMS) lead to higher levels of 
responsibility attribution (H4). The experimental manipulation was coded as a dummy variable 
(0= functional SSMS, 1= dysfunctional SSMS). H4 was supported (β=0,183 and p=0,010). 
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Second, the model tested whether higher accident severity lead to higher levels of responsibility 
attribution (H5). The experimental manipulation was coded as a dummy variable (0=low 
severity, 1=high severity). H5 was rejected because the relationship between accident severity 
and responsibility attribution was not significant (β=0,012 and p=0,869). 
It was hypothesised that consumers’ organizational identification with fast fashion MNEs (H6) 
and consumers’ perceptions of corporate social irresponsibility (H7) influenced responsibility 
attribution. First, all three structural models tested whether higher levels of organizational 
identification lead to lower levels of responsibility attribution (H6). H6 was rejected because 
the relationship between organizational identification and responsibility attribution was not 
significant for the ZARA model (β=0,062 and p=0,397), the C&A model (β=0,007 and 
p=0,922) and H&M model (β= -0,008 and p=0,917). Second, all three models tested whether 
higher levels of perceived corporate social irresponsibility lead to higher levels of responsibility 
attribution (H7). This relationship was found to be significant across all models. The 
relationship between perceived corporate social irresponsibility and responsibility attribution 
was positive and significant for the ZARA model (β=0,383 and p=0,000), for the C&A model 
(β=0,393 and p=0,000) and for the H&M model (β=0,309 and p=0,000). The three models 
highlight a strong effect of anger on boycott intentions. 
H8 and H9 were tested across the three structural models. First, it was hypothesised that higher 
levels of responsibility attribution lead to higher levels of anger (H8). This relationship was 
found to be significant across all models. The relationship between responsibility attribution 
and anger was positive and significant for the ZARA model (β=0,622 and p=0,000), for the 
C&A model (β=0,729 and p=0,000) and the H&M model (β=0,659 and p=0,000). The three 
models highlight a strong effect of responsibility attribution on consumer anger. Second, it was 
hypothesised that higher levels of anger lead to higher levels of boycott (H9). This relationship 
was found to be significant across all models. The relationship between responsibility 
attribution and anger was positive and significant for the ZARA model (β=0,820 and p=0,000), 
for the C&A model (β=0,872 and p=0,000) and the H&M model (β=0,744 and p=0,000). The 
three models highlight a strong effect of consumer anger on consumer boycott intentions. 
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Impact of gender, age and educational attainment level 
After the hypothesis testing, control variables were added to the models to verify that the 
relationships between the variables were not affected by demographic characteristics such as 
gender, age and education attainment level. The current study tested the impact of control 
variables on responsibility attribution and on perceived corporate social irresponsibility. First, 
the impact of control variables on responsibility attribution is reported then followed by the 
impact of control variables on perceived corporate social irresponsibility 
In the current study, respondents’ gender has no significant impact on responsibility attribution 
in the ZARA vignette data (β= -0,007 and p=0,912), in the C&A vignette data (β=0,039 and 
p=0,549) and in the H&M vignette data (β=0,020 and p=0,772). Respondents’ age was found 
to have no significant impact on responsibility attribution in the ZARA vignette data (β=0,071 
and p=0,311) and in the C&A vignette data (β=0,098 and p=0,155). However, for the H&M 
vignette data (β=0,165 and p=0,023), the relationship between age and responsibility attribution 
was significant. It was found that the older people get, the more responsibility they attribute. 
Nevertheless, these findings were not supported in the C&A and the ZARA model. The effect 
of age on responsibility attribution cannot be confirmed with certainty. Finally, respondents’ 
educational attainment level had no significant impact responsibility attribution in the ZARA 
vignette data (β= -0,077 and p=0,224), in the C&A vignette data (β= -0,051 and p=0,455) and 
in the H&M vignette data (β= -0,012 and p=0,871).  
In the current study, respondents’ gender has no significant impact on perceived corporate 
social irresponsibility in the ZARA vignette data (β= 0,075 and p=0,296) and in the C&A 
vignette data (β= -0,086 and p=0,230). However, for the H&M vignette data (β=0,140 and 
p=0,063), the relationship between gender and perceived corporate social irresponsibility was 
significant. It was found that the female respondents perceived more corporate social 
irresponsibility than men did. Nevertheless, these findings were not supported in the C&A and 
the ZARA model. The effect of gender on perceived corporate social irresponsibility cannot be 
confirmed with certainty. Respondents’ age was found to have no significant impact on 
perceived corporate social irresponsibility in the C&A vignette data (β= -,0120 and p=0,102) 
and in the H&M vignette data (β= -0,126 and p=0,104). The p values are just over the rejection 
level of 0,1. However, for the ZARA vignette data (β= -0,128 and p=0,084), the relationship 
between age and perceived corporate social irresponsibility was significant. It was found that 
the older people get, the less they perceived corporate social irresponsibility. Nevertheless, 
these findings were not supported in the C&A and the ZARA model even though the p value 
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were close to the rejection threshold. The effect of age on perceived corporate social 
irresponsibility cannot be confirmed with certainty. As a precaution, respondents age was no 
included in the model. Finally, respondents’ educational attainment level had no significant 
impact perceived corporate social irresponsibility in the ZARA vignette data (β= 0,006 and 
p=0,938), in the C&A vignette data (β= -0,032 and p=0,665) and in the H&M vignette data (β= 
0,039 and p=0,614).  
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Figure 6. Results of structural equation modeling 
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Table 20. Results of the structural equation modeling 
Experimental manipulations
Controllability
H1. Organizational distance -0,080 0,241
H2. Supplier criticality -0,070 0,291
Stability
H3. Company vs. Individual 0,246 0,000
H4. Safety management system 0,183 0,010
Severity
H5. Degree of severity 0,012 0,869
Consumer attitude
H6. Organizational identification 0,062 0,397 0,007 0,922 -0,008 0,917
H7. Perceived CSI 0,383 0,000 0,393 0,000 0,309 0,000
Structural paths
H8. Responsability attribution -> Anger 0,622 0,000 0,729 0,000 0,659 0,000
H9. Anger -> Boycott 0,820 0,000 0,872 0,000 0,744 0,000
Goodness of fit
RMSEA
Confirmatory fit index (CFI)
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI)
CMIN
Note: N=202 for each model
H&MC&AZARA 
0,090
0,912
0,077
0,911
Standardized 
coefficient β
Standardized 
coefficient β
Standardized 
coefficient β
p-value p-valuep-value
0,897
2,177
0,900
2,627
0,099
0,907
0,893
2,975
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5. Discussion 
This chapter aims to provide an answer to the main research question of the current thesis. In 
order to do this, the two first sections address and discuss the two research sub questions. The 
findings of the research are used to answer the research sub questions and are discussed against 
the theory presented earlier. The third section summarizes the answer to the two research sub 
questions, answers the main research questions and discusses it against the literature. Finally, 
in the last section I seize the occasion to extend the contributions of the current study findings 
by discussing its implications for offshoring by means of the DLE frameworks. 
5.1 Consumer reaction to supply chain incidents 
The objective of the first research sub question was to study how consumer react to supply 
chain incident depending on consumer attitude towards MNEs and depending on the 
dimensions of causal determinations by assessing how consumers attribute the responsibilities 
of a negative event (Weiner, 1980, 1986 and 1995; Lange and Washburn, 2012; Hartmann and 
Moeller, 2014) and how customer’s belief about responsibilities and related emotion translate 
into actions potentially impacting MNEs performances (Weiner, 1995; Folkes and Kamins, 
1999; Bougie et al., 2003; Watson and Spence, 2007; Kalamas et al., 2008; Funches, 2011, 
Lindenmeier et al., 2012) by means of presenting consumers with supply chain incidents caused 
by irresponsible suppliers. This section is divided into sub sections that cover each hypothesis 
and discusses the findings. 
5.1.1 The effect of organizational distance  
It is argued that second-tier, third-tier suppliers and sub suppliers rather than direct suppliers 
are often the starting point of the most severe environmental and social incidents (Ernst and 
Kim, 2002; Plambeck, 2012). MNEs extend their reach deeper into the supply chain increasing 
the number of intermediaries and making supply chain dynamic but also more complex 
networks (Choi & Linton, 2011; Pagell et al., 2010; Mena et al., 2013). Longer supply chains 
are more complex and more difficult to manage than shorter ones (Awaysheh and Klassen, 
2010). There is a positive relationship between a firm’s business complexity and the occurrence 
of CSI (Strike et al, 2006). The more complex MNEs operations, the more likely is the 
occurrence of CSI. Scholars have suggested that geographical distance influences the power a 
buyer has over its suppliers (Elg and Hultman, 2011). It implies that the greater the distance, 
the more difficult it is for MNEs to control suppliers’ activities and practices (Ulstrup et al., 
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2013). The greater the control the MNE has, the greater the chances are that the MNE can 
prevent or foresee the supplier irresponsible behaviour, the greater the responsibility attribution 
in case of supplier irresponsible behaviour (Weiner, 1986, 1995). Because fast fashion MNEs 
have less power over lower-tier suppliers than over first-tier suppliers. Hartmann and Moeller 
(2014) argue that customers should recognize that longer supply chains are more difficult to 
control and to manage. The current study assumed that customers attribute less responsibility 
to fast fashion MNEs for social irresponsible supplier behaviour when organizational distance 
between the fast fashion MNE and the supplier is greater. Contrarily to what was expected, this 
assumption was not empirically supported in the current study. Our findings are however in line 
with previous studies testing that hypothesis (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014). 
5.1.2 The effect of supplier criticality  
Fast fashion MNEs offshore their productions to many suppliers (Doyle et al., 2006). However, 
not all have them have the same strategic importance. Fast fashion MNEs develop different 
relationships with their supplier ranging from close partnerships to distant relationships (Bruce 
and Daly, 2006). Close partnerships between fast fashion MNEs and lower-tier suppliers 
implies that fast fashion MNEs have more information, oversight and control over their 
suppliers and to prevent or foresee supplier irresponsible behaviour. Additionally, Hartmann 
and Moeller (2014) argue that if consumers recognize that the fast fashion MNE and the 
supplier have a close relationship, that the fast fashion MNEs have more opportunities to control 
suppliers’ behaviours then they will perceive the fast fashion MNEs as more culpable for the 
supplier irresponsible behaviour because it failed to prevent it. The current study assumed that 
customers attribute more responsibility to fast fashion MNEs for social irresponsible supplier 
behaviour when the strategic importance of the supplier is greater. Contrarily to what was 
expected, this assumption was not empirically supported in the current study. Our findings are 
however in line with previous studies testing that hypothesis (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014). 
None of the two hypotheses related to the causal dimension controllability lead to higher levels 
of responsibility attribution. The relationship between the number of intermediaries between 
the fast fashion MNEs and the upstream supplier and the responsibility attribution levels was 
not significant. In addition, the relationship between the supplier criticality for the activities of 
the fast fashion MNEs and the responsibility attribution levels was also found to be not 
significant. The fact that organizational distance and supplier criticality do no play a role in 
responsibility attribution may be explained by consumers’ unfamiliarity with multi-tier supply 
chain management challenges and particularities (Hartmann et Moeller, 2014). Confronted with 
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a complex crisis, consumers might not try to untangle the responsibilities and search for a 
scapegoat: the fast fashion MNEs (Gao et al., 2012). According to Hartmann and Moeller 
(2014), these findings demonstrate that chain liability occurs regardless of the organizational 
distance between the fast fashion MNEs and its suppliers and regardless of the supplier 
criticality for the operations of the fast fashion MNEs. 
5.1.3 The effect of company vs individual act  
The fact that an irresponsible behaviour that triggered an incident is caused by a systemic failure 
of a firm rather than being caused by a single worker, leads to uncertainty of future outcomes 
and chances of a similar incident happening again are higher. In that case, the reason leading to 
the irresponsible behaviour is unstable (Weiner 1980). According to Hartmann and Moeller 
(2014), customers are expected to attribute fewer responsibilities to a firm because it could not 
have foreseen or prevented that a single supplier worker would behave irresponsibly (Hartmann 
and Moeller (2014). The current study assumed that customers attribute more responsibility to 
fast fashion MNEs for social irresponsible supplier behaviour when the supplying company, 
rather than an individual worker within the supplying company, caused the irresponsible 
behaviour. This assumption was empirically supported in the current study. Similarly to what 
was discovered in a previous study by Hartmann and Moeller (2014), consumers attributed 
more responsibility to fast fashion MNEs when the supplier as whole acted irresponsibly rather 
than a single worker of that supplier acted irresponsibly. In the current study, consumers believe 
that it is more difficult for fast fashion MNEs to control an individual supplier worker than to 
control the supplying company. Therefore, consumers attribute less responsibility to fast 
fashion MNEs when an individual worker acted irresponsibly. 
5.1.4 The effect of the supplier safety management system  
Gao et al. (2012) argue that consumers expect firms to account for the environmental behaviour 
of the suppliers when making purchasing decisions. Global buyers are expected to monitor the 
operations and the behaviours of their suppliers (Carter and Jennings, 2002). Past incidents and 
scandals have pushed MNEs in the garment industry to develop codes of conduct for their 
suppliers (Soundararajan and Brown, 2016). Codes of conduct are expected to ensure that the 
working conditions are safe and hygienic (Jiang, 2009). Supplier incentive to abide by these 
codes of conduct is for example to secure future offshoring contracts with the sourcing MNE 
(Soundararajan and Brown, 2016).  
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However, the efficacy of codes of conduct is questioned (Soundararajan and Brown, 2016). 
First, it is difficult to ensure suppliers commitment to the codes (Clarke and Boersma, 2015). 
Second, Pinkse and Kolk (2009) argue that codes of conduct lack monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. Third, codes of conduct are often established by Western MNEs and imposed on 
suppliers in developing countries making them passive players (Jiang, 2009). And finally, the 
codes are not delivering large scale and sustained working condition improvements (Locke et 
al.,2007). According to Hartmann and Moeller (2014), customers are expected to attribute more 
responsibilities to firm when there is no environmental management system because it failed to 
prevent or limit the outcome of an environmental incident and because in the absence of an 
environmental management system they believe a similar supplier irresponsible behaviour will 
happen again in the future and causing another incident. The current study assumed that 
customers would attribute more responsibility to fast fashion MNEs for social irresponsible 
supplier behaviour, when the safety management system in place is dysfunctional. This 
assumption was empirically supported in the current study. 
Unlike Hartmann and Moeller (2014), consumers attributed more responsibility to fast fashion 
MNEs when the supplier safety management system was dysfunctional. When faced with the 
experiments with the dysfunctional supplier safety management system, 89% of the 
respondents expected that a similar incident and related outcome would happen again in the 
future and when faced with the experiments with the functional supplier safety management 
system, only 64% of the respondents expected that a similar incident and related outcome would 
happen again in the future. Poorly implemented and poorly performing codes of conduct are 
more expected by consumers to cause or at least fail to prevent similar incidents and related 
outcome in the future. 
It is argued that instead of aiming to produce substantive and sustained environmental and social 
improvements, codes of conducts are an instrument used by MNEs to maintain or improve its 
reputation and to maintain or enhance stakeholder trust (Bondy et al., 2004). The instrumental 
view of CSR (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Pless et al., 2012) and codes of conducts (Diller, 
1999; Van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Brereton, 2002) is widely spread in the literature. Van Tulder 
and Kolk (2001, p.268) argue that the emergence of and increase in voluntary governance 
mechanisms/codes of conduct during the 1990s were the result of public scrutiny and legitimacy 
concerns due to “(tacit) support for oppressive regimes, international environmental damage or 
outsourcing to countries with inferior labour conditions”. The findings of the current study draw 
interesting insights for the instrumental view of codes of conducts. Indeed, codes of conduct 
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might improve reputation and stakeholder trust (Bondy et al., 2004) but in the context of a 
supply chain incident, the current study findings show that only functional and effective codes 
of conduct can protect the firms from customer responsibility attribution.  Although, it is argued 
that a firm reputation can act as a reservoir of goodwill during a crisis (Jones et al., 2000; 
Schnietz & Epstein, 2005) but this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
A positive relationship between the supplier safety management system and responsibility 
attribution was expected and is not at odd with the literature. The findings of the current study 
support Brewer’s (1977) arguments and findings that observers attribute more responsibility for 
highly probable outcome and attribute less responsibility for less probable outcome. Brewer 
(1977) argue that outcome with low or mild severity are highly probable and that outcome with 
high severity are les probable and that responsibility attribution depends on the outcome 
probability. Brewer (1977) also found that observers attribute more responsibility for highly 
probable outcome and attribute less responsibility for less probable outcome. The findings of 
the current study corroborate the second half of Brewer’s (1977) assumptions and findings. The 
primary objective of the experimental manipulations related to the supplier safety management 
system (SSMS) in the H&M vignette scenarios was to find out whether consumers attribute 
more responsibility when they believe a negative event and its resulting outcome are likely to 
happen again in the future. However, by doing so it also indirectly assess responsibility 
attribution as a function of the outcome probability of occurrence. Indeed, the functional SSMS 
suggests a diminution of the outcome probability and the dysfunctional SMSS suggests a status 
quo of the outcome probability. When confronted to a negative event with a low severity 
outcome, respondents of this research have attributed more responsibility to the MNE when the 
SSMS was dysfunctional than when the SSMS was functional. Similarly, when confronted to a 
negative event with a high severity outcome, respondents of this research have attributed more 
responsibility to the MNE when the SSMS was dysfunctional than when the SSMS was 
functional. 
5.1.5 The effect of outcome severity  
Lange and Washburn (2012) hypothesised that the assessment of effect undesirability would 
influence the observer’s assessment of corporate culpability for irresponsible behaviour. 
Previous research had produced findings arguing for a similar relationship between outcome 
severity and responsibility attribution. The psychology literature suggests that the more severe 
an accident is perceived by observers, the more blame they attribute to the responsible of the 
accident (Burger, 1981; Robbennolt, 2000). The presence of this relationship between severity 
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and blame attribution was researched to determine consumer behaviour in the context of a 
product-harm crisis by Laufer et al. (2005). Potentially, the greater the severity, the greater the 
consequences, and therefore the greater the reaction it will provoke (Zyglidopoulos, 2001, 
p.423). Then, incident outcome of greater scale drives greater reactions than smaller incident 
outcome. Building from attribution theory (Lange and Washburn, 2012) and from previous 
studies (Burger, 1981; Robbennolt, 2000, Laufer et al., 2005; Hartmann and Moeller, 2014), 
the current study assumed that customers would attribute more responsibility to fast fashion 
MNEs for social irresponsible supplier behaviour when the severity of the outcomes of the 
irresponsible behaviour is higher. However, this assumption was not empirically supported in 
the current study. 
Contrary to what was discovered in previous research by Laufer et al. (2005) and by Hartmann 
and Moeller (2014) severity was not found to lead to higher responsibility attribution by 
consumers. Laufer et al. (2005) found that consumers significantly attributed more 
responsibility for the product-harm crisis when the crisis was more severe. Hartmann and 
Moeller (2014) found that more severe outcome of environmental incidents caused by supplier 
unsustainable behaviour lead to higher responsibility attribution by consumers to the focal firm. 
The non-significance of the relationship between incident outcome severity and responsibility 
attribution is unexpected but not surprising. Robbennolt (2000) highlights that research across 
the literature has produced mixed support for the severity hypothesis. Walster (1966) was 
among the first to address responsibility attribution as a function of the outcome severity of a 
negative event. Walster (1966) found a significant increase of responsibility attribution for more 
severe outcome.  
Since Walster’s (1966) seminal study, the literature has produced mixed support for the severity 
hypothesis (Walster, 1967; Shaver, 1970a and 1970b; Thomas and Parpal, 1987; Feigenson et 
al., 1997). Researchers have therefore studied the reasons explaining the mixed support of the 
severity hypothesis. It is argued that the result of the severity hypothesis depends on the 
situation which means that observers will attribute more responsibility for more severe 
outcomes if the observers identify with the situation or with the actors in the situation 
(Schroeder & Linder, 1976; Shaver, 1970a). From this reasoning, it can be argued that the 
design of the H&M scenario may have influenced the respondent situational identification. But 
also, that the severity hypothesis depends on the respondents included in a sample especially if 
the sample is not representative of the whole population. Respondents might be less inclined to 
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identify with the situation or with the workers in the H&M scenarios because they do not relate 
to the situation or to the fast fashion workers. 
Additionally, Wortman and Linder (1973) argue that responsibility attribution does not depend 
on the outcome severity of a negative event but on the probability of the occurrence of a 
negative event and that more severe outcome are less probable than less severe outcome. 
However, the H&M scenarios controlled for the probability of an event by consistently referring 
to a factory fire as the sole negative event across the four scenarios developed (see Appendix 
1). The H&M scenarios, through the experimental manipulations related to the supplier safety 
management system, also controlled for the probability that a negative event lead to less severe 
outcome or to more severe outcome.  Furthermore, this rationale has also been contradicted by 
subsequent research. Lowe and Medway (1975 and 1976) found that research participants 
attributed more responsibility for more severe outcome and at the same time did not perceive 
less severe outcome as more probable than more severe outcome and DeJoy and Klippel (1984) 
found that research participants perceived more severe outcome as more probable. Robbennolt 
(2000) suggests that the mixed results to the severity hypothesis might be caused by the 
differences in operationalization of the different concepts across studies. There are various ways 
to operationalize responsibility attribution and severity and those differences might be the 
source of the mixed findings (Robbennolt, 2002). 
Finally, it is important to point out that individuals build attributions based on perceptions and 
not on objective reality (Lange and Washburn, 2012) which implies that attribution is a 
subjective process. In addition, according to Janssen et al. (2015, p.190): “it is worth noting that 
regardless of the actual or potential severity of the damages inflicted, crisis responsibility and 
crisis severity eventually lie in the public’s eyes”. Those considerations shed some light on why 
the results of the severity hypothesis are mixed. 
5.1.6 The effect of consumer organizational identification  
Customers identify with MNE brands with varying degrees. Fiske and Taylor (2008) argue that 
members of a group attribute the negative behaviour of the group to external causes. Building 
on that, Lange and Washburn (2012, p.315) hypothesised that: “an observer social identification 
with the implicated corporation is negatively related to assessments of the corporation’s 
culpability”. Social identification is referred to as consumer organizational identification or as 
consumer-company identification in the marketing literature (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2003). As 
explained by Pérez (2009, p.179): “consumer organizational identification is not the direct, 
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objective correspondence between the individual’s personal characteristics and those of the 
organisation, but it is derived from a subjective sense of approval between both identities.” In 
the context of the present study it means that consumers that identify with the MNE and its 
brand would be more inclined to attribute the cause of the negative behaviour and its related 
responsibilities to the supplier. Furthermore, the literature has produced significant theories and 
empirical findings indicating that in normal conditions (not in the event of an incident) 
consumer brand identification had a positive effect on brand loyalty and commitment (Kim et 
al., 2001; Stokburger-Sauer et al., 2012; Tuškej et al., 2013) and entailed positive consumer 
behaviour such as brand advocacy (Kim et al., 2001; Stokburger-Sauer et al., 2012) and higher 
purchase intentions (Pérez, 2009). Therefore, it was expected that in the event of an incident in 
the supply chain, consumers that identify highly with the MNE/brand would attribute less 
responsibilities, be less angry and be less inclined to boycott the MNE. The current study 
assumed that the more customers identify with the fast fashion MNE, the less responsibilities 
they attribute. Contrarily to what was expected, this assumption was not empirically supported 
in the current study. The way customers identify with the fast fashion MNE was not found to 
have a significant impact on the responsibility attribution levels. The findings of the current 
study may suggest that in the event of an incident consumer identification with the MNE/brand 
does not affect consumer responsibility attribution. 
5.1.7 The effect of consumer perceived corporate social irresponsibility  
Consumer perceptions of a firm influence positively or negatively their behaviour towards that 
firm (Paloviita and Luoma-Aho, 2010, Lange and Washburn, 2012). However, consumer 
perception of corporate social responsibility and consumer perception of corporate social 
irresponsibility are not two different faces of the same coin because the consumer reaction 
derived from those perceptions are distinct. High consumer perception of corporate social 
responsibility might lead to positive consumer behaviour but low consumer perception of 
corporate social irresponsibility does not entail positive consumer behaviour. (Wagner et al., 
2008) Conversely, high consumer perception of corporate social irresponsibility might lead to 
negative consumer behaviour but low consumer perception of corporate social responsibility 
does not entail negative behaviour. (Grappi et al., 2013a). Research has primarily focused on 
positive consumer reaction to CSR (Brown and Dacin, 1997, Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Klein 
and Dawar, 2004; Becker-Olsen et al., 2006; Tian et al., 2011) but more recently the focus has 
been put on negative consumer reaction to CSI (Wagner et al., 2008; Grappi et al., 2013a). 
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CSI information influences stakeholders’ perceptions of an MNE’s responsibilities which in 
turn impacts stakeholders’ attitudes toward that MNE (Lange and Washburn, 2012; Lin-Hi and 
Muller, 2013). In addition, MNEs CSI record affect consumer perceptions of those fashion 
MNEs (Brown and Dacin 1997; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). Previous research has shown that 
perceived unethical corporate behaviour has an influence on consumer attitude (Folkes and 
Kamins, 1999). Lange and Washburn (2012, p.313) argue that a customer perception of a firm 
disposition for irresponsible behaviour is positively related to the customer assessment of the 
firm culpability. The current study assumed that the more customers perceive the fast fashion 
MNE as socially irresponsible, the more responsibilities they attribute. In line with previous 
research (Grappi et al, 2013b), this assumption was empirically supported in the current study. 
The relationship between customer perceptions of fast fashion MNEs CSI and responsibility 
attribution was found to be significant. The more CSI customers perceive, the more 
responsibility they attribute. These findings corroborate Lange and Washburn (2012, p.313) 
hypothesised positive relationship between a customer perception of a firm disposition for 
irresponsible behaviour and the customer assessment of the firm culpability. The findings of 
the current study empirically contribute to confirming Lange and Washburn’s (2012, p. 313) 
theoretical assumption that: “the implicated corporation’s perceived disposition for social 
irresponsibility is positively related to observer assessments of corporate culpability”. 
5.1.8 The effect of responsibility attribution on anger  
Consumers’ responsibility attributions are intrinsically linked to emotional and behavioural 
reactions (Weiner, 1986, 1995). The more responsibility is attributed to an MNE, the stronger 
the emotional and behavioural reactions (Fincham and Jaspers, 1980; Shaver, 2012).  Weber 
(2004) argue that higher degree of agent’s blame lead to higher degrees of anger. Differently 
said, consumers’ causal inferences about a negative event influences their anger level. Previous 
research studying the relationships between attribution and emotion have found that consumers 
that attribute responsibilities to the firm for a negative event, exhibited higher levels of anger 
(Folkes et al., 1987; Diaz et al., 2002; Funches, 2011, Hartmann and Moeller, 2014). The 
current study assumed that higher levels of customer responsibility attribution, towards the fast 
fashion MNEs for social irresponsible supplier behaviour, lead to higher levels of customer 
anger. In line with previous research assessing the positive relationship between consumer and 
consumer boycott, this assumption was empirically supported in the current study. 
Alike discovered by Folkes et al. (1987), Diaz et al. (2002), Funches, (2011) and Hartmann and 
Moeller (2014), there is a significant relationship between responsibility attribution and anger. 
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However, there is a decrease between the number of respondents that attributed responsibilities 
and the number of respondent that indicated they would be angry. Indeed, 61,4% of the 
respondents attributed responsibilities to ZARA for the workforce exploitation in Sao Paulo, 
and 52,0% of the respondents attributed responsibilities to H&M for the factory fire, and 45,0% 
of the respondents attributed responsibilities to C&A for the factory. Respectively, 49,0% of 
the respondents indicated they would be angry at ZARA for the workforce exploitation, 45,5% 
of the respondents indicated they would be angry at H&M for the factory fire, 35,6% of the 
respondents indicated they would be angry at C&A for the factory fire. These findings are 
counterintuitive but not surprizing. There are numerous emotions that consumers can 
experience when confronted to supply chain OSH incidents. The current study acknowledge 
that different emotions lead to different behavioural responses (Watson and Spence, 2007) and 
that limiting consumer’s emotion to anger limits the consumer’s behaviour that will result. The 
decrease of respondents between respondents that attributed responsibility and respondents that 
are angry may be explained by the fact that some respondents that attributed responsibilities did 
not feel angry but experienced another emotion. 
5.1.9 The effect of anger on boycott intentions.  
Sweetin et al. (2013) found that consumers were more likely to punish and less likely to reward 
socially irresponsible firms in comparison with socially responsible firms. They also found that 
the purchase intention and the brand attitude were lower for the socially irresponsible firms 
compared to the socially responsible firms (Sweetin et al., 2013). Consumers are more likely to 
punish or boycott socially irresponsible firms than to reward socially responsible firms (e.g. 
paying a premium for responsible products) (Mohr et al., 2001; Sweetin et al., 2013). The 
current study has exclusively focused on boycott. First, because boycott has a direct impact on 
product sales. Second, because there is empirical support showing that boycott is a mechanism 
used by consumers to hold corporate brands responsible for CSR failings (Klein et al., 2004). 
The major boycott motivation has been identified as being an instrumental motivation. In this 
case, boycott is an instrument used to make the target change or discontinue a detrimental 
behaviour (Friedman, 1999). Klein et al. (2004) argue that negative emotions, such as anger, 
are a good indicator of boycott participation. It is expected that higher levels of anger would 
lead to higher levels of willingness to boycott.  
In addition, Kalamas et al (2008) found that with increasing anger levels, consumers were more 
inclined to deliberately worsen the consequences of their actions towards a firm. 
Correspondingly, anger was found to have a negative effect on future purchasing behaviour and 
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increased levels of anger make consumers less likely to repurchase products from the firm 
(Bougie et al., 2003; Chebat and Slusarczyk, 2005; Kalamas et al., 2008). The current study 
assumed that higher levels of customer anger, towards the fast fashion MNEs for social 
irresponsible supplier behaviour, lead to higher levels of customer willingness to boycott. In 
line with previous research assessing the positive relationship between consumer and consumer 
boycott, this assumption was empirically supported in the current study. 
Alike discovered by Bougie et al. (2003), Chebat and Slusarczyk (2005), Kalamas et al. (2008) 
and Hartmann and Moeller (2014), there is a significant relationship between anger and boycott. 
However, there is a decrease between the number of respondents the indicated they would be 
angry and the number of respondent that indicated boycott intentions. Indeed, only 33,2% of 
the respondents indicated they would boycott ZARA for the workforce exploitation in Sao 
Paulo, and only 25,2% of the respondents said they would boycott H&M for the factory fire, 
and only 24,7% of the respondents declared they would boycott C&A for the factory. 
Respectively, 49,0% of the respondents indicated they would be angry at ZARA for the 
workforce exploitation, 45,5% of the respondents indicated they would be angry at H&M for 
the factory fire, 35,6% of the respondents indicated they would be angry at C&A for the factory 
fire. These findings are counterintuitive but not surprizing. Because, consumer willingness to 
punish corporate brands can be materialized through various actions: bad word of mouth, 
complaint, boycott, etc. but the current study has exclusively focused on boycott. The decrease 
of respondents between respondents that were angry and respondents that are willing to boycott 
may be explained by the fact that some respondents that were angry decided to punish the MNE 
but not through boycott. 
In addition, consumers may be willing to punish corporate brands but they do not necessarily 
know what are the reasons that motivates them to take actions (Carlsmith, 2008). Consumers 
may not be aware of their own motivation and to which extent they desire to punish corporate 
brands (Sweetin et al., 2013). Although this research is not focused on individual consumer 
motivation to boycott, investigating the reasons that motivate consumers to participate in 
boycott might be important to understand consumer behaviour towards firms they perceive as 
acting irresponsibly. Klein et al. (2004) found that consumer participation to a boycott depends 
among other things on: the perceived egregiousness of the firm’s actions, the belief that the 
boycott is the appropriate and effective response, to feel good about themselves if they take part 
in the boycott, the estimation of others participation in the boycott and assessment of the 
available alternatives to the boycotted product. 
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Additionally, the psychology literature highlight the probable presence of a discrepancy 
between stated intentions and actual behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Additionally, 
consumer behaviours are characterized by an attitude-behaviour gap phenomenon (Vermeir and 
Verbeke, 2006). The attitude-behaviour gap describes situation where consumers condemn the 
unsustainable behaviour of a company but fail to translate it into shopping behaviour and 
continue to buy from that company (Vermeir and Verbeke, 2006). In addition, Klein et al. 
(2004) argue that consumers’ participation to a boycott depends among other things on: the 
perceived egregiousness of the firm’s actions, the belief that the boycott is the appropriate and 
effective response, to feel good about themselves if they take part in the boycott, the estimation 
of others participation in the boycott and assessment of the available alternatives to the 
boycotted product. Moreover, consumers might be willing to punish the fast fashion MNEs the 
supplier CSI but they might be unable to express what form this punishment should take and 
the result it should have on the fast fashion MNEs (Sweetin et al., 2013). Therefore, in the 
current study the punishment and its results are limited to boycott intentions and may not 
capture other relevant and desired punishment. These elements potentially explain consumers’ 
low boycott intentions. The findings and answers provided to the first research sub question are 
now going to be discussed in terms of the impact it has on the sales of MNEs. 
5.2 The impact of supply chain incidents on the sales of fast 
fashion MNEs 
Previous research has highlighted the importance of stakeholders such as consumers for 
manager decision making and has argued that stakeholders should be given more attention from 
managers (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). After all, MNE sales performances depend on 
consumers (Grappi et al., 2013b) which makes consumers a crucial stakeholder group for MNE 
managers. Therefore, the current study has adopted a consumer approach do determine the 
impact of supply chain incidents on MNE sales. 
The findings and answer provided to the first research sub question suggest the existence of a 
chain liability effect in supply chain: a fast fashion MNE may be held responsible by consumers 
for irresponsible supplier behaviour resulting in occupational safety and health incident. The 
more consumers believe or perceive that an MNE is partly or fully responsible for their supplier 
irresponsible supplier resulting in a supply chain incident, the more likely consumers are going 
to feel angry and the more likely consumers are going to retaliate against the MNE through 
negative purchase behaviour: product boycott. These findings are important because consumer 
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purchasing behaviour directly impacts MNE financial performances through sales and 
determine to which extent the supply chain incident is going to harm the MNE. 
The findings, suggest that customers punish MNEs as severely regardless of the decreasing 
control MNEs have over their suppliers when organizational distance increases. Another form 
of MNEs control over suppliers and their activities may be derived from the type of relationship 
between the MNE and the suppliers. Close partnerships between fast fashion MNEs and 
suppliers implies that fast fashion MNEs have more information, oversight and control over 
their suppliers and to prevent or foresee supplier irresponsible behaviour Bruce and Daly, 
(2006). Nonetheless, our findings, suggest that customers punish MNEs as severely regardless 
of the type of relationship MNEs have with their suppliers. The current study findings, suggest 
that varying conditions (organizational distance and supplier criticality) of MNEs indirect 
control over their suppliers lead to the same negative consequences. 
Contrasting with the idea of controllability limited to situations of ownership, it is argued that 
MNEs can control supplier’s operations over large distances without exercising ownership 
(Jenkins, 2001) and have sufficient power to control the supplier’s social practices (Ulstrup et 
al., 2013) through codes of conducts, monitoring and third party certification. The findings 
suggest that, in the event of a supply chain incident, consumers punish MNEs less severely 
when codes of conduct such as a supplier safety management system is successfully 
implemented and demonstrate its effectiveness than when codes are unsuccessfully 
implemented and are ineffective.  Nevertheless, despite fast fashion MNEs power and efforts, 
it is argued that voluntary governance mechanisms have failed to improve significantly the 
working conditions in factories of developing country suppliers (Lund-Thomsen and 
Lindgreen, 2014; Soundararajan and Brown, 2016). 
In addition to the findings of the current study, the following considerations are important to 
understand boycotts and their consequences. Klein et al. (2004, p. 92) observed that “as a result 
of greater public attention to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the increased 
vulnerability of brands and corporate reputations, boycotts have become ever more relevant for 
management decision making.” It is argued that modern boycotts are motivated by irresponsible 
corporate practices rather than by socio-political agenda and found that boycott is a mechanism 
used by consumers to hold corporate brands responsible for CSR failings and that boycott are 
typically called by NGOs condemning irresponsible corporate practices. (Klein et al., 2004). 
Ultimately, boycotts “represent a source of consumer power and a mechanism for the social 
control of business” (Klein et al., 2004, p.92). However, consumers may be willing to punish 
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MNEs but they do not necessarily know what are the reasons that motivates them to take actions 
(Carlsmith, 2008). Consumers may not be aware of their own motivation and to which extent 
they desire to punish MNEs (Sweetin et al., 2013). The success of boycotts and the extent of 
their consequences on MNE sales are difficult to measure and to quantify because of MNEs 
unwillingness to communicate on decreasing sales due to boycotts (Klein et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, the study of this research has shown that severity did not play a role in consumer 
blame, consumer anger and consumer boycotts towards MNEs for supply chain incidents. It 
suggests that consumers punish MNEs as harshly for incidents with outcome of low and high 
severity. For MNEs it means that supply chain incidents are going to impact its sales negatively 
the same way even if it managed to prevent a more severe incident outcome or to reduce the 
incident outcome. MNEs way out from supply chain incident related adverse consequences 
reside in the elimination of irresponsible behaviour from supply chain and therefore the 
minimization of supply chain incidents and related outcomes. 
Moreover, as highlighted by Grappi et al. (2013b, p.1820): “consumer perceptions of unethical 
actions of a company enter into the formation of their attitudes toward the company, and 
therefore potentially contribute to a faltering company image and reputation.” The findings of 
the current study suggest the same relationship. Indeed, higher consumer perceived corporate 
social irresponsibility lead to more blame towards the MNE and therefore to more consumer 
anger and more consumer boycotts regardless of the causal dimensions of the supply chain 
incident and regardless of the irresponsible behaviour that lead to it. To protect itself from 
boycotts, decreasing sales and related adverse financial consequences, MNEs must ensure that 
it is perceived as acting responsibly or at least ensure that it is at least not perceived as acting 
irresponsibly by consumers. 
5.3 The impact of supplier CSI on MNEs sales performances 
The first research sub question “How do consumers react to supply chain incidents?” was 
examined by assessing consumer reaction towards MNEs for supply chain incidents caused by 
irresponsible suppliers. The findings of the current study suggest that consumers react 
negatively to supply chain incidents. Indeed, this study found that consumers hold MNEs 
responsible for their suppliers’ irresponsible behaviour and that they experience anger towards 
the MNEs. This feeling of anger stimulates consumers to punish MNEs through negative 
purchase behaviour such as boycott. Therefore, the findings suggest the existence of a chain 
liability effect in supply chain: a fast fashion MNE may be held responsible by consumers for 
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irresponsible supplier behaviour resulting in occupational safety and health incident. Through 
this study chain liability in supply chains was taken to a new context: the fast fashion industry 
and related social issues. This study corroborates and extends Hartmann and Moeller’s findings 
(2014). 
The second research sub question “How do supply chain incidents impact sales of MNEs?” was 
examined by discussing the findings of the first research sub question and especially by 
discussing to which extent consumers boycott intentions could significantly impact MNEs sales 
performances in the event of a supply chain incident caused by a supplier CSI. By means of 
consumers’ negative reactions to supply chain incidents and especially their boycott intentions, 
it was found that supply chain incidents caused by irresponsible suppliers negatively impact 
sales of MNEs. 
The main research sub question “How does supplier corporate social irresponsibility impact 
MNEs sales performances?” is examined by means of the two research sub questions. This 
study found that consumers negatively react to supply chain incidents caused by irresponsible 
suppliers and that consumers negative reactions deteriorate sales of MNEs through boycott. 
Therefore, it can be said that supplier corporate social responsibility negatively impacts sales 
of MNEs. Contrary to the business case for CSR that aims to establish a positive relationship 
between corporate social performances and corporate financial performances and building from 
(Grappi et al., 2013a, Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014), this master’s thesis assumed and 
demonstrated that supplier corporate social irresponsibility negatively impacts MNEs sales 
performances (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014) through consumer boycott.  
The findings and answers provided to the research questions do not mean that CSR initiatives 
does not lead to improved corporate performances for MNEs but instead that in addition to that 
relationship CSI behaviours deteriorate MNEs sales performances. The current study focuses 
on CSI rather than CSR because the relationship between CSR and corporate performances as 
already been extensively covered and because consumers are more exposed to negative CSR 
through media (Wagner et al., 2008) and because they have stronger reactions when confronted 
with negative CSI information than with positive CSR information (Sen and Bhattacharya, 
2001). Acknowledging the coexistence of socially responsible and irresponsible behaviours is 
essential for a better understanding of CSR because it influences consumers’ perceptions of an 
MNE’s, it influences consumer responsibility attribution which in turn impact consumers’ 
attitudes and behaviour towards that MNE (Lange and Washburn, 2012; Lin-Hi and Muller, 
2013).  
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The CSR definition selected for the current study stated that MNEs should be responsible and 
liable beyond legal compliance and that MNEs have a responsibility for their suppliers’ 
behaviour (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005). Because irresponsible behaviour and poor working 
conditions in global supply chains remain a contemporary issue especially in developing 
countries (Soundararajan and Brown, 2016) and because of the weak regulatory institutions in 
developing countries to ensure suppliers responsible behaviours, the present study considers 
that MNEs should be held responsible and liable beyond legal compliance and that MNEs are 
responsible for their suppliers’ behaviours. The findings and answers provided to the research 
questions suggest that consumers play a role in making MNEs responsible and liable beyond 
legal compliance through boycott and related sales decrease. In addition, by holding MNEs 
responsible for supply chain incidents caused by irresponsible behaviour consumers consider 
that MNEs have a responsibility for their suppliers’ behaviour. 
5.4 The implications of the findings for offshoring 
MNEs decision to offshore activities or processes has mainly been studied from a cost-benefit 
analysis or transactional perspective for MNEs (Jacobides and Winter, 2005) and it is argued 
that managers’ evaluation of offshoring efficiency through a firm-centric approach have 
overlooked the importance of the stakeholders when selecting offshoring (Robertson et al., 
2010). Donaldson and Preston (1995) suggest that stakeholders such as consumers should be 
given more attention from managers and that their perceptions are essential for manager 
decision making. The findings and answers provided to the two research sub questions suggest 
the existence of a chain liability effect in supply chain and adverse consequences for MNE 
sales. Consumer negative reaction to supply chain incidents and related adverse financial 
consequences for MNEs suggest a fundamental revision of offshoring through the assessment 
of its advantages and disadvantages. 
Recent research has been concerned with the effect of company offshoring practices on 
consumer responses (Grappi et al., 2013b) and with stakeholder perceptions of offshoring and 
outsourcing (Robertson et al., 2010). That research primarily focused on customers concerns 
about the quality and the information security related to the product or service offshored or 
customers concerns about the loss of job related to the relocation of activities to foreign 
countries and argues that consumers may reconsider their purchase decisions based on the risk 
related to offshoring practices developed by MNEs. Grappi et al. (2013b) and Robertson et al. 
(2010) highlight customer related risks of offshoring practices.  
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I seize the occasion to extend the contributions of the current study findings by discussing its 
implications for offshoring. Therefore, the DLE framework (Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009) 
presented earlier (see section 2.1.3) is used to discuss the findings and answers to the two 
research sub questions in order determine the implications for offshoring. The offshoring 
practices and related advantages and disadvantages are discussed and the captive offshoring, 
the domestic outsourcing and the in-house development practices are discussed in order to 
evaluate how these substitute practices potentially attenuate the disadvantages of offshoring 
while retaining most of its advantages. The offshoring practices are the starting point to discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages compared to other externalization and disintegration 
practices. offshoring is also the starting point because it is the one that was studied by means of 
the vignette experiments.  
Offshore-outsourcing 
The offshore-outsourcing practices, in this paper referred as offshoring are characterized by 
high disintegration advantages, high externalization advantages and high location advantages. 
Offshoring emerges because there are advantages to be gained from decoupling value chain 
activities, because there are economically more attractive regions or country to offshore the 
production to and because there are advantages to be gained from externalizing parts of the 
value chain activities to contractors. As argued by Ghemawat (2001), the garment industry and 
the fast fashion MNEs exploits the economic distance (labour costs) from emerging/developing 
countries to minimize production costs. Differently said, fast fashion MNEs main advantages 
are derived from location advantages. However, Hoffman and Müller (2009, p.245) argue that 
MNE “should not primarily base location strategy on a cost-cutting philosophy. While 
stockholders may welcome a reduction in labour costs, stakeholders who represent the social 
environment of the company (e.g., customers and employees) demand social responsibility”. 
Furthermore, as highlighted in the findings and answers provided to the two research sub 
questions in the event of a supply chain incident specificities inherent to offshoring might lead 
to negative consequences for fast fashion MNEs.  
Offshoring relationships between suppliers and MNEs are contractual and the MNEs have no 
ownership related control over their suppliers. However, to prevent CSI or to ensure CSR in 
supply chains, the present study as argued for the necessary control MNEs should have over 
their suppliers and their operations. Therefore, this paper argues that MNEs must control their 
offshore operations more directly. MNEs control over suppliers is not needed to decrease the 
consumer boycott and related consequences in the event of a supply chain incident but to 
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prevent the supplier irresponsible behaviour that caused that supply chain incident. This paper 
argue that captive offshoring would entail a more direct control over offshore operations. 
In addition, before MNEs succeed in effectively implementing codes of conduct that yields 
significant working conditions improvements in supply chain, the current study findings 
regarding the decrease of consumer boycotts and related consequences when codes of conduct 
are effective might not be of use. Until then, MNEs might be better off developing practices 
that allow them to control more directly its offshore operations. Additionally, the findings 
clearly indicate that consumers make the distinction between the isolated irresponsible 
behaviour of an individual worker or the systemic irresponsible behaviour of the whole supplier 
when assessing supply chain incident. Consumers punish more severely MNEs dealing with 
irresponsible suppliers than when the irresponsible act of an individual worker lead to an 
incident. It suggests, that consumers punish the MNE not only for the incident but for dealing 
with an irresponsible supplier. 
Captive offshoring 
The captive offshoring practices are characterized by low disintegration advantages, low 
externalization advantages and high location advantages. Captive offshoring emerges because 
there is no advantage to be gained from decoupling value chain activities, because there are 
economically more attractive regions or country to offshore the production to and because there 
are no advantages to be gained from externalizing parts of the value chain activities to 
contractors. Therefore, the production is offshored to a subsidiary of the fast fashion MNE in 
the emerging/developing country. In this research, the term subsidiary refers to a supplier that 
is owned or controlled by a fast fashion MNE and also includes suppliers linked through shared 
ownership to the MNE. 
Compared to offshore outsourcing, captive offshoring offers the MNE a more direct control 
over the offshore operations. Indeed, through the owned subsidiary or the supplier controlled 
via shared ownership, the MNE has a managerial control over the offshore operations. Codes 
of conduct are obsolete because the MNE has a voice within the organization that manufacture 
its production and can directly ensure that operations are run responsibly. However, the garment 
industry is characterized by high disintegration advantages and high eternalization advantages.  
It implies that when operating abroad, the transaction costs induced by the externalization are 
lower than the costs associated with maintaining the production within a subsidiary. For fast 
fashion MNEs, the production of garments does not bring added value, garment manufacturing 
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does not entail the creation of core competencies and it is costlier than externalizing it. By 
adopting captive offshoring, fast fashion MNEs would voluntarily relinquish the practice that 
minimize costs the most. This rationale does not make sense in the short term. However, in the 
long term and in the event of supply chain incidents, captive offshoring may be beneficial. 
Indeed, in the short terms, with captive offshoring MNES might lose savings derived from the 
externalization of the production but might be less subject to the adverse financial consequences 
implied by supply chain incidents caused by irresponsible practices. By maintaining the 
garment production within an owned subsidiary or a controlled supplier via shared ownership, 
MNEs have direct total control over offshore operations and decide how it is run.  
Domestic outsourcing 
The domestic outsourcing practices are characterized by high disintegration advantages, high 
externalization advantages and low location advantages. Domestic outsourcing emerges 
because there are advantages to be gained from decoupling value chain activities, because there 
are no economically more attractive regions or country to offshore the production to and 
because there are advantages to be gained from externalizing parts of the value chain activities 
to contractors. Therefore, the production is outsourced to national contractors. 
Compared to offshore outsourcing, domestic outsourcing is also characterized by an indirect 
control over suppliers. However, in this situation, the MNE and the supplier are located in the 
same country: the MNE home country. As it was argued earlier, in the context of the current 
study, for fast fashion MNEs, the home country is a developed country where laws are enforced 
and regulatory institutions are strong. Although, MNEs have an indirect control over its 
suppliers, the supplier is less likely to break the law and behave irresponsibly as it is the case 
when suppliers are located in emerging/developing countries where laws are enforced with 
difficulty and regulatory institutions are weak (Djankov and Ramalho, 2009). In this situation, 
the location of the operation ensures that suppliers are going to act responsibly thanks to strong 
regulations and enforcement mechanism. However, as highlighted earlier, fast fashion MNEs 
main advantages is derived from location advantages by means of emerging/developing 
countries cheap labour. Domestic outsourcing is characterized by transaction costs but without 
the benefits of the location advantages. Indeed, repatriate the garment production that has been 
offshored to emerging/developing countries to outsource it to a national supplier would cause 
the loss of the main advantages that caused garment production to be offshored in the first place. 
Even to prevent the adverse consequences of supply chain incidents and to eradicate 
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irresponsible practices from its supply chain, it is unlikely that fast fashion MNEs adopt 
domestic outsourcing because the cost differential is too important. 
In-house development 
The in-house development practices are characterized by low disintegration advantages, low 
externalization advantages and low location advantages. In-house development emerges 
because there is no advantage to be gained from decoupling value chain activities, because there 
are no economically more attractive regions or country to offshore the production to and 
because there are no advantages to be gained from externalizing parts of the value chain 
activities to contractors. However, in-house development does not refer to the 
internationalization of a firm’s operations per se in the DLE framework because it is 
characterized by low disintegration advantages, low location advantages and low 
externalization advantages. Therefore, in house-development is more relevant in the OLI 
framework than in the DLE framework. Because in the OLI framework it is suggested that the 
emergence of in-house development is due to high internalization advantages, low ownership 
advantages and low location advantages while in the DLE framework it is suggested that the 
emergence of in-house development is due to the absence of three kind of advantages, 
disintegration, externalization and location respectively. As the current study argued earlier, the 
OLI framework developed by Dunning (1980) is a framework explaining a firm rationale for 
internationalizing its activities or a MNE rationale for adopting some international practices 
instead of others.  
Typically, in-house development characterizes firms that have not yet internationalized their 
activities and that are not MNEs. The OLI framework take those firms as the starting point to 
explains why those firms may decide to internationalize their activities and what advantages it 
will derived from different practices. Contrarily to that the OLI framework, the DLE framework 
does not explain why firm internationalize but explains why MNEs have internationalized that 
way. Indeed, MNEs enjoying advantages from offshore outsourcing and/or from a captive 
offshoring and/or from domestic outsourcing might reconsider their international operations in 
the event of changing macro-economic conditions and adapt it accordingly. And in the event of 
extreme changes resulting in the absence of disintegration, externalization and location 
advantages, MNEs would be left with the repatriation of value chain activities or development 
of in house expertise. Briefly, the OLI framework explains why a firm should internationalize 
its activities while the DLE framework explains whether an MNE should continue to 
internationalize its activities and under what form. 
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Adopting in-house development practices to attenuate the effect of or to avoid the consequences 
of supply chain incidents would not make sense for fast fashion MNEs in economic terms. 
Indeed, repatriate the garment production that has been offshored to emerging/developing 
countries would cause the loss of the main advantages that caused garment production to be 
offshored in the first place. As argued earlier, the fast fashion MNEs exploits lower labour costs 
from emerging/developing countries to minimize production costs (Ghemawat, 2001). If fast 
fashion MNEs were to stop offshoring its production to emerging/developing countries, it 
would lose a significant advantage over its competitors. Additionally, in-house development is 
beyond the scope of this research because this paper has studied the effect of supply chain 
incident on MNEs and if firms internalize the garment production, the supply chain context 
disappear.  
After the analysis of the different offshoring/outsourcing practices from the DLE framework, 
the best fitted way to offshore/outsource operations to address consumer negative reaction to 
supply chain incidents and related adverse financial consequences for MNEs while maintaining 
most of the advantages from offshoring seems to be captive offshoring. In addition, thanks to a 
direct control over the offshore operations captive offshoring is promising to ensure the 
elimination of supply chain irresponsible practices and provide sustained and significant 
working conditions improvements.  
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6. Conclusions 
This chapter presents the main findings and the theoretical contribution of the current study, 
summarizes the managerial implications and acknowledges the limitations of the research and 
addresses suggestions for future research. 
6.1 Main findings and theoretical contribution 
The findings of this paper are that higher consumer perception of an MNE corporate social 
irresponsibility, high supplier criticality, and the inefficiency of a safety management system 
are important predictors of higher consumer responsibility attribution to MNEs in the event of 
a supply chain incident caused by a supplier irresponsible behaviour. Additionally, the findings 
suggest that higher consumer responsibility attribution results in higher consumer anger and 
that higher consumer anger results in higher consumer boycott intentions. This study found that 
consumers negatively react to supply chain incidents caused by irresponsible suppliers and that 
consumers negative reactions deteriorate sales of MNEs through boycott. The main 
contribution of the thesis is demonstrating the existence of a negative impact of supplier 
corporate social irresponsibility on MNEs sales performances in the event of supply chain 
incidents caused by supplier irresponsible behaviour. By means of the consumer approach, the 
findings suggest that in the event of a supply chain incident, fast fashion MNEs are likely to be 
boycotted by consumers and to experience negative consequences such as decreasing sales and 
related decrease in revenue. Those findings contribute to existing international business 
research by demonstrating that contrary to the business case for CSR there is a negative 
relationship between supplier CSI and MNEs sales performances because understanding what 
factors impact sales performances of MNEs and whether consumers can affect MNEs sales is 
key to incite MNEs to address their suppliers’ irresponsible behaviour and to eliminate CSI 
behaviour from supply chains. This would therefore resolve supply chain social issues and 
improve working conditions in supply chains. 
Consumer negative reaction to supply chain incidents and related adverse financial 
consequences for MNEs suggest a fundamental revision of offshoring through the assessment 
of its advantages and disadvantages. This paper suggest that captive offshoring is most fitted to 
address consumer negative reaction to supply chain incidents and related adverse financial 
consequences for MNEs while maintaining most of the advantages derived from offshoring and 
the most promising to eliminate irresponsible behaviours from supply chains. Therefore, the 
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existence of a chain liability effect in supply chain is a small but necessary step in solving 
supply chain issues and could encourage fast fashion MNEs to take wiser management decision 
and could incite them to make their supplier improve the working conditions and commit to 
CSR principles and consequently improve and save the lives of millions of workers in the 
developing and emerging economies. 
 
6.2 Managerial implications 
First and foremost, the presence of a chain liability effect in the event of a supply chain incident 
and related sales decrease and financial performance decrease has important implications that 
deserves managers’ attention. Indeed, the chain liability presence and related effect have 
changed the economic equilibrium of offshoring. Managers should operate a fundamental 
revision of offshoring practices and carry out an assessment of the advantages derived from 
offshoring considering the disadvantages resulting from supply chain incident. The current 
study argue that managers should shift the indirect control they have over offshore operations 
towards a direct control of offshore operations in order to prevent and eliminate irresponsible 
behaviours in supply chains that are currently beyond their control. It is suggested that 
developing captive offshoring by means of offshoring operations to an owned subsidiary or to 
a supplier controlled via shared ownership would provide such a direct control over offshore 
operations.  
After the revision and assessment of the offshoring practices and if managers consider that the 
offshoring remains relevant for fast fashion MNEs, the current study suggests that MNE 
managers should work hand in hand with suppliers to ensure healthy and safe working 
conditions throughout the supply chain to protect the workers, to prevent irresponsible 
behaviour and resulting incidents and therefore to preserve their organization from consumer 
retaliation. It is recommended that managers should do so regardless of the size of the supplier, 
of the criticality of the supplier and of the position of the supplier in the supply chain. 
Collaboration between supply chain actors is necessary to improve working conditions. In 
addition to benefiting workers from developing countries, improving working conditions can 
also benefit the MNEs. It is in managers best interest to understand the expectations of 
consumers for corporate social responsibility. Consumers and other stakeholder groups are 
essential to the implementation of voluntary governance mechanisms (Soundararajan and 
Brown, 2016) and therefore essential to the improvement of working conditions in developing 
countries.  
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Managers should ensure that their organization is not perceived as irresponsible by consumers 
because consumer perceived corporate social irresponsibility could stimulate their boycott 
intentions and therefore worsen the negative consequences for the MNE in the event of a supply 
chain incident. To prevent consumers’ perception of corporate social irresponsibility, it is 
suggested that managers work towards improving supply chain transparency by publishing the 
extensive list of their suppliers.  Improved supply chain transparency could help firms to secure 
the trustworthiness of their ethical claims about the origins of their products (New, 2010). More 
transparency in the supply chain about product origins improves customer loyalty and secures 
the relationship between the customers and the brand (New, 2010). Brands such as Primark, 
Nike and Levi-Strauss voluntarily revealed the list of their suppliers. However, firms usually 
argue that the name of their suppliers, and therefore the details about their supply network, is 
of strategic importance and that revealing that information would diminish their competitive 
advantage (Doorey, 2011). 
6.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The biggest limitation in the current study relates to the sampling method used to produce the 
sample. Indeed, this research used a convenience sampling method to collect observations 
which causes the sample to be biased towards woman, younger people and people in possession 
of a master degree. The convenience sampling method is classified as a non-random sampling 
method because individuals from the studied population do not have an equal chance of being 
selected to be part of the sample. However, resource, budget and time constraints restricted the 
use of other sampling methods more likely to produce statistically sound samples representing 
the studied population: Walloon consumers. Therefore, the findings of the current study lack 
generalizability. Moreover, the research focuses on a single country/region. It raises the 
question whether consumers across the globe would have similar reactions towards fast fashion 
MNEs. The inclusion of MNEs with global presence in the research ease the replication of the 
study across countries. 
In addition, to test the effect of organizational identification and perceived corporate social 
irresponsibility, it was decided to design the experiments around existing fast fashion brands. 
The inclusion of these brands rather than others may have influenced the results in one way or 
another. It would be interesting to confirm the findings of this research by repeating this study 
but with different fast fashion brands. The focus was put on the garment industry and fast-
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fashion products, future research could investigate whether different industries and products 
yield different or similar results. 
The finding obtained through the vignette-based experiments are inherently dependent on the 
design of the vignettes and related scenarios. Although, the ZARA, C&A and H&M vignettes 
were designed carefully, the findings may have been impacted by the wording or the 
specificities of the situations presented in the vignettes. In order to confirm the current study 
findings, the experiments would need to be reproduced with new vignettes and new scenarios 
describing a supply chain incident. 
The current study only studied consumer reactions to fast fashion MNEs exhibiting offshoring 
practices, it would be interesting for future research to replicate the current study but with the 
inclusion of MNEs exhibiting captive offshoring practices in order to confirm that the captive 
offshoring is most fitted to address consumer negative reaction to supply chain incidents and 
related adverse financial consequences for MNEs while maintaining most of the advantages 
derived from offshoring. The consumer reaction process developed to study consumer reaction 
in the event of a supply chain event only included anger as the emotion experienced and limited 
consumer negative behaviour to boycott. The next step for future research would be to research 
whether responsibility attribution lead to other emotions than consumer anger or whether other 
emotions than consumer anger also lead to consumer boycott or whether consumer anger lead 
to different consumer negative behaviour towards MNEs.   
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8. Appendix 
Appendix 1. Vignette-based experiments 
Vignette C&A (2x2, between subject manipulation) 
General introduction of the company 
 
C&A is a Dutch multinational retail-clothing company, known for its clothing for men, 
women, teenagers and children. C&A sell clothes in Belgium through its 138 retail stores. 
C&A sources from several factories located in different countries. 
 
Supplier criticality (H4) 
 
aa. Low supplier importance ab. High supplier importance 
  
C&A has been sourcing basic t-shirts from 
the Tazreen Fashion Factory for 3 years. 
During that time, they did not develop a tight 
collaboration. C&A sells a lot of basic t-shirts 
but it is not a product that attracts customers 
in the stores and these t-shirts can be sourced 
from many factories. Therefore, C&A did not 
invest time and money in developing the 
production capacity of the Tazreen Fashion 
Factory. 
C&A has been sourcing blue jeans from the 
Tazreen Fashion Factory for 3 years. During 
that time, they developed a tight 
collaboration. Blue jeans from the Tazreen 
Fashion Factory are among the bestselling 
products of C&A and it attracts a lot of 
customers in stores located in Belgium. 
Therefore, C&A has invested time and 
money in developing the production capacity 
of the Tazreen Fashion Factory. 
 
 
Company vs Individual (H5) 
 
ba. Company bb. Individual 
  
Recently, a fire broke out at the Tazreen 
Fashion Factory, a garment factory located 
in Dhaka, Bangladesh. A total of 117 
workers died and more than 200 were 
injured. The fire was caused by an electrical 
short circuit. The short circuit happened 
because the Tazreen Fashion Factory did not 
regularly do the maintenance of its electrical 
installation. 
Recently, a fire broke out at the Tazreen 
Fashion Factory, a garment factory located in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh. A total of 117 workers 
died and more than 200 were injured. The fire 
was caused by an electrical short circuit. The 
short circuit happened because the Tazreen 
Fashion Factory worker responsible for the 
maintenance of the electrical installation did 
not do the maintenance correctly. 
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Vignette ZARA (3-level, between subject manipulation) 
General introduction of the company 
 
ZARA is a Spanish multinational retail-clothing company, known for its fast-fashion clothing for 
men, women, teenagers and children. ZARA sell clothes in Belgium through its 27 retail stores. 
ZARA designs its collections but subcontracts the production of the garments to several factories 
located in different countries. 
 
Organizational distance (H3) 
 
a. Two-tier supply chain b. Three-tier supply chain c. Four-tier supply chain 
   
For its new collection of 
hoodies, ZARA has decided to 
subcontract the production in 
Brazil.  
 
ZARA appointed the Brazilian 
hoodie manufacturer Nolio Inc. 
This is how Nolio Inc. was 
subcontracted to make hoodies 
for ZARA. Nolio Inc. has a 
manufacturing factory in Sao 
Paulo, Brazil.  
 
Recently, Nolio Inc. was 
convicted of employing and 
exploiting adult migrant 
workers. The migrants had to 
work between 16 and 18 hours a 
day and earned only between 
$156 and $290 a month. 
However, the minimum wage in 
Brazil is $344. 
 
Hoodies produced by Nolio inc. 
are especially shipped in 
Belgium and sold to Belgian 
consumers under the ZARA 
label. 
For its new collection of 
hoodies, ZARA has decided to 
subcontract the production in 
Brazil.  
 
ZARA appointed the Brazilian 
garment wholesaler Hozipa to 
supply the hoodies. Hozipa 
assigned various producers 
from Brazil to manufacture 
ZARA’s hoodies. This is how 
Nolio Inc. was subcontracted to 
make hoodies for ZARA. Nolio 
Inc. has a manufacturing factory 
in Sao Paulo, Brazil.  
 
Recently, Nolio Inc. was 
convicted of employing and 
exploiting adult migrant 
workers. The migrants had to 
work between 16 and 18 hours a 
day and earned only between 
$156 and $290 a month. 
However, the minimum wage in 
Brazil is $344. 
 
Hoodies produced by Nolio inc. 
are notably especially in 
Belgium and sold to Belgian 
consumers under the ZARA 
label. 
For its new collection of 
hoodies, ZARA has decided to 
subcontract the production in 
Latin-America.  
 
ZARA appointed the Latin 
American garment wholesaler 
Texerio to supply the hoodies. 
Latin America is huge and 
therefore Texerio uses country-
based wholesalers to source 
specific products. Texerio 
knows that Brazil is the 
specialist when it comes to the 
production of hoodies. 
Therefore, Texerio contacts the 
Brazilian garment wholesaler 
Hozipa to provide the hoodies. 
Hozipa assigned various 
producers from Brazil to 
manufacture ZARA’s hoodies. 
This is how Nolio Inc. was 
subcontracted to make hoodies 
for ZARA. Nolio Inc. has a 
manufacturing factory in Sao 
Paulo, Brazil.  
 
Recently, Nolio Inc. was 
convicted of employing and 
exploiting adult migrant 
workers. The migrants had to 
work between 16 and 18 hours a 
day and earned only between 
$156 and $290 a month. 
However, the minimum wage in 
Brazil is $344. 
 
Hoodies produced by Nolio inc. 
are especially shipped in 
Belgium and sold to Belgian 
consumers under the ZARA 
label. 
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Vignette H&M (2x2, between subject manipulation) 
General introduction of the company 
 
H&M is a Swedish multinational retail-clothing company, known for its fast-fashion clothing 
for men, women, teenagers and children. H&M sell clothes in Belgium through its 85 retail 
stores. H&M designs its collections but subcontracts the production of the garments to several 
factories located in different countries.  
 
Incident severity (H7) 
 
aa. Low ac. High 
  
Recently, a fire broke out at Khulna Inc., a 
garment factory located in Bangladesh that 
produces t-shirts for H&M. A total of 55 
workers were bothered by the smokes but 
were capable of working the next day. On the 
day of the accident, 6000 people were 
working in the factory. 
Recently, a fire broke out at Khulna Inc., a 
garment factory located in Bangladesh that 
produces t-shirts for H&M. A total of 21 
workers died, 34 workers were injured and 
were unable to work for a week and another 
55 workers were bothered by the smokes but 
were capable of working the next day. On the 
day of the accident, 6000 people were 
working in the factory. 
 
Supplier safety management system (SSMS) (H6) 
 
ba. Functional SSMS bb. Dysfunctional SSMS 
  
The consequences of the fire could have 
been worse. But H&M is strongly engaged 
in worker safety and has developed and 
successfully implemented a Supplier Safety 
Management System. Almost all of H&M 
suppliers carried out renovations mandated 
by the Supplier Safety Management System. 
Following H&M safety requirements, 
Khulna Inc. had implemented a vital, life-
saving feature: adequate fire exits and fire 
exit signs. 
The consequences of the fire could have been 
avoided. H&M is strongly engaged in worker 
safety and has developed but unsuccessfully 
implemented a Supplier Safety Management 
System. Almost none of H&M suppliers 
carried out renovations mandated by the 
Supplier Safety Management System. By 
following H&M safety requirements, Khulna 
Inc. would have implemented a vital, life-
saving feature: adequate fire exits and fire exit 
signs. 
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Appendix 2. Webropol online survey 
 
Appendix 3. Webropol online survey 
148 
 
  
149 
 
  
150 
 
  
151 
 
  
152 
 
  
153 
 
  
154 
 
  
155 
 
156 
 
 
